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Drawing from organizational learning theory, this PhD thesis explores the relationship between 
exploratory and exploitative R&D and firm performance and advances prior knowledge by 
specifying how firm- and industry-specific contingencies influence this relationship. Research on 
ambidexterity suggests that firms should balance exploratory and exploitative R&D activities for 
enhancing their performance (i.e. invest significantly in both activities). Yet, exploitative R&D 
(which relies on existing knowledge and old certainties and includes activities and structures that 
focus on efficiency) and exploratory R&D (which requires distant knowledge and includes 
activities and structures that rely on experimentation) are two antithetical activities with 
distinctively different knowledge requirements and outcomes. We therefore posit that 
specialization rather than ambidexterity might be more beneficial for the performance of some 
firms. Accordingly, in the context of R&D, we examine how balance versus specialization in 
exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D affect firm performance. 
In the first empirical chapter, we test and make a direct comparison between specialization in 
either exploratory or exploitative R&D and ambidextrous R&D strategies. This chapter also 
identifies whether and how the returns to exploratory and exploitative R&D vary for those firms 
that adopt a specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy. It advances thus scholarly 
understanding of how certain mechanisms affect the returns from specializing in exploratory or 
exploitative R&D and consequently firm performance. The second empirical chapter contributes 
to the literature on exploration and exploitation by identifying which specialization strategy 
(exploratory or exploitative R&D) and under what conditions is more beneficial for firm 
performance. Drawing from industrial organization economics, our analysis shows that this 
depends on industry orientation (a typology we develop that captures cross-industry variations in 
the concentration of exploratory and exploitative R&D activities). In the third empirical chapter, 
we contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon by examining how firms change their 
specialization strategies over time. We propose that firm performance depends on the speed at 
which firms switch between specialization strategies in a given timeframe and examine how the 
speed of such changes affect firm performance. This chapter offers thus an explanation that 
accounts for performance differentials across firms that change at different speeds and in different 
contexts. 
We test our framework and hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset of 32,537 observations. The 
analysis mainly supports our theoretical predictions, indicating that the effects of specialization 
in exploratory/exploitative R&D depend upon both firm and industry- specific dynamics that 
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AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Drawing mainly from organizational learning theory (March, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Argyris and Schön, 1978; Levinthal and March, 1993; Yelle, 1979; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Argyris, 2002; Huber, 1991; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Wang et al., 2014; 
Ahmed, 2003; Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004; West and Burnes, 2000; Atuahene-Gima and 
Murray, 2007;  Ho et al., 2015; Chiva et al., 2010) this PhD thesis applies the concepts of 
exploration and exploitation in the context of research and development (R&D) (D’Este, et al., 
2017). Accordingly, it investigates the relationship between exploratory/exploitative R&D and 
firm performance and examines certain firm- and industry-specific contingencies that affect this 
relationship.  
The organizational learning and ambidexterity literatures emphasize the role of exploration and 
exploitation in enhancing firm performance (Benner and Tushman, 2002; He and Wong, 2004; 
Cao et al. 2009, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Wilden et al., 2018; Koryak 
et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2014; Junni et al., 2013). Exploitation largely relies on existing 
knowledge and old certainties, and includes activities and structures that focus on efficiency, 
implementation and refinement. In contrast, exploration requires new possibilities and distant 
knowledge, and includes activities and structures that rely on experimentation, new searches and 
discoveries (March, 1991; Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dover and Dierk, 
2010). This research stream hinges on the premise that organizations that want to achieve superior 
performance must balance exploration and exploitation (i.e. invest significantly in both activities) 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003; Levinthal and March, 1993; He and Wong, 2004; Morgan and 
Berthon, 2008; Tushman et al., 2010). A strategy that overrelies on exploitative activities may 
lead to self-destruction in the long term, mainly because at some point firms over exhaust all the 
possible combinations and alternatives with existing knowledge (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). 
Reliance also on exploitation may foster structural inertia, reducing thus firms' capacity to adapt 
to environmental changes and attain a good position in future markets (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Uotila et al., 2009). On the other hand, a strategy that centres too 
much on exploration may have similarly negative performance consequences by leading to under-
utilization of new ideas, by increasing the costs of experimentation or by generating a plethora of 
uncertain and underdeveloped ideas with excessive substitutability (March, 1991; Levinthal and 
March, 1993; Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Yelle, 1979; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; 











The literature suggests that balance can be achieved in two distinct ways. More specifically, some 
studies emphasise the importance of organizational ambidexterity, suggesting that firms should 
simultaneously pursuit and excel at both knowledge exploration and exploitation by having some 
subunits that are more exploratory while others that are exploitative oriented (Duncan, 1976; 
Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006). In contrast, other 
studies support the view that the simultaneous pursue of the two is not necessary because short-
term efficiency and long-term adaptability are inherently incompatible (Abernathy, 1985). These 
studies suggest that organizations can balance exploration and exploitation using a punctuated 
equilibrium approach, which rests upon the temporal shift or cycling from one activity to the 
other. This strategy involves periods of exploitation followed by periods of exploration 
(Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006). 
Although the debate on ambidexterity versus punctuated equilibrium has not yet been resolved, 
it is accepted in the literature that most organizations must balance exploitation and exploration 
using one way or another (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Levinthal and 
March, 1993; March, 2006). However, despite the above compelling arguments, prior empirical 
research often shows that ambidexterity has either insignificant (Bierly and Daly, 2007) or 
negative effects on firm performance (Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 
2005). Furthermore, statistics from the PITEC (Technological Innovation Panel) dataset indicate 
that many firms do not actually balance their investments between exploratory and exploitative 
R&D, and they instead choose to specialize in one activity (i.e. invest over 66.6% of their budget 
in either exploratory or exploitative R&D). From the 32,537 observations that are used in this 
thesis, 40% of firms specialize in exploitative R&D, 31% of firms specialize in exploratory R&D, 
and only 29% tend to be balanced (invest between 33.3% and 66.6% in the two activities).  
Prior mixed findings highlight the importance of understanding why some firms do not benefit 
from investing in both activities, and whether specialization (rather than ambidexterity) is more 
beneficial for firm performance. Although prior studies have examined the relationship between 
balance (or ambidexterity) and firm performance, we know very little about the relationship 
between specialization and firm performance. In this PhD thesis, we focus on the context of 
research and development (R&D) in organizations and examine how balance versus 
specialization in exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D influences firm performance. This study 
develops the premise that balance and specialization are two separate innovation strategies that 
are more beneficial for certain firms and contexts and less advantageous for other firms and 
contexts.  
Accordingly, we adopt a contingency approach and seek to advance understanding of this 
phenomenon by examining how firm- and industry-specific factors influence the effectiveness of 











study identifies how the usefulness of balance versus specialization changes depending on the 
characteristics of the firm and the environment or industry in which the firm competes. To identify 
such firm- and industry-specific contingency factors, the thesis examines a set of research 
questions that are organized in three groups and empirical chapters:  
Q1: Specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D and firm performance: In the first 
empirical chapter of this thesis, we argue that a reason for prior mixed findings with respect to 
exploitation and exploration and firm performance is partly the implicit assumption of some 
studies that the effects of exploration and exploitation on firm performance do not differ across 
firms that are specialized and those that are ambidextrous. Nevertheless, exploration and 
exploitation involve different and incompatible processes (Chen and Katila, 2008; Benner and 
Tushman, 2003). Hence, the economic returns to exploratory R&D may differ for firms that 
specialize in exploratory R&D, and a similar argument may apply in the case of exploitative 
R&D.  Accordingly, the first empirical chapter of this thesis examines two important research 
questions:  
a) Is specialization in either exploratory or exploitative R&D more beneficial than an 
ambidextrous strategy?  
b) How do the economic returns of exploratory and exploitative R&D differ for those firms that 
adopt a specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy? 
This set of questions offers a direct comparison between specialization in exploratory and 
exploitative R&D and ambidextrous R&D investment strategies. To our knowledge, there are no 
studies that make a direct comparison between specialization and ambidexterity in the context of 
R&D. Hence, it remains unclear whether firms should be ambidextrous or specialize. Equally, 
prior research has not examined how the impact of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance varies across firms that make different decisions with respect to specialization and 
ambidexterity. In other words, we do not know whether the effects of R&D investments differ for 
firms that adopt a specialized (exploratory or exploitative) versus an ambidextrous R&D 
investment strategy, and in which situations is more advantageous for firm performance. This 
chapter therefore aims at addressing these issues.  
Q2: The role of industry orientation: Whereas the first empirical chapter focuses on whether 
firms should be ambidextrous or specialize, the second empirical chapter examines which 
specialization strategy (exploratory or exploitative) and under what conditions is more 
advantageous to the firm. Drawing from industrial organization economics (Dranove et al., 1998; 
Jacobides et al., 2006), we suggest that the answer to this question depends on a particular 
characteristic (the orientation) of the industry in which the firm operates. Industry orientation is 
a typology that this thesis develops to capture cross-industry regularities and variations in the 











may be exploitative-oriented (most firms in these industries specialize in exploitation but there is 
a low concentration of firms that specialize in exploration), or exploratory-oriented (they exhibit 
the opposite pattern), or hybrid (whereby firms pay similar attention to both exploitation, 
exploration and ambidextrous strategies).  
Accordingly, this study examines how the orientation of each industry affects how beneficial 
specialization in exploratory or exploitative R&D is for firm performance. The analysis shows 
that specialization in exploitative R&D has a negative effect on performance when the firm 
operates in an exploitative-oriented industry. Conversely, the opposite pattern emerges with the 
corresponding effect on performance being positive when a firm that specializes in exploitative 
R&D operates in an exploratory-oriented industry. These findings explain why firms experience 
different returns to such strategies when the orientation of their industry varies.  
Q3: Changing specialization strategies and the role of speed: As we discussed earlier, firms 
may choose to either invest simultaneously in both exploratory and exploitative R&D (Benner 
and Tushman, 2003; He and Wong, 2004) or engage in a temporal shift from one activity to the 
other (Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006). In the third empirical chapter, we propose that firm 
performance depends not only on the way ambidexterity is achieved, but also on the speed at 
which firms change their investments from one activity to the other. To enhance our 
understanding of this phenomenon, we examine thus how quickly firms change from one 
specialisation strategy to another within a given timeframe, and how the speed of such change 
affect firm performance. 
This analysis captures that some firms change from a specialized in exploitative R&D strategy to 
either a specialized in exploratory R&D strategy or ambidextrous strategy, whereas others change 
from a specialized in exploratory R&D strategy to either a specialized in exploitative R&D or 
ambidextrous strategy. There are also some firms that change from an ambidextrous strategy to 
either a specialized in exploratory R&D or exploitative R&D strategy. We propose that changing 
specialization strategies may enhance learning and establish new capabilities (Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001), but changing at higher speed between specialization strategies can be disruptive 
and harmful (Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Amburgey et al., 1990). Therefore, firms that change 
their specialization strategies quickly (e.g. every 1-2 years) may not benefit from their learning 
as those firms that change their strategy at a lower speed (e.g. every 4-5 years). In addition, the 
chapter examines the context under which how the negative effect of speed on firm performance 
could be ameliorated. This aspect of the analysis shows that that the negative effects of speed of 
change could be moderated (positively) when firms operate in R&D intensive industries that 
require firms to adapt to dynamic changes. 
The unit of our analysis is the firm. To test our hypotheses and address our research objectives, 











This dataset is designed to monitor the innovation activities of Spanish firms across time. The 
dataset is collected and managed by the INE (which is Spain’s National Statistics Institute). 
PITEC is a panel survey and will therefore enable us to trace not only the economic innovation 
expenditures of a variety of firms that operate in multiple industries, but also control for the 
heterogeneity in firms’ decisions to invest in exploratory/exploitative R&D and their impact on 
firms’ financial performance. PITEC reports the actual amount of money that firms invest in 
internal and external R&D. It therefore allows us to understand the outcome of decisions and 
innovation strategies employed by firms.  
The information reported in PITEC is obtained from postal questionnaires. PITEC provides over 
460 variables for approximately 12,000 companies. We have been granted access to a set of 
coordinated year-based files from 2005 to 2012. After clearing and merging the related variables 
of the years spanning from 2005-2012 and deleting the missing values, the final dataset includes 
32,537 observations. Given that our sampled firms are clustered within industries, a Multilevel 
Mixed Model approach is adopted to test our theoretical predictions and conceptual framework 
(Bliese and Ployhart, 2002; Anderson, 2014; Preacher et al., 2006). This will enable us to test 
both the direct and contingency effect of each explanatory variable on our dependent variable 
(total factor productivity, TFP).  
 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
This study makes a number of contributions to organization learning (March, 199; Cyert and 
March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Baum et al., 2000) and exploration/exploitation (or ambidexterity) literatures (O'Reilly and 
Tushman, 2013 for a review) by specifying how firm- and industry-specific factors influence the 
impact of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance. We extend the discussion on 
ambidexterity by identifying the conditions under which specialization in either exploration or 
exploitation is more beneficial than the equal distribution of resources. We theorize and expect 
that a balanced orientation is not always the optimal strategy for superior firm performance and 
this balance is contingent upon different factors. Accordingly, we develop a conceptual 
framework that extends prior studies by showing that the usefulness of balance versus 
specialization changes depending on the characteristics of the firm and the environment or 
industry in which the firm competes. More specifically, each empirical chapter contributes to the 
exploration/exploitation and ambidexterity literature in the following way: 
The first empirical chapter explains how and why the performance-enhancing effects of firms that 
specialize in explorative/exploitative R&D differ from those firms that decide to make similar 
investment in both explorative/exploitative R&D. It thus shows why the effectiveness of 











similar (or dissimilar) to the specialization of the firm. It thus contributes to research that 
examined the effects of being ambidextrous (Auh and Menguc, 2005; He and Wong, 2004; Jansen 
et al., 2006; Uotila et al, 2009; Venkatraman, et al., 2007; Lubatkin et al., 2006), but has not 
examined if and how the returns from specializing in either in exploratory and exploitative R&D 
might be more beneficial for firm performance, and whether those effects strengthen or weaken 
when firms choose to invest in activities that require knowledge that is similar to the firm’s own 
knowledge base. Furthermore, we show that certain factors allow firms to specialize and achieve 
ambidexterity in the broader network when interacting with other firms (Gupta et al., 2006 
Chesbrough, 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Chesbrough, 2006; Wassmer et al., 2017). 
This view contributes to organization learning theory that clarifies the different types of learning 
and their advantages but does not specify when different types of learning associated with 
exploration and exploitation are more effective in enhancing firm performance, and whether they 
complement or substitute each other in enhancing firm performance (March, 1991; Holmqvist, 
2004; Baum et al., 2000; Levinthal and March, 1993: Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014;).  
Second, drawing from industrial organization theory (Bain, 1968; Schumpeter, 2017; Porter 1979; 
1990; 2000; Mason, 1939; Jacobides et al., 2006; Dranove et al., 1998;), we show how the 
structure of the industry with its level of competition may require a different balance towards 
specialization to counter-act competitors’ behaviour. We thus enhance understanding of how 
firms should invest their resources to successfully respond to competitive conditions. This study 
also differs from prior studies (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006; Jansen et al., 2006) 
because it emphasizes the interrelatedness of external and internal factors for determining whether 
balance or specialization is the most optimal solution for firm performance. Identifying the 
industry-specific mechanisms that make specialization more beneficial enables us to specify 
which specialization strategy firms should pursue and how the industry in which they operate 
may affect the economic returns to this strategy. We contribute thus to ambidexterity (exploitation 
and exploration) research that has not examined how the orientation of each industry affects the 
economic returns to exploration and exploitation for the focal firm.  
The third empirical chapter draws from learning theory and research on temporal effects (Klarner 
and (Raisch, 2013; Levinthal and March 1993; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Hashai et al., 2015; 
Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014; Swift, 2016), extends prior research on the exploration 
and exploitation literature and firm performance in two ways. First, it identifies how quickly firms 
should switch between specialization strategies. This enables us to understand how firms could 
minimize the cost of disruption associated with either quick changes (of a shorter time-length) or 
extreme changes (i.e., from being specialized in exploration to being specialized in exploitation 
strategies and vice versa) that influence firm performance. Second, it increases knowledge of how 











this issue have largely been ignored by the literature, understanding of these phenomena could 
help firms to use time effectively to create a source of competitive advantage (Shi et al., 2012).  
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
This PhD thesis also has important implications for practice as some firms may benefit more by 
focusing on utilizing successfully established and tested technologies, avoiding thus the cost of 
experimentation, while others may benefit more by investing time and resources in exploring the 
potential of new ideas and technologies (March, 1991; Uotila et al., 2009; Bierly and Daly, 2007). 
This means that senior managers need to be aware that under certain circumstances there is no 
need to allocate their resources and time equally between the two activities not only because 
ambidexterity requires different structures and knowledge to manage it successfully but also 
because the usefulness of ambidexterity has some limits (Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Rothaermel 
and Alexandre, 2009; Amason et al., 2006; Bierly and Daly, 2007, Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 
2004). Hence, the results will help firms to 1) develop an optimal exploration/exploitation strategy 
that enhances their economic performance and 2) identify contingency factors that affect their 
performance in current and future markets (Aug and Mengue, 2005; Cao et al., 2009; Jansen et 
al., 2006).  
Second, the results can help managers choose which specialization strategy they should follow 
and how the industry affects the benefits of this strategy. The typology of industry orientation can 
help firms decide whether a specialization strategy as well as which specialization strategy 
(exploration or exploitation) is more advantageous for each industry. Hence it can help them 
develop a better exploration/exploitation strategy that enhances performance by ensuring a better 
fit between the firm and its industry.  
Third, the findings show that two firms that shift between specialization strategies experience 
different performance when they do it at different speeds and in technologically different 
industries. Managers should understand that when their firms quickly shift from one 
specialization strategy to another, they compress learning over a shorter time frame which may 
in turn lead to diminishing returns (Hashai et al., 2015; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Hence, a high-
speed cycling from one activity to the other might actually have adverse consequences for their 
performance. They should also bear in mind that the way in which speed affects their performance 
depends on the technological dynamism of their industry (Uotila et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2006) 
Technologically dynamic industries enable firms that change their specialization strategies 
frequently to enhance their performance. It is thus advisable to change specialization strategies at 
















As the determinants of exploration and exploitation (i.e. what factors may encourage firms to 
balance the two activities) are outside the scope of this PhD thesis, our review focuses on studies 
that examine how exploration and exploitation (or ambidexterity) influence firm performance. A 
key question addressed in this PhD thesis is whether balance (ambidexterity) or specialization is 
better for firm performance. This chapter thus synthesizes prior knowledge and empirical 
evidence about this relationship and therefore serves as a platform for conceptual development 
and empirical testing.  
 
Definitions of Exploratory and Exploitative R&D 
In this thesis, exploratory R&D is defined as creative work and research (both basic and applied) 
that is conducted in the firm as a way to create new ideas, accumulate new knowledge and advance 
understanding that may lead to something new in the firm and/or the market. By contrast, 
exploitative R&D is captured by firms’ R&D expenditure on technological development that 
consists of the systematic work that relies mainly upon the firm’s existing knowledge base and 
which aims at developing new features or refining existing features of products and processes. 
Hence, exploratory R&D requires firms to move to unknown territories and explore unfamiliar 
knowledge, whereas exploitative R&D requires the utilization of already tested knowledge and 
aims at making use of existing knowledge to create new products or refine existing ones. Hence, 
exploratory R&D is closer to what typically some studies in the past referred to as the “research” 
component (either basic or applied) of R&D, whereas exploitative R&D is closely aligned with 
the “development” component of R&D (March, 1991; Jansen et al., 2006; He and Wong, 2004; 
D’Este et al., 2017).  
The above definitions are aligned with the technological innovation literature (Jansen et al., 2006; 
He and Wong, 2004; Smith and Tushman, 2005) and organisational learning (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Piao and Zajac, 2016). According to this view, we 
should distinguish exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D by considering three dimensions: 1) 
their relatedness to existing knowledge, technologies and processes, 2) their relatedness to 
existing markets and 3) their ultimate objective. In the case of exploratory R&D, firms rely mainly 
upon new knowledge, and for this reason, they often engage in experimental work that may or 
may not consider its immediate practical application in business and market. On the other hand, 
exploitative R&D consists of the systematic work that relies mainly upon the firm’s existing 
knowledge base that has been accumulated through repetition and practical experience and aims 











The proposed definitions are also in line with recent conceptualizations of exploration and 
exploitation that stress the importance of repetition and incremental refinement of a firm’s 
existing products (repetitive exploitation and incremental exploitation) and exploration as the 
development of new products aimed at creating new market trajectories and domains (Piao and 
Zajac, 2016). These definitions emphasise the idea that the balance between exploitation and 
exploration lies not on the presence/absence of learning but on the types of learning that occur 
i.e., repetitive and incremental in exploitative R&D versus radical learning in exploratory R&D. 
Nevertheless, our considerations are consistent with the common consensus that the essence of 
exploitation is minor advances and refinements/extension of existing ideas, competences and 
technologies whereas the essence of exploration is search, discover and experimentation with new 
alternatives (March, 1991).   
The definitions that we adopt for exploratory and exploitative R&D are also aligned with 
organizational learning theory and the work of March (1991) on knowledge exploration and 
exploitation. We view exploratory and exploitative R&D as two antithetical activities. While 
exploitative R&D largely relies on a firm’s existing knowledge base, and includes activities and 
structures that focus on efficiency, implementation and refinement, exploratory R&D requires 
new possibilities and distant knowledge, and includes activities and structures that rely on 
experimentation, new searches and discoveries (March, 1991; Gupta et al., 2006; D’Este et al., 
2017).  
 
Disadvantages and Benefits of Exploratory and Exploitative R&D 
The literature acknowledges that excessive exploration (exploratory R&D) may lead to risky 
experimentation, with unpredictable results and distant returns (March, 1991; Levinthal and 
March, 1993) that may affect the firm’s cash flow (Auh and Menguc, 2005) and disrupt 
established routines (Mitchell and Singh, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Abernathy and Clark 
1985, Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Nevertheless, a number of other theoretical arguments 
suggest that exploratory R&D can improve firm performance. First, it can improve firm 
performance by enhancing a firm’s absorptive capacity, reflected on a firm’s ability to identify 
and internalize valuable knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms with adequate 
exploratory R&D, and thus absorptive capacity, function proactively and experiment with 
emerging opportunities (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009). This 
means that those firms are more likely to identify potentially promising technological 
opportunities, make strategic decisions about what technologies to pursue, choose carefully what 
markets to enter and decide what innovative outputs will have the greater commercial value to 
exploit further (Teece, 2007). As a result, firms that engage in exploration are better able to 











Second, exploratory R&D can help firms to enter (or even create) a new market and enhance 
product design (Mitchell and Singh, 1993). Firms can tap into a domain-specific knowledge as a 
result of exploration and experimentation, resulting in superior outcomes and new ideas and 
concepts that can add greater value and utility for consumers, enabling the firm not only to enter 
new market domains but also create new ones (He and Wong, 2004). Finally, because exploratory 
R&D leads to outputs (especially those that involve tacit knowledge) that are difficult to replicate, 
first-mover advantages from having the monopoly of a product can enhance firm performance 
(Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2007).    
The literature also acknowledges that excessive exploitation (investing a lot in exploitative R&D) 
may lead to knowledge obsolescence (Levinthal and March, 1993), foster structural inertia, 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and cause capability rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) that are often 
reflected in lower firm performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Bierly and Daly, 2007).  Yet, despite 
these negative effects, exploitation comes with significant benefits. First, the returns to 
exploitative R&D are proximate in time and more predictable (March, 1991). The dual 
conceptualization of exploitation as repetitive and incremental supports this line of thinking and 
indicates that while incremental exploitation creates better products or services, repetitive 
exploitation achieves efficiency gains by reducing the cost and improving quality due to repetitive 
engagement with the same tasks (Piao and Zajac, 2016). Regardless of the nature of exploitation 
(repetitive or incremental), investments in exploitative activities are likely to enhance firm 
performance because firms operate within their comfort zone, shifting from existing product lines 
to product extensions (Morgan and Berthon, 2008). 
Second, as firms engage in further exploitative activities, building further confidence on areas of 
already established capabilities (Baum et al., 2000), making their subsequent exploitation in the 
same field more efficient (Levinthal and March, 1993). Hence, exploitative R&D not only creates 
reliability through refinement and routinization, but it can also extend the life cycle of 
technologies and generate a stream of sales for longer. Third, because exploitative outcomes are 
familiar to both the innovating firm and its customers, their commercialization is less risky 
(Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Finally, the economies of scale, scope and learning in exploitative 
strategies are high, enhancing thus firm’s performance (Auh and Menguc, 2005).  
 
Exploratory and Exploitative R&D and Firm Performance?  
As explained a key question this PhD thesis explores is how (the mechanisms) and the context 
(when) which balance (ambidexterity) or specialization is more beneficial for firm performance. 
In this section thus, we synthesize prior empirical results that explore the effects of exploration, 
exploitation and ambidexterity on firm performance.  











effect on firm performance (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013 for a 
review). He and Wong (2004) test the ambidexterity hypothesis at the firm level in the context of 
technological innovation. Using data from 206 manufacturing firms, they find a positive effect of 
exploration and exploitation on firm performance (sales growth). Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), 
based on data collected from 4,195 individuals in 41 firm units, also show that the capacity of the 
firm to be aligned with existing demands and be adaptable to emerging environmental changes 
impacts significantly its performance. Along the same lines, Lubatkin et al., (2006) indicate that 
that the joint pursuit of exploratory and exploitative activities affects positively the performance 
of small-to-medium enterprises.  Similarly, a recent study considered the viability of the 
ambidexterity hypothesis in buyer-supplier relationships (Aoki and Wilhelm, 2017). Specifically, 
through the case study of Toyota Motor Corporation, the authors illustrate that the firm can be 
ambidextrous by simultaneously achieving mass production with exploitative focus and product 
development with exploratory focus, thus counteracting tendencies to overemphasise either 
exploration or exploitation. 
By contrast, other studies find either an insignificant or even a negative effect on firm 
performance (Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; Amason et al., 2006; Ebben and Johnson, 2005). 
For instance, some of these studies suggest that attempts to be both efficient (exploitative-
oriented) and flexible (exploratory-oriented) to customer demands impact negatively the 
performance of small firms (Ebben and Johnson, 2005). Other studies do not find any effect of 
ambidexterity on firm performance (Bierly and Daly, 2007). They suggest instead that exploration 
and exploitation have a differential effect on performance, showing that there is a linear and 
positive relationship between exploration and performance, and a concave relationship between 
exploitation and firm performance, indicating diminishing returns to exploitation after a point 
(Bierly and Daly, 2007).  
The fact that some studies find a positive effect of balancing exploratory and exploitative 
activities (being ambidextrous) while other studies point to an insignificant or negative effect 
indicates that there is no universal relationship between balance (ambidexterity) and firm 
performance. This in turn, suggests that a number of moderating factors may influence the impact 
of exploration and exploitation on firm performance (Junni et al., 2013), and that the usefulness 
of ambidexterity might be contingent upon firm- and industry-specific idiosyncrasies. The 
following sections therefore review what we know about such contingencies (moderators).  
 
FIRM-SPECIFIC MODERATING FACTORS 
Although one would expect the benefits of exploratory and exploitative activities (i.e., exploratory 
R&D/exploitative R&D used interchangeable with the terms exploration and exploitation) to 











moderate the relationship between exploration, exploitation and firm performance. This Phd 
thesis classifies the moderators of this relationship into two distinct groups (firm-specific and 
industry-specific) that in turn, help us understand the conditions under which firms achieve 
superior performance outcomes.  
 
The Role of Firm Resources and Firm Size 
A firm-specific moderator of the relationship between exploration, exploitation and firm 
performance is firm resources. Firms with rich resources have the ability to both exploit and 
explore (Cao et al., 2009), whereas firms with scarce resources are more likely to end up worse- 
off from adopting a mixed strategy (Ebben and Johnson, 2005). Similarly, larger firms are more 
likely to have access to a larger pool of resources compared to smaller firms (Chen and Hambrick, 
1995). Since the large size of the firm is often associated with abundance in resources (Cao et al., 
2009), larger firms can achieve a balanced orientation more effectively, exploiting and exploring 
simultaneously. By contrast, smaller firms with fewer resources may be less successful when they 
attempt to be ambidextrous.  
Reinforcing this line of thinking, Cao et al. (2009) suggests that firm performance is contingent 
upon the firm’s size, emphasising that size is indicative of the resources a firm possesses. The 
importance of resources is that they can mitigate the negative effects caused on firm performance 
when imbalances between exploration and exploitation occur (Cao et al., 2009). For instance, 
over exploitation may lead to knowledge obsolescence, whereas over exploration compromises 
the immediate cash flow of the firm due to continuous experimentation with novelties (Teece, 
1986). These risks however are less threatening for larger firms because the possession of 
abundant internal resources provides them with a buffer to neutralize the negative effects caused 
by imbalances in exploratory and exploitative activities. By contrast, smaller firms are more 
vulnerable and exposed to these risks because of their limited resources to cushion these risks 
(Cao et al., 2009).  
Large firms with more resources are more capable of achieving structural separation, allowing 
their exploitative units to apply existing knowledge to refine characteristics of products in order 
to increase the efficiency of both organizational routines and products (Benner and Tushman, 
2003, March, 1991), and exploratory units to deal with knowledge that is external to the firm that 
can potentially create breakthrough innovations (McGrath, 2001). Therefore, greater resources 
could secure high levels of engagement in both exploration and exploitation enhancing firm 
performance. By contrast, when a firm has inadequate resources to deploy, it will have to decide 
how much and on which activity it will invest. It is likely that either one or both will be deprived 
of essential resources. Hence, optimal firm performance may be contingent upon the resources 











(Bourgeouis, 1981).  
Similarly, the external resources to which firms have access to can moderate the relationship 
between exploration exploitation and firm performance (Cao et al., 2009). Drawing on theories 
of organisational behaviour, the authors suggest that when firms have access to abundant external 
resources they can more easily obtain the resources needed to carry out innovations due to their 
larger quantity and multiple offerings (Dess and Beard, 1984). For instance, resources such as 
technological knowledge and industry related information could be accessed through alliances 
with external parties (Powell et al., 1996; Wassmer et al., 2017). An alliance strategy is an 
attractive alternative to firms that focus on either exploration or exploitation. This strategic 
decision allows firms to enjoy the benefits of focusing on one activity without being penalised 
from not investing in the other (Gupta et al., 2006; Wassmer et al., 2017; Choi and McNamara, 
2018). Therefore, the resources possessed by a firm and the external resources the firms have 
access to work in conjunction to influence its performance (Cao et al., 2009). These findings 
indicate that firm performance is contingent upon the availability of internal and external 
resources and therefore on the size of the firm.  
The relationship between exploration/exploitation and firm performance may also be moderated 
by a firm’s organisational slack (Voss, 2008; Lavie et al., 2010; Luger et al., 2018). Consistent 
with the above line of thinking, firms with high levels of unabsorbed slack (defined as unutilized 
and ready to deploy assets; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) can simultaneously explore and exploit.  
Nevertheless, Luger et al., 2018 suggest that firms with slack resources could maintain a balance 
between exploration/exploitation even if this balance proves harmful for their performance. This 
study emphasizes that firms with slack resources can insulate themselves from the negative effects 
from choosing not to align (adapt) their investments with the needs of the environment, 
overlooking weak signals that point to adaptation strategies.  
 
The Role of a Firm’s Market Orientation 
Another firm-specific moderator of the relationship between exploration, exploitation and firm 
performance is the market orientation that the firm chooses to adopt (Kyriakopoulos and 
Moorman, 2004; Atuahene-Gima, 2005). Market orientation refers to the firm’s ability to predict 
and respond to market needs ahead of its competitors, while serving and creating value for its 
current and emerging customers (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Slater and Narver, 1999). Results 
from a research on 75 Dutch business units of packaged food producers reveal that strong market 
orientation facilitates a complementarity of both exploratory and exploitative marketing 
strategies, which in turn, results in better financial performance of the product (Kyriakopoulos 
and Moorman, 2004). By contrast, firms with weak market orientation exhibit a reduction in 











In explaining how market orientation moderates the effects of exploration, exploitation and firm 
performance, the authors suggest that market-oriented firms i) are customer-led, implying that 
those firms are proactive to customer demands and reactive to their expectations, ii) act as a bridge 
that ensures that information from exploitative activities flows to relevant parts of the 
organization in order to be utilized, and iii) can respond to the external environment, sensing 
trends, and predicting competitors behaviours by interpreting incoming information (Day, 1994).  
Similarly, market orientation also moderates positively the relationship between exploration, 
exploitation and firm performance by affecting managerial choices regarding resource allocation 
(Atuahene-Gima, 2005). Market-oriented firms are more likely to have a closer interaction with 
the market, and thus greater market knowledge with which they can easily identify capability 
deficiencies and emerging opportunities that necessitate the investment on new capabilities. For 
this reason, market-oriented firms are likely to build stronger internal competences that enable 
them to make wiser judgments in resource allocation (Atuahene-Gima, 2005). Therefore, market-
oriented firms are more sensitive to environmental cues and such sensitivity allows them to 
identify opportunities for enhancing their performance. These characteristics of market-oriented 
firms facilitate an ambidextrous orientation of both exploratory and exploitative strategies that 
enhances firm performance.  
 
The Role of the Leadership Team Characteristics and Team Composition 
Another firm-specific moderator of the relationship between exploration, exploitation and firm 
performance is the characteristics of the leadership team (Lubatkin et al., 2006). This study 
assessed the behavioral integration of the top management team using three dimensions: i) the 
level of the team’s collaborative behavior, ii) the quantity and quality of information exchanged, 
and iii) the team’s emphasis on joint decision making. The authors found support for the 
moderating role of the top management team’s (TMTs) behavioral integration. The explanation 
behind these results is that behaviorally integrated TMTs act as a forum in which senior managers 
exchange knowledge, resolve conflicts, and create a set of shared perceptions, that facilitate firm’s 
gravitation towards a balanced orientation (Lubatkin et al., 2006, p.652). Thus, behavioral 
integration allows the TMT to be sensitive to market needs by combining information and insights 
to develop and strengthen internal capabilities that are essential for incremental and radical 
innovations (Hambrick et al., 1998).  
Further, a recent study on managers characteristics in promoting an exploratory/exploitative or 
ambidextrous orientation indicates that managers play a far more important and configurational 
role in adopting and promoting a specific perspective that is different from prior established 
design perspectives on ambidexterity (Zimmermann et al., 2018). Along the same lines, a recent 











expertise breadth, external connectivity, empowering leadership (Wang et al., 2018) in supporting 
temporal ambidexterity. The results indicate that these specific managerial capabilities promote 
ambidexterity especially in the context of young ventures. In line with the behavioural 
characteristics of the TMT, recent work (Koryak et al., 2018) considers the effect of TMT 
heterogeneity on exploration and exploitation expanding this discussion on considering the 
moderating role of team size in the relationship. The study concludes that team heterogeneity is 
beneficial in management that requires creative thinking and experimentation with new 
alternatives (i.e., exploratory activities)	
Beyond team characteristics to either explore or exploit, other studies indicate that manager-level 
attributes to allocate resources and time evenly between exploratory and exploitative activities 
reflect their ambidextrous predispositions (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). Although individual 
level characteristics that predispose either an exploratory/ exploitative or ambidextrous behaviour 
is beyond the scope of this thesis we believe that a network perspective on individual- 
ambidexterity is important in demonstrating that ambidexterity may be more viable when 
interacting or accessing resources that are of limited supply at the firm/Individual level.  
For instance, Rogan and Mors (2014) rather than viewing the individual as a single unit that works 
in isolation, they conceptualize them as agents embedded in networks. This echoes the idea of 
Gupta et al., (2006) who view firms as units operating in a wider network of firms. The importance 
of these two conceptualizations that is emphasized in network theory is that the actions of firms 
and thus individuals working in them are shaped by those networks they are embedded in (i.e., 
their interactions, knowledge flows and actions of others constitute a part of this network). This 
consideration is important because the exploration/exploitation distribution (or behaviours at the 
manager level) could be moderated by the interactions, information flows, and actions of other 
firms in the network. Thus, network dynamics may affect the relationship between firms 
exploratory/exploitative or ambidextrous behaviour and activity.  
 
The Role of the Firm’s Learning Mode 
Prior research has also shown that exploration and exploitation have a different effect on firm 
performance that is contingent upon the firm’s current learning mode and it is more prominent 
when competition intensifies (Auh and Menguc, 2005). Specifically, the effects of exploration 
and exploitation on firm performance vary depending upon firms’ current learning mode; namely 
exploratory-oriented (i.e., prospectors) or exploitative-oriented (i.e., defenders). The effect of 
exploration on firm performance increases for defenders when competitive pressure increases, 
whilst it reduces for prospectors. Therefore, exploitative-oriented firms are more likely to benefit 
from exploration, whereas exploratory-oriented firms from exploitation. The explanation is that 











exploratory activity will compromise the short-term profitability and cash flow of the firm 
(March, 1991), which is an argument that is consistent with a curvilinear-effects logic.  
 Exploitation however might be more beneficial to secure the firm’s current income. By contrast, 
exploitative firms are more likely to have greater economic returns from exploratory activity as a 
means to achieve their differentiation. The justification is that because exploitative firms already 
invest more resources on exploitation, their further engagement with exploitation will only serve 
to neutralise competitors’ actions (Auh and Menguc, 2005). Responding therefore to competitors 
behaviour with similar activities, such as price-cutting strategies and imitating techniques will 
simply provoke their replicative behaviour.  
Implicit in this argument is that the performance effect of exploration and exploitation is different 
for exploratory and exploitative firms when competition increases. When competition intensifies, 
defenders should respond by skewing the balance towards exploratory activities to increase their 
performance. By contrast, prospectors are likely to benefit from exploitation. These findings 
suggest that the learning mode of the firm will impact differentially its performance and 
cautiously direct firms to respond differently in competitive conditions, increasing accordingly 
their exploratory or exploitative activities. They further indicate that the equal distribution of 
resources on both exploratory and exploitative activities may not always be the optimal way to 
achieve superior performance, pointing that under different contextual conditions (e.g., 
competition) and firm-idiosyncratic characteristics (i.e., learning mode), the optimal balance 
might necessitate an “imbalance” to improve performance.  
Further, a recent study on technological acquisitions explored the moderating role of a firm’s 
acquisition rate in the relationship between a firm’s exploration or exploitation orientation and 
subsequent behaviour (integrated versus independent knowledge leverage behaviour; Choi and 
McNamara, 2018). This line of thinking indicates that acquiring firms with exploitative trajectory 
are likely to utilize and integrate their existing knowledge stock with that of the acquired firm as 
a way to make minor refinements (integrated knowledge leverage behaviour). By contrast, 
acquiring firms with exploratory focus often leverages the knowledge acquired through 
acquisitions to create a new technological trajectory (independent knowledge leverage 
behaviour). The authors theoretically predict and empirically test the idea that a high acquisition 
rate will weaken the link between the degree of exploitation and integrated knowledge leverage. 
In contrast, they found support for the existence of a stronger relationship between exploration 
and independent knowledge leverage for frequent acquirers. This study highlights that acquisition 
intensity by a firm can affect the relationship between exploitation or exploration orientation and 
knowledge leverage behaviors. Those findings once again indicate that investments in either 
exploration or exploitation may be determined and moderated by the firms current learning 












INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC MODERATING FACTORS 
The Role of Competition 
At the industry level, prior studies suggest that the level of competition in an industry or 
environment (Matusik and Hill, 1998) moderates the relationship between exploitation, 
exploration and firm performance. Jansen et al. (2006) empirically test this hypothesis, showing 
that pursuing exploitative innovation is more beneficial for financial performance in competitive 
environments. In explaining their findings, the authors theorized that engaging in exploitation is 
beneficial when competition increases because risk-taking behaviour (i.e., exploration) can be 
disruptive to firms’ organisational routines. For this reason, they suggest that firms are required 
to find ways to eliminate disruption, focusing instead on risk-aversive behaviour that seeks to 
create minor improvements, incremental changes and refinements on existing innovations 
(Matusik and Hill, 1998; Lumpkin and Dess, 2001). 
 
The Role of Environmental and Technological Dynamism 
Environmental dynamism defined as the rate of change and degree of instability of an environment 
(Dess and Beard, 1984) has been also found to have a moderating and differential effect on the 
relationship between exploration, exploitation and performance (Jansen, et al., 2006). Engaging 
in exploration is more effective in dynamic environments that are characterized by rapid 
technological changes, uncertainty and fluctuations in customer needs and demands (Jansen et 
al., 2006). Similarly, in industries where technological dynamism is high, exploratory activities 
are more profitable than exploitative activities (Uotila et al., 2009). High technological dynamism, 
which prior studies capture by measuring the R&D intensity (R&D over sales) of an industry has 
a positive moderating effect on exploratory activities and financial performance (e.g., Uotila et 
al., 2009). However, in industries with low and average R&D intensity, exploration has a 
negligible effect on firm performance (Uotila et al., 2009). These findings therefore suggest that 
as the R&D intensity of the industry increases so does the effect of exploration on the economic 
performance of the firm.  
An explanation for such findings is that in dynamic environments firms are forced to constantly 
explore novel ideas. By contrast, less dynamic environments may not require a similarly high 
focus on exploration because a firm’s existing stock of technologies could be used for a longer 
time period, allowing firms to focus instead on exploitation and risk-aversive strategies (Zahra 
and Ellor, 1993). Therefore, by definition in low dynamic environments the rate of new 
inventions, and therefore the firm’s need to respond to changes is low. Bierly and Daly (2007) 
find empirical support for the view that exploration has a stronger impact on performance in high 











Overall, by pointing to the moderating and differential impact of environmental dynamism on the 
relationship between the firm’s exploratory and exploitative activity and firm performance, these 
results suggest that in environments with lower technological dynamism the balance between 
exploration and exploitation may not be ideal from the point of view of performance.  
In line with the above thinking, recent studies on the exploration exploitation debate (Luger et al., 
2018; Stieglitz et al. 2016) question whether firms need to move away from balancing their 
exploration/exploitation investments towards aligning them to meet contextual demands. Is 
ambidexterity a better investment option and more viable because firms learn from accumulated 
experience and are therefore capable to balance exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2008), or does this balance affect a firm’s ability to adapt to changing technological 
environments? 
In sum, we can make a number of observations from the above synthesis of the literature. First, 
prior empirical findings about the balance between exploration and exploitation and firm 
performance are mixed, with some studies suggesting a positive, negative or insignificant effect 
on firm performance. Placing similar emphasis on both exploratory and exploitative activities 
may not always be the optimal way to achieve superior performance. Second, prior results also 
emphasise the moderating role of certain firm-specific and industry-specific factors on the firm’s 
exploration, exploitation and firm performance. Firm-specific moderators include factors such as 
firm resources, firm size, market orientation, learning mode and leadership team characteristics. 
The industry-level moderators include factors such as competition, environmental and 
technological dynamism. All these results about moderators imply that that the balance between 
exploration and exploitation (ambidexterity) matters less in certain cases (Luger et al., 2018). 
Another interesting idea is that firms should calibrate their exploratory/exploitative R&D 
investments to match dynamic environments (Posen and Levinthal, 2012; Luger et al., 2018; 
Uotila et al., 2009). Since environments change over time, maintaining a balance between 
exploration/exploitation would influence performance negatively due to misalignment between 
R&D investments and contextual needs (Posen and Levinthal, 2012; Luger et al., 2018). In 
environments characterised with incremental changes, it is more beneficial for firms to maintain 
their ambidexterity because their accumulated experiential learning will equip them to balance 
the two. Nevertheless, firms in less dynamic environments with discontinuous changes should 
skew the balance to prevent inertia and environmental misalignment that is likely to impact their 
performance negatively (Luger et al., 2018).		
Further, and consistent with Luger’s et al., (2018) logic that the exploration/exploitation balance 
should be aligned with environmental demands, other studies (Stieglitz et al. 2016; Posen et al., 
2012) argue that focused orientations either towards exploration or exploitation are often 











dynamism forces firms to explore to avoid knowledge obsolescence (Uotila et al., 2009), some 
studies suggest that environments characterised with frequent changes often necessitate to 
devalue exploration and shift the balance towards exploitation and inertial practices that restrict 
exploration (Stieglitz et al., 2016). These results indicate once again that dynamic environments 
necessitate a different focus.  In sum, scholars have started increasingly to indicate that 
environmental changes require organizations to become focused either on exploratory or 
exploitative activities rather than balancing the two.  
Yet, although a large volume of studies focuses on the effects of balance, three key questions 
remain less well understood. First, we have an incomplete understanding of how specialization in 
exploratory R&D or exploitative R&D influences firm performance. Given that specialization 
may change how beneficial exploration and/or exploitation is, we also do not understand how the 
returns to exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D differ for firms that choose to specialize vis-
à-vis those firms that invest a similar amount of effort and resources in both.  
Second, irrespective of the level of competition in a given industry, the opportunities to engage 
in collaborative projects and knowledge sourcing depend on what the majority of firms in these 
industries do with respect to exploratory and exploitative R&D. For instance, the availability and 
nature of opportunities in an industry in which the majority of firms specialize in exploratory 
R&D differ from those in industries that focus on exploitative R&D. As a result, we have a rather 
incomplete knowledge of how the orientation of the industry in which the firm operates changes 
the relationship between specialization in exploratory R&D or exploitative R&D and firm 
performance, and in which industry settings it is more beneficial to specialize (or pursue balance), 
and if so in which activity they should specialize.   
Third, the literature acknowledges that firms may change their exploratory R&D or exploitative 
R&D focus over time. However, little research has examined how firms change (i.e. what patterns 
they adopt when they change) and how temporal dimensions in exploratory R&D and exploitative 
R&D (i.e. how quickly firms change from one activity to the other) influence firm performance 
(Hashai et al., 2015; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014). We 
address these questions in three separate empirical chapters in which we develop and test a set of 
hypotheses concerning these effects. Before doing do, however, the next chapter sets the 
theoretical foundation for the thesis.   
 
 
Technological Diversification-Firm Performance 
Our aim to examine the effects of ambidexterity and specialization can also benefit from a review 











diversification relates to the knowledge diversity that underlines the nature of products and the 
way they are produced. Technological diversification requires firms to expand their technological 
competence into a broader range of scientific disciplines and technological domains (Granstrand 
and Oskarsson, 1994). Yet, such expansion is not always associated with product diversification 
(Granstrand et al., 1997; Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998). Technological diversification can be 
defined and understood as a firm’s strategy for finding unexplored niches in the market to 
differentiate themselves from their competitor firms, since the ultimate aim of technological 
diversification is to achieve synergies between different technological domains (Kim et al., 2016; 
Pan et al., 2018).  
Our review on technological diversification points to two observations. First, the theoretical 
arguments in the literature on technological diversification echoes the idea of investing in both 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991; Koryak et al., 2018). This requires integrating new 
knowledge in the firm’s existing knowledge base yet avoiding excessive investments in either 
that could lead to either technological exhaustion or costly experimentation. Secondly, although 
specialized and diversified firms follow a different investment strategy to enhance their 
performance, specialized firms can outsource their expertise and diversify their knowledge by 
tapping into complementary collaborative opportunities in different industries. Such opportunities 
help them strengthen and complement their core competences using their prior established 
expertise.  
Empirical evidence indicates that firms often use their technology alliance portfolios drawing 
upon their combinative capabilities to enhance their performance (Lucena and Roper, 2016). 
Specifically, diversity in technology alliance portfolios allows firms to improve not only their 
absorptive capacity but also ambidexterity in R&D. By implication, the ability of the firm is 
enhanced through better exploitation of both internal and external knowledge and knowledge 
generated from exploration and exploitation.  
The literature offers a variety of explanations about the drivers of technological diversification 
(Kim et al., 2016; Besanko et al., 2010; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco, 2008). First, 
firms decide to diversify (intra-firm) using their technological resources and know-how with other 
fellow-units (Markides and Williamson, 1994) as a way to achieve synergies that accentuate their 
value when complement one another and aim at extending existing product lines (Besanko et al., 
2010; Suzuki and Kodama, 2004). Second, firms that diversify technologically (and are therefore 
exploratory) are more likely to expand their absorptive capacity and technological competences, 











diversification) (Baum et al., 2002; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco, 2008). Tapping into 
diversified areas of technological expertise of other units or firms helps the focal firm enhance its 
exploratory capabilities and integrate into external knowledge its routines (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco, 2008).  
Although some opportunities could be identified and exploited commercially, low knowledge 
overlap between new and existing knowledge affects the firm’s ability to capitalize on new 
knowledge and thus ability to generate new products. Thus, technological diversification could 
enhance firm performance by preventing against the natural tendency of firms to follow the same 
trajectory making their core rigidities into liabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) by taking advantage 
of cross-fertilization and utilization of knowledge originating from between different 
technologies (Suzuki and Kodama, 2004). 
Therefore, technological diversification is likely to strengthen a firm’s competence or 
exploratory/exploitative R&D and productivity especially if investments are related in the firm’s 
chosen trajectory since building on existing areas of core technology, redeploying mainly firm 
core assets will ultimately expand the firm’s knowledge base and enhances its performance 
(Klette and Kortum, 2004). Third, technologically diversified firms are more likely to reduce the 
risk involved in R&D and them to learn to adapt more easily in technological environments that 
are often characterised with dynamism, frequent changes and unpredictability. Because both 
exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D is uncertain due to increased risk of knowledge 
obsolescence and experimentation with proximate returns, firms aim at eliminating the risk by 
distributing their R&D resources across various technologies (Garcia-Vega, 2006; Corradini et 
al., 2016). This approach enables firms to develop diverse and versatile technologies by 
expanding their technological scope. Technological diversification is a necessity not only because 
of increased environmental uncertainty but primarily due to technological complexity and firm-
specific architectural competence that is required to be successful (Suzuki and Kodama, 2004; 
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
Forth, technological diversification helps firms generate revenue because they are more likely to 
develop products with diverse technologies and prevent technological lock-ins (Granstrand, 1998; 
Suzuki and Kodama, 2004) and capability rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Technological 
diversification may affect the firms’ combinative capacity by allowing the firm to blend and 
infuse its existing knowledge base with new components that are likely to be used in developing 











Overall, the above arguments are reminiscence of the idea of balancing exploratory and 
exploitative R&D investments since firms that choose to diversify their technological innovations 
follow to some extent a path-dependant trajectory that allows them to be successful because they 
build on their core competencies, assets and capabilities (via related diversification) rather than 
totally deviate from these as often happens when firms engage in unrelated diversification.  
Drawing from organizational learning theory, scholars of technological diversification emphasise 
the importance of maintaining consistency in the firm’s knowledge base at times of firms’ 
diversification efforts (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco 2008). Resembling the trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation (March 1991; Fleming 2001), finding the right balance 
between the need to diversify technological efforts and the need to use and exploit the firm’s 
existing knowledge base that is underlined by specific technological skills is important for both 
large and small-size firms (Corradini et al., 2016). Especially smaller firms that often engage in 
search depth and technological specialisation will enable them to be successful from their R&D 
investments by maintaining a narrow focus on their activities (or chosen technological areas; 
Corradini et al., 2016).  
Theoretical predictions suggest that the trade-off between specialisation and technological 
diversification will be in favour of specialised firms in technologically turbulent environments 
characterised by abundancy in technological opportunities (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Some 
studies suggest that when exploration investments are risky, resource demanding, have 
unpredictable returns and require complex knowledge recombination, firms are more likely to 
follow a technologically specialized trajectory (Toh and Kim, 2013). Some studies suggest that 
the higher the rate of patenting activity in technologically intense environments, the lower the 
chances to explore the possibilities that arise from inter-sectoral technological recombination 
because of time and resource limitations especially in the context of small firms (Corradini et al. 
2016; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). As a result, this reduces the 
opportunities for engaging in exploration and experimentation of new research domains away 
from the current technological trajectory and capabilities. Thus, specialisation in exploitation may 
be more beneficial since firms exploit mainly internal competencies that have built across time 
and along an already tested technological trajectory (Kogut and Zander 1992; Corradini et al. 
2016).  
Interestingly, Kim et al., (2016) explore the contingent role of core-technology competence in the 
relationship between technological diversification and firm performance (growth). In line with 











of characteristics of a firm’s core-technology competence. They suggest that competence in (core) 
domain knowledge i.e., build on existing knowledge integrating simultaneously new knowledge 
elements as well as architectural knowledge on R&D enhances firm performance. The first 
attribute that could characterise ambidextrous firms increases the chances of commercializing 
technologies by combining value of existing and new knowledge generated from technological 
diversification. The second attribute, architectural competence in R&D which typically refers to 
a firm’s ability to identify explore and integrate new knowledge elements utilizing and translating 
technological opportunities originating from diverse fields of technology captures firms with 
greater investments in exploratory R&D.  Therefore, firms with low core-technology competence 
are likely to face challenges when choose to diversify technological especially with unrelated 
technological fields that require the integration of diverse and unfamiliar knowledge (Kim et al., 
2016). By contrast, firms with greater core-technology capacity are better equipped to control 
technological complexity and identify evolutionary paths and opportunities that arise from diverse 
technological fields. Those ideas are in line with ambidextrous investments, indicating that 
insufficient and excessive technological diversification can be destructive for firm growth 
(Quintana-Garcıa and Benavides-Velasco, 2008).  The authors conclude that a firm’s core 
technological competences affects the commercial returns to technological diversification (Kim 
et al., 2016).  
Consistent with the idea of balancing exploration and exploitation, studies on technological 
diversification suggest that searching for new knowledge elements expands the firm’s knowledge 
base by allowing distinctive combinations to be made (Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002). 
Yet, high levels of knowledge deviation and technological diversification may destruct the desired 
balance and combination between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991; Levinthal and 
March, 1993). Hence, one may conclude that such imbalance in technological diversification 
could be distractive to the firm’s capacity and competitive position by affecting knowledge 





















To address the research objectives of this PhD thesis, we draw on organizational learning theory 
that has been most widely used in the exploration and exploitation literature (Levitt and March, 
1988; Huber, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Wang and 
Ahmed, 2003; Levinthal and March, 1993) and industrial organization economics (Bain, 1968; 
Mason, 1939; Schumpeter, 2017; Porter 1979; 1990; 2000). The justification for choosing these 
two theories is twofold. First, they fit well the phenomena of interest and the objectives of the 
thesis to focus on how specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D affects firm 
performance, and how the external environment (industry) might change this relationship. 
Second, because organizational learning theory focuses on learning processes within the firm 
whereas industrial organization economics is a theory of the environment (industry), the two 
theories play a complementary role in explaining the relationship between exploratory R&D, 
exploitative R&D and firm performance. Such complementarities also assist us in identifying 
factors and conditions that moderate this relationship.  
In the next sections, we review these two theories and the key concepts that are employed in the 
next chapters of this thesis. In addition, we review the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) that attributes performance differentials to firms’ idiosyncratic 
resources (e.g. technology). In addition to the RBV theory, we assess the concept of 
organizational dynamic capabilities (Teece, 1994; Teece et al, 2007; Teece and Pisano, 1994) 
and its relevance to the exploration exploitation context. The dynamic capabilities concept 
suggests how well a firm utilises its available inputs (e.g. knowledge predisposition and strengths) 
to create specific outputs and products and respond timely to changing industry circumstances 
(Dutta et al., 2005; Teece, 1994). Both the RBV and the concept of dynamic capabilities will act 
complementary to our two main theories (organizational learning theory and industrial 
organization economics) in better explaining how both firm- and industry-specific characteristics 
affect the usefulness of balance and specialization and, in turn, the effects of exploratory and 
exploitative R&D on firm performance. 
 
Organizational Learning Theory-Mechanisms of learning 
In the context of organizational learning theory, organizational learning refers to the process of 
creating, retaining, and transferring knowledge within an organization (Cyert and March, 1963; 











and March, 1993). This perspective of learning views firms as information processing systems 
that develop, infer, circulate, and store information within the organisational boundaries (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Huber, 1991). Thus, important components to enhance firm knowledge that 
could in turn affect firm performance is knowledge acquisition through information distribution 
and interpretation and storage of this information in a firm’s memory.   
Firms in their search and effort to acquire knowledge, distribute such knowledge across firm units, 
translate and integrate such knowledge into their routines to enhance firm performance have two 
choices (West and Burnes, 2000). The first choice is to act as learning entities of a closed system 
in which learning is a private matter that is restricted within firm boundaries. The second choice 
is for firms to act as learning entities of an open system where learning is the result of inter-
organisational learning and interaction between individual firms and the context where they 
operate. Knowledge acquisition therefore and translation into beneficial learning occurs both 
within and outside organisational boundaries (Wang and Ahmed, 2003).  
Therefore, organisational learning occurs and is the result of a firm’s effort to obtain knowledge 
from different agents (i.e., knowledge from intra-organisational units, other inter-organisational 
firms and the environment), disseminate such knowledge within its units, manipulate it to fit its 
purpose and implement it to its routines to achieve better performance outcomes (Fiol and Lyles, 
1985). Organisational knowledge is stored in the form of experience and reflected in personal 
capabilities of those working in the firm, reflecting to some extent the absorptive capability of 
organisations. As firms accumulate experience, they further add to their expertise (i.e., result of 
their specialization and narrowing of their focus when engaging in either exploratory and 
exploitative R&D), contributing thus to revenue generation and firm performance.  
Apart from learning within organisational boundaries, learning theories admit that the 
environment where the firm competes and operates contributes to its learning process including 
its behaviour and choices a firm pursues. In organisational environments, the learning context 
such as the structure of an industry is a significant contributing factor to the firm’s learning 
potential (Wang and Ahmed, 2003). The inclusion of the industrial context explicitly indicates 
the need for firms to engage in various modes of learning (both single-loop and double-loop 
learning as well as adaptive and generative learning to sustain their competitive advantage and 
expertise (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Argyris, 1976; Bierly and Daly, 
2007).  
Indeed, current organisational learning practices involve single and double-loop level learning.  
In a single-loop learning, firms change their actions based on the difference between the desired 
and actual output (Argyris, 1976). A single-loop learning is often related with the ability of the 
firm to detect errors and rectify them in its attempt to sustain quality control (Argyris and Schon, 











and incremental changes to their innovations. By contrast, double-loop learning is classified as a 
higher level of learning because of its proactive nature that enables firms to act proactively by 
preventing errors to occur at first place. Similarly, in generative learning, firms create ideas as a 
result of risk-taking action to produce breakthrough outputs (Morgan and Berthon, 2008).  
Some studies also suggest that firms learn by engaging either in local (i.e., search for knowledge 
that exhibits some degree of similarity to the firm’s own knowledge base) versus distant 
(knowledge that is different to what the firms knows; March and Simon, 1958; Rosenkopf and 
Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). The search for distant versus local search is partly 
determined on the desired outcome. For instance, if firms aim at creating quality through minor 
improvements on existing products/processes and services they need to learn through local search 
and build further expertise in a specific domain (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf and 
Almeida, 2003). By contrast, engaging in distant search (Baum et al., 2000) to enhance learning 
better fit the aim of entering or even shaping new industries and markets (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001; He and Wong, 2004). Regardless however of the type of the learning mechanism the firms 
need to engage to meet their objectives, we suggest that firms always learn but the value of each 
learning mechanism is different in different contexts and conditions and thus learning has the 
potential to accentuate its value in certain contexts and weakens in others.    
 
Organizational Learning Theory in the context of Specialization 
A key premise in organizational learning theory is that organizations are able to learn through 
experience (inferences from past activities) that can subsequently be used to develop conceptual 
maps to interpret such experience and make it useful (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991). 
Experience is therefore the driving force that contributes to the understanding of a process. In 
organizational learning theory, firms are conceptualized as learning entities that are able to make 
inferences from past activities and incorporate these into new organizational routines (i.e., rules, 
procedures and strategies through which organizations operate; Levitt and March, 1988).  
Organizations therefore become more competitive over time as they gain experience and learn. 
Learning through direct experience help firms create and accumulate beneficial knowledge that 
induces greater efficiency due to the repetitive execution of the same set of activities which in 
turn enhances firm performance (Huber, 1991). This type of learning (experiential learning) 
therefore enables organizations to develop capabilities either in the form of exploitation or 
exploration (March 1999; Holmqvist, 2004). It allows firms to become better at those routines 
they repeat successfully and less capable in activities and processes they do irregularly. This self-
reinforcing nature of learning makes firms prone to maintain their current focus and trajectory 
(i.e. specialise in either activity; March 1999). 











exploratory or exploitative R&D may enhance firm performance by enabling firms to firstly build 
capabilities in areas of established competence and secondly, by engaging in different types of 
knowledge search (so called local or distant). In the context of exploratory and exploitative R&D, 
firms learn by engaging in local search (i.e., search for knowledge that exhibits technological and 
geographical similarity to that of the firm’s own knowledge stock) and distant search (i.e., use 
new knowledge that is often distant to their own existing knowledge/technological base; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). According to organizational learning theory and the literature on 
exploration and exploitation, firms have to decide on how best to allocate their attention, time and 
resources between exploring new knowledge and routines and exploiting existing knowledge and 
established routines (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Baum et al., 2000). Firms often 
search for solutions, ideas and technologies that have already used successfully in the past, 
replicating therefore their past behavior (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt 
and March, 1988).  
In the context of specialization, although firms are uncertain about the rewards of a given activity, 
with repetitive execution of certain activities and processes, they accumulate experience and 
confidence, diminish unpredictability and strengthen their capabilities. Success breeds further 
success as organizations repeat such activities and processes as it is more rewarding to repeat a 
prior action, rather than actions for which they have limited knowledge, experience and 
understanding (Levitt and March, 1988; Baum et al., 2000). This echoes the idea that as a process 
or activity becomes standardized, and as techniques are learned, the time required to accomplish 
it declines while the quality of executing the task improves (March, 1991). In other words, 
enhanced performance from specialization is facilitated by concentrating efforts in areas of 
already established capabilities (Baum et al., 2000). This further increases the likelihood of firms 
to improve their operations and perfect their organisational routines gaining further greater 
operational functionality and achieve efficiency gains.  
 
Exploratory and Exploitative R&D in the context of Organizational Learning Theory 
Organizational learning theory also helps us gain a better understanding of what exploratory R&D 
and exploitative R&D conceptually and practically represent by considering: 1) what type of 
learning occurs in each activity, and 2) what is the aim and possible output of engaging in either 
exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D. 
Prior research suggests that exploitation (and therefore exploitative R&D) builds on the firm’s 
existing knowledge base, whereas exploration stretches beyond its current knowledge stock and 
requires new knowledge and searches (Uotila et al., 2009; Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2007; 
Bierly and Daly, 2007; Gupta et al., 2006; Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014; Benner and 











and advances in existing components, whereas exploratory R&D requires a shift towards a 
different technological trajectory. For this reason, exploitative R&D requires local search (i.e., 
search for knowledge that exhibits technological similarity to that of the firm’s own knowledge 
stock) in order to build competence and gain expertise in a specific domain (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Exploratory R&D on the other hand, requires 
distant search (Baum et al., 2000) that often necessitates that firms move beyond technological 
boundaries (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) and enter new domains (He and Wong, 2004). 
Furthermore, exploratory R&D is aligned with double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) 
and generative learning (Senge, 1990) in order to create new ways of doing things in the light of 
experience (Argyris, 1976). In generative learning, firms generate ideas as a result of risk-taking 
action (Morgan and Berthon, 2008). Consequently, in exploratory R&D, firms have to engage in 
a different, more sophisticated ways to produce breakthrough ideas.  
By contrast, exploitative R&D requires single loop and adaptive learning in order to create 
improvements or create new features for existing products and processes. Searching for ideas and 
alternatives in close proximity enhances the existing knowledge stock and experiential learning, 
yet in an incremental rather than radical way (Yelle, 1979). Exploitative R&D differs from 
exploratory R&D because it often requires adaptive learning to create refinements on products 
and processes, whereas the exploratory R&D requires firms to engage in generative learning 
through experimentation with novelties and risk-taking action with new alternatives. Therefore, 
revolutionary changes are likely to be the output of exploratory R&D, whereas evolutionary and 
incremental changes are likely to be the output of exploitative R&D (Bierly and Daly, 2007).  
Furthermore, because firm performance is a joint function of the potential returns from a given 
activity and the firm’s own capabilities, firms enhance their performance as they accumulate more 
experience (Levinthal and March, 1993; Gaur and Lu, 2007). It is well accepted in organizational 
learning theory that searching for new directions where skills have to be developed from scratch 
reduces the speed with which existing skills could be improved. It is also accepted that building 
capabilities with existing activities make the search of entirely new ways less attractive (Levitt 
and March, 1988). In other words, capabilities’ improvement when undertaking an activity 
increases the likelihood of returns for engaging in that activity (Argyris and Schon 1978; Sydow 
et al., 2009). These two premises in organizational learning theory (the cumulative effects of both 
experiential learning and competence building) suggest that investment decisions are often 
guided by organisations’ prior experience. Therefore, the more competent the firm is in a specific 
activity, the greater the likelihood in enhancing its performance by increasing effort in this 














Industrial Organization Economics 
Industrial organisation economics theory will help us address the set of research questions and 
hypotheses concerning how industry factors affect the impact of exploratory and exploitative 
R&D on firm performance. Research on industrial organization economics has focused on how 
firm performance is influenced by industry-specific characteristics such as competition, barriers 
to entry, industry concentration, product differentiation and the price elasticity of demand (Bain, 
1968; Mason, 1939; Schumpeter, 2017; Porter, 2000). Within industrial organization economics, 
there are 5 distinct, but interrelated, paradigms that aim at explaining performance differences 
across firms (Conner, 1991): 1) the Structure-Conduct-Performance view, 2) the Schumpeterian 
view, 3) the Chicago approach, 4) the transaction costs approach and 5) the Neo-Classical Perfect 
Competition view. The key logic behind each paradigm, including the conceptualization of firms, 
the main assumptions of each paradigm and how performance differential arise across firms are 
summarized in Table 1. Because this PhD thesis focuses on two of these paradigms to address its 
research objectives, the following paragraphs discuss the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm and the Schumpeterian view. 
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm attributes variations in performance across 
firms to an industry’s configuration (Mason, 1953; Bain, 1968). It suggests that the structure of 
the industry determines a firm's behaviour (conduct), its chosen strategy and, in turn, its 
performance. The SCP paradigm rests on the notion that the firms’ main strategic objective is to 
achieve monopoly power and set product prices, and that this objective is achieved by either 
driving competitors out of the market or by colluding with other firms (Weiss, 1979; McWilliams 
and Smart, 1993; Barney, 1986, Porter, 1981; Conner, 1991). This implies that firms that want to 
achieve superior performance should dominate and control a large share of the market (Bain, 
1968; Mason, 1953; Conner, 1991). In this sense, innovation can help a firm to implement a 
strategy that will gradually make the firm one of the few providers (or even the only provider) of 
a set of products or services (Conner, 1991). Therefore, the motivation for the firm according to 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm is to prevent other firms to gain monolpoly power 
by driving certain firms out of business. Product differentiation through an innovation and higher 
entry barriers are seen as two fundamental ways for a firm to reach such position in a given 
industry (Comanor and Wilson, 1974).  
Reinforcing this line of thinking, Schumpeter (1950) suggested that firms should enhance their 
competitive position and firm performance not through price competition but by creating 
innovations that make rivals movements and products obsolete (Conner, 1991). According to this 
view, firms are conceptualized as entities that continuously seek new ways of competing. For this 











R&D) or to refine the features of existing products (which can be achieved through exploitative 
R&D) to establish greater market share and power. Competition therefore forces firms to innovate 
and upgrade continuously to prevent technological obsolescence.  
Drawing therefore upon the SCP paradigm and the Schumpeterian view on how performance 
differentials across firms arise, we develop hypotheses about potential moderators that can be 
identified at the industry level predicting and testing empirically how the effects of exploratory 













Table 1 – Theories of the Firm in IO (Industrial Economics) 
  Conceptualisation of the Firm                                         Assumptions     Performance differentials  
Neoclassical Theory 
Input Combiners: Firms work together to produce a product. 
This joint production occurs by combining labour and capital 
a) Easy and same access to resources 
(technology), b) access to symmetrical 
information, c) mobility of resources 




Output Restrainers: Firms restrict output generated by other 
firms by a) gaining monopolistic position by driving other firms 
out of business or by b) colluding with other firms with the 
objective to control prices and/or output 
Firm heterogeneity that is reflected on 
monopoly power (industry concentration) 
Above normal returns exist because of a) 
different industry characteristics (e.g. 
industry concentration) and b) within 
industry differences in the market power of 
each firm. 
Schumpeterian theory 
Seek new ways to compete: Firms engage in radical innovation 
to produce breakthroughs as a way to exercise monopoly and 
limit competition by making competitors' inventions obsolete 
Market power provides firms with the 
resources to engage in radical innovation 
Performance differentials exist because 
firms use innovation (radical) to find new 
ways of competing 
The Chicago approach  
Seekers of Efficiency: Firms outperform competitors because 
they are better (efficient) in both product production and 
distribution. Effective firm collusions are rare due to costly 
monitoring and enforcement.  
a) Firm heterogeneity due to differences 
in inputs, b) the role of new entrants 
causes the efficiency differentials across 
established firms.  
Short-term performance differentials exist 
and arise from the exploitation of current 
(not new) innovations. Yet, imitative entry 
will erode long-term performance 
differentials (profits). 
Transaction costs theory 
Avoiders of the Cost: Firms are trying to economise by keeping 
the cost of transaction of market exchange lower or equal than the 
cost of producing something internally 
Firm heterogeneity arises due to 
differences in firms' ability to minimise 
cost. 
Performance differentials exist when firms 
act as avoiders of cost throughout an 
exchange in market. Transaction cost will be 
higher when a) asset specificity 
(dependence) is high, b) when the number of 
actors is small (interdependency), c) when 
complete (contingent) contracts is difficult 












The Resource-based View (RBV) of the Firm 
As noted earlier, the RBV will help us better develop and support the reasoning for certain 
hypotheses that consider how firm-specific characteristics affect the usefulness of balance and 
specialization and, in turn, the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance. 
Firms vary in their performance because of the different resources and assets they possess 
(Barney, 1991; 2001). However, not all resources could be translated into valuable outputs. A 
firm’s strength lies in its ability to deploy the appropriate resources to conceive and implement 
appropriate strategies that enhance its performance (Wernerfelt, 1984). For instance, 
complementarity in resources could lead to different performance outcomes (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989).  
The importance and distinctiveness of complementarity in assets is that their value accentuates 
when employed together (Teece, 1986). An established expanded network could act as a 
complementary asset that enables firms to accelerate their performance outputs by sensing market 
trends and needs. Similarly, collaborations and strategic alliances may be important in accessing 
complementary assets (Lockett and Thompson, 2001; Lockett et al., 2009). Thus, performance 
differentials across firms may derive from differences in firms’ efforts to access complementary 
resources that are important for the acquisition of new and valuable knowledge. 
The complementarity and interconnectedness of resources may prevent rivals to replicate firm 
resources (Teece, 1986). The difficulty in imitating these resources derives not only from their 
limited mobility (specific to the firm), but also utility to other firms. For this reason, firms with 
complementary resources are more likely to be perform better because they exhibit heterogeneity 
in both resources and capability in deploying them that is difficult to imitate. Because internal 
organizational resources are finite and exhaustive, tapping into diverse and complementary 
knowledge resources of other firms could affect positively a firm’s performance (Lavie, 2006).  
The possession of complementary resources that are likely to be rare and valuable, can also give 
firms positional advantages and increase their ability to employ strategies that lead to product 
differentiation. In the resource-based view, firms can obtain superior performance not only 
because they possess difficult to copy resources assets, but because they are able to overcome 
organisational resource constrains by tapping into assets and knowledge of external firms. By 
implication, above normal profits based on the resource view derives from the fact that firms 
employ heterogeneous resources to create an output that is highly differentiated from alternative 
ones (Conner, 1991). In other words, product differentiation is the result of the distinctiveness in 
resources employed to produce the specific output. 
 Therefore, the resource-based view of the firm emphasises the importance of identifying inputs 
that are more likely to be translated into profitable outputs and retain and exploit those 











resources is highly relevant in explaining performance differentials across specialized firms. For 
instance, consider two firms that specialize in the same activity (let’s say exploratory R&D), yet 
they operate in a differently- oriented industry and thus the returns to their specialization activity 
differ. Put simply, the effects of firms that specialize in exploratory R&D may be stronger 
(attenuate) in specific industries where the output of exploratory ideas has more chances to be 
utilized (complemented) by exploitative firms and vice versa.   
 
Limitations of the RBV theory and its extension of the Dynamic Capabilities Framework 
Despite the importance of the RBV theory in explaining performance differentials across firms 
that are attributed to the specific heterogeneous and often path-dependent and difficult to clone 
assets that a firm possesses, the theory has been criticized as conceptually vague and tautological 
(Mosakowski and Mc Kelvey, 1997). Those criticisms derive from the simple observation that 
although the RBV theory outlines which resources can lead to sustainable competitive advantage 
(i.e., better performance outcomes), it offers little explanation about the mechanisms by which 
those resources can be transformed into strategic assets. More importantly however, it has been 
criticized on the grounds of its feasibility especially in dynamic industry environments (D'Aveni 
and Ravenscraft, 1994) 
 
Dynamic Organisational Capabilities 
Another framework that is also relevant in theorizing and explaining why the effects of 
specializing in exploratory or exploitative R&D on firm performance differ across differently-
oriented industries is that of dynamic capabilities (defined as a firm’s capacity to employ and 
adapt existing competences and expertise to achieve compatibility with the technological 
environment, Teece, 1994). Dynamic capability requires the firm’s ability to explore and exploit 
by recognizing technological opportunities and maintaining its competitiveness through 
combining, integrating and reconfiguring its intangible assets, such as its tacit knowledge and 
expertise (i.e., specialization) to match the need of the external industry (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 
2007). This framework thus identifies which capabilities (i.e., its strengths on exploratory or 
exploitative activities, and which combinations of these capabilities (resource configuration) 
could trigger better performance outcomes (Teece et al., 1997). Organisational capabilities 
therefore are all those internal and external competences that are employed effectively to rapidly 
changing environments such as those of R&D intensive industries. They can be conceptualized 
as the efficiency with which a firm utilises its available inputs to create specific outputs and 
products and respond timely to changing industry circumstances (Dutta et al., 2005; Teece, 1994). 
A capability to be dynamic needs to carry two important properties; technical and evolutionary 











sustain its living, whereas evolutionary fitness refers to how well the capability enables a firm to 
make its living. Dynamic capabilities therefore assist firms not only in adapting to the 
environment (industry), but also in achieving evolutionary fitness by shaping the environment. 
For instance, by creating better quality strategic alliances and collaborative 
agreements/opportunities in some industries than in others. Furthermore, organizational 
capability is defined as a set of high-level routines that when in operation have the potential of 
producing significant outputs (Winter, 2003). Routine is a learned behavior that is highly 
patterned. Its success is attributed to its learning through repetition. Repetitive execution of the 
same activities and tasks (i.e. specialization) enables firms to comprehend in greater detail and 
precision the processes required to develop effective routines (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). This 
idea echoes that of organizational learning theory and its emphasis on the firm’s experiential 
learning and competence building through repetition in achieving better performance outcomes.  
The concept of dynamic capabilities resonates the definitions given by other authors. For instance, 
dynamic capabilities are defined as combinative capabilities, which encompass the ability of 
firms to synthesise and apply existing and assimilated knowledge to generate new knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). Similarly, dynamic capabilities can be equated with architectural 
competence (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) or simple capabilities (Amit and Shoemaker, 
1993). More importantly however, dynamic capabilities are organizational and strategic 
sequences that above all require resource integration, restructuring and mainly reconfiguration to 
achieve transformation of resource inputs into valuable outputs (Teece et al., 1997). Although in 
our thesis, we have not tested empirically the existence of dynamic capabilities, since their 
conceptual definition due to their tacit element appears less concrete, our analysis implicitly 
suggest that the routines specified in product development, expertise and experiential knowledge 
to revenue-producing products and services might capture the essence of the dynamic capability 
concept (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Building on that, we argue that specialized firms that mainly 
focus on building a routine that is highly repetitive in nature are likely to possess valuable 
dynamic capabilities that could potentially enable them to use their expertise to restructure their 
resources to fit industry needs and thus achieve superior performance outcomes. The idea of 
dynamic capabilities thus is relevant for our research enquiry because it will enhance 
understanding on which and how knowledge-related capabilities (exploration or exploitation) and 
in which industries attenuate or weaken their value and what are the underlying mechanisms that 
will enable firms to utilize their expertise and capabilities (i.e., specialization) to respond to 














Determinants of Firms’ Dynamic Capabilities 
Three set of factors (namely firm processes, firm position, and firm path) has been suggested as 
critical to a firm’s formation of dynamic capabilities. Specifically, the first factor refers to 
organisational processes. This factor encapsulates the idea that the competitive advantage of a 
firm might lies with the way things are carried out in the firm (i.e., routines) and its general 
practice of learning and knowledge acquisition (Teece et al., 1997). These organizational routines 
reflect patterns of current practice and learning behavior that affect the formation of a firms’ 
dynamic capabilities repertoire. Firm position is another factor that shapes and determines the 
outcome of dynamic capabilities. This factor implies that the present position of the firm in terms 
of its current technological endowments, equipment, complementary assets and relationships with 
suppliers and external parties are all essential in helping firms to build their distinctive 
competence and capability. Finally, the firm’s chosen or inherited path that is partly defined by 
the available strategic alternatives and opportunities, found for instance in some industry contexts, 
constitutes part of its dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Accordingly, a firm’s 
organizational routines, which are the cumulative efforts of highly patterned activities based on 
repetition, are shaped by the specific assets firms possess which have been predetermined by the 
firms already chosen trajectory. Therefore, the firm's processes, position and chosen trajectory 
collectively reflect and encompass its capabilities. The distinctiveness of these bound-to-the firm 
capabilities is that they have to be built (Teece and Pisano, 1994).  
 
Traits of Dynamic Capabilities 
The capacity of the firm to identify the value of environmental opportunity is critical capability 
in defining its performance. However, because knowledge is cumulative and largely 
consequential in nature, learning is dependent upon the level of the firm’s current learning stock 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992). By implication, the ability of a firm to recognize not only the value of 
external novel information, acquire and integrate it into its routines, but also from its ability to 
exploit it towards commercial ends is vital to its capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This 
capability is a firm's absorptive capacity that necessitates for its successful application the 
synthesis of existing and new knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992). It depends thus from its prior 
knowledge stock, diversity of background and overlap between prior and new knowledge. This 
capability requires skills such as scanning, updating, creating, and interpreting information at both 
local and distant proximity (Teece, 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982). It necessitates the creation 
of internal knowledge and the exploitation of the knowledge that has been accumulated by others. 
With respect to technological innovation, R&D activity may be thought as a form of search for 
novel products and processes. However, when a firm’s knowledge creation relies heavily on in 











knowledge, its performance potential will ultimately be compromised. In fast-paced and 
exploratory-oriented environments a large portion of technological innovations often yields from 
exploring external sources (e.g., collaborators). In the context of exploration and exploitation, this 
implies that the effect of specializing in either exploratory or exploitative R&D is partly 
dependent on the availability of knowledge sourcing and external collaboration of the industry 
where the firm has chosen to operate and compete.   
Access to information is a prerequisite in identifying technological opportunities. The ability to 
recognize their value and potential however depends partly on the existing knowledge and 
learning capacities of the firm. It involves interpreting skills in translating and integrating this 
information to the firm’s objectives. Thus, acquisition and assimilation of this knowledge to 
match specific objectives is just the first step. The second step involves filtering the information 
and identifying its commercial potential. This task involves scanning and monitoring internal and 
external technological opportunities (Teece, 2007).  For instance, a firm that seeks to sustain and 
upgrade its output should sense potentially promising technological opportunities, make strategic 
decisions about what technologies to pursue, choose carefully what industries segments to target 
and decide what outputs will have the greater commercial value to exploit further (Teece, 2007). 
Integration is another critical trait of dynamic capability. The ability of the firm to integrate 
external activities and technologies into its established routines and processes is a core element 
of its dynamic capability repertoire (Teece and Pisano, 1994). The way a firm integrates its 
routines has a significant effect on its performance output (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). The 
importance of the idea that capability is embedded in the ways of integrating and coordinating 
routines is explained by the way that firms respond to changes in the environment. 
In highly volatile environments, it makes sense to acknowledge the value in the ability to identify 
the need to reconfigure and restructure the set of assets that a firm has on its disposal to achieve 
the required transformation (Amit and Schoemaker, 1992). The ability to reconfigure and 
transform is a learned skill and its application requires that the firm acknowledges the most critical 
assets and is willing to discard those that are less relevant to meet its objectives.  
Briefly, the dynamic capabilities concept reflects the capacity of the firm to employ its internal 
and external assets in a way efficient to increase its output. Capabilities indicate how good a firm 
is in combining efficiently a number of resources to accomplish a certain objective (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993). The dynamic capabilities of the firm are hard to articulate explicitly because 
they are captured in a firm’s high-performance routines, and they are embedded in its processes. 
They are an intermediate step between inputs and outputs that induce transformation (Dutta et al., 
2005). One can only see the resources that a firm uses to produce specific outputs, but he can only 
speculate on the capabilities employed in converting one to the other (Dutta, et. al., 2005). 











history and chosen trajectory. Their distinctive characteristics that make them immune to 
replication are that they require time to be built and are not tradable in the market. Finally, a firm’s 
absorptive capacity, its ability to identify the need to reconfigure and restructure the set of its 
existing assets, integrate external activities and technologies into its established routines and its 
ability to coordinate its routines are just but a few core elements of the dynamic capabilities. 
Therefore, we could argue that a specialized firm’s capability, which is determined to some extent 
by its absorptive capacity to identity evolutionary paths, could be strengthened in those contexts 
(industries) where the value of its expertise accentuates. In other words, in those industries where 








































CHAPTER 4: METHODS AND DATA 
  
Epistemological Underpinnings 
We adopt a positivist approach to the phenomenon of knowledge exploration and exploitation. 
We therefore subscribe to the view that there is an objective reality to the interpretation of the 
phenomenon under study. For this reason, we use quantitative methodologies and regression 
analysis to examine the effect of each independent variable on the dependent. According to the 
positivist approach, any knowledge claims that we make should be supported through quantifiable 
data and validated through statistical analysis (Benton and Craib, 2010). Therefore, the synthesis 
of logic and empiricism holds great promise in establishing legitimate knowledge claims. For this 
reason, our approach values verifiability (testability) as the most objective criterion to 
differentiate analytic from speculative knowledge (Caldwell, 2010). 
 For these reasons, we do not attach personal values or feelings to understanding the factors that 
affect firms’ decisions to invest in exploratory or exploitative activities. Yet, the objectivist 
approach and reliance on quantifiable data that are based purely on numbers and frequencies does 
not necessarily reject subjective interpretations. We acknowledge that what we consider facts in 
our study (e.g. investment decision of firms) could be theory impregnated, meaning that what we 
see as researchers can be affected by theory. Consistent with Kuhn (1970) we believe that 
inductivist and falsificationist approaches to research are not entirely correct because they view 
as legitimate knowledge (science) the progressive accumulation of facts to confirm various 
hypotheses and theories (Benton and Craib, 2010). We acknowledge thus that it is highly likely 
that even factual information (numerical data) observations are not entirely value free and 
objective but it can be affected by our theoretical presuppositions (Benton and Craib, 2010; Kuhn, 
1970). This implies that although, for instance, we monitor and report how much firms invest on 
exploration and exploitation using numerical data, we are trying to theorise based on the literature 
the conditions underpinning firms’ decisions. Therefore, we study firms’ decisions to invest in 
either exploratory and exploitative R&D and we do it as much as possible objectively using over 
32,537 observations and numerical data (the actual money firms’ report).  
 
METHOD 
To address the research objectives of this thesis, we need to have sufficiently high variation in 
both firm- and industry-specific factors. A large number of observations are required to identify 
inter-firm differences in exploration and exploitation and how such variations influence firm 











of this thesis for three reasons. First, regression analysis will enable us to establish not only 
causality, but also the directionality of the relevant relationships (Bryman, 2008) and place greater 
confidence in our research results (statistical significance captured in p values). Although the use 
of qualitative analysis (e.g., case studies or semi-structured interviews) is particularly useful for 
better understanding the processes underlying exploration and exploitation, such analysis will not 
enable us to identify and measure the causal effects of such differences and identify variations 
across firms and time.  
Second, another objective in our study is to obtain a representative sample in order to apply our 
research results to other firms with similar characteristics. This means that qualitative approaches 
to the study of exploration and exploitation are less appropriate because it would be less likely 
and feasible to obtain a representative sample to draw conclusions that can be generalized. 
Another benefit concerns the length of the time period. Although qualitative analysis may enable 
us to ask managers about their investments in exploration and exploitation in prior years, their 
responses are likely to be less reliable because of memory restrictions. Therefore, because one of 
our main objectives is to describe variation across firms and observe their economic evolution 
over time, a structured instrument such as surveys organized by the national institute of statistics 
and a probabilistic sample would be more appropriate in mapping the overall trend.  
 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE  
This PhD thesis employs data from PITEC (Technological Innovation Panel dataset), which is a 
longitudinal dataset that is co-managed by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the 
Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT), and the Foundation for Technical 
Innovation (COTEC). Spain constitutes of big and small-to-medium enterprises, and the majority 
of them engage in R&D. Specifically, PITEC accounts for 86% of all firms with 200 or more 
employees, and a sample of firms with intramural R&D expenditure that accounts for 56% of all 
firms engaged in in-house R&D, according to data from the Research Business Directory 
(DIRID). The cross-sectional dimension of the panel data not only reduces multicollinearity 
problems among explanatory variables, but also increases the degrees of freedom and variability 
across firms (Baltagi et al., 2005). Therefore, the nature of panel data allows us to obtain a more 
accurate and efficient estimation of the effect of each independent on our dependent. PITEC also 
comprises of firms that operate in various industries with low (furniture, recycling), medium 
(aeronautic space construction) and high technological intensity (chemical and pharmaceutical). 
Thus, PITEC and Spain provide an appropriate setting for testing our framework and proposed 
hypotheses and consider how firm-specific idiosyncrasies and industry factors influence the 











PITEC resembles in structure and objectives the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). It includes 
firm-level anonymized data that monitor the economic evolution and technological activities of 
firms in Spain. The information reported in PITEC is collected through several postal 
questionnaires. The companies are selected from national surveys conducted by the National 
Institute of Statistics in the field of innovation: "Survey on Technological Innovation in 
Companies and Statistics on R&D (http://icono.fecyt.es/pitec/Paginas/por_que.aspx). We have 
been granted access to a set of coordinated year-based files from 2003 to 2012. Similar to other 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), there is high reliability in the reported data because the 
survey is administered every two years by the National Statistics Institute (INE) in Spain and sent 
to firms that are obliged to respond. As a result, over a 90% response rate is achieved.  
PITEC is an appropriate source of data for this thesis for several reasons. First, rather than just 
providing an aggregate measure of R&D, it is a very detailed innovation survey that reports 
variables that are essential for identifying how much firms invest in exploratory versus 
exploitative R&D, providing a detailed breakdown of the distribution of R&D expenditure across 
exploratory activities (basic and applied research) and exploitative activities (technological 
development). Second, there is high reliability in the reported data because this is not a self-
administered survey, but it is instead administered and managed by the National Statistics Institute 
(INE) after consulting a group of academics and researchers. Third, PITEC follows the same firms 
across time allowing us to trace the innovative activity of those firms and investigate with greater 
accuracy their economic evolution, changes over time, and heterogeneity in their decisions, 
especially those concerning investments in exploratory and exploitative activities. Fourth, the 
dataset also reports the R&D services that firms purchase from the market.  
Our analysis focuses on firms with more than 10 employees. We avoided focusing on particularly 
small firms because they do not report (or do not conduct) exploratory and exploitative R&D 
systematically and this may bias the results for all other firms. Instead of focusing on a single 
industry (Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; He and Wong, 2004), we have 
chosen to examine 56 industries to increase variability in our data and be able to test how certain 
hypothesized effects differ across groups of industries.  The use of this multi-industry sample will 
enable us to test not only the direct effect of exploratory and exploitative R&D investments on a 
firm performance, but also the interacting effect of investing heavily in one activity (specialization 
strategies) when a firm operates in differently oriented industries (exploratory/ exploitative-
oriented or hybrid industries). The initial sample consisted of 41,196 firm-year observations that 
had information on exploratory and exploitative R&D investments. However, after deleting 
missing observations and firms that had less than four years of information, the final sample 















Advantages of Longitudinal Panel Data 
Panel data better capture the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi et al., 2005; Baltagi, 2001). This 
means that the longitudinal aspect of PITEC survey allows us to take a dynamic perspective on 
the study of exploration and exploitation. Studies using cross-section data cannot estimate the 
effect of each variable across time, but they can only make estimations at a certain point in time. 
Using panel, we will be able to estimate the investment decisions of firms at different points in 
time. Furthermore, because panel data include a time dimension we would be able to control for 
the performance and investment decisions of firms in prior years.  
Using panel data allows us to control for firm heterogeneity (Pindado et al., 2012). Using 
information across firms and across time, we are able to control for such unobserved 
heterogeneity. For instance, firms may differ in decisions to invest in exploration or exploration. 
Some firms may be more exploratory- or exploitative- oriented and this propensity may change 
over time because of various external or internal factors. Therefore, entering firm-specific 
variables into our specified model, will allow us to obtain more accurate estimation effects, 
controlling for firm variations.  
Panel data also provide us with a viable solution to problems of endogeneity. Endogeneity can 
arise because there is reverse causality in the model and the dependent variable might influence 
some independent variables (Wooldridge et al., 2002). In our study, for example, it is possible 
that firms with superior performance engage in ambidextrous strategies due to greater access to 
resources (both internal and externa) and vice versa (Cao et al., 2009) Thus, the use of longitudinal 
data will enable us to construct instrumental variables to mitigate problems that arise from 
endogeneity (Pindado et al., 2012).  
 
MEASURES 
In addition to the following sub-sections that describe in detail how the measures employed in the 
study were constructed, Table 1 in Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis provides a brief description 
of the main variables used in this study. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Following the literature on R&D and performance (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Adams and 
Jaffe, 1996; Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001; Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005), we capture firm 
performance by constructing a measure of total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is an appropriate 











products and services of firms, but also for two key inputs; namely the firm’s labour (number of 
employees) and capital (tangible assets). Because industries vary in the inputs they use, a few 
studies also consider the cost of intermediate inputs when estimating TFP (Kafouros et al., 2008; 
Kafouros et al., 2018). Although data on intermediate inputs are not available in the dataset, we 
tried to address cross-industry variations by using multi-level estimators that are nested in each 
industry. Second, the TFP measure reflects the fact that R&D investment leads not only to the 
development of new products but also to new process innovations that might enhance firm 
productivity by leading to higher efficiency and to the better allocation of resources. 
Finally, while other measures of firm performance such as profitability are very volatile and often 
take negative values, total factor productivity remains relatively stable to market 
fluctuations, exchange rate variations, transfer pricing, accounting standards and the treatment of 
royalties (Buckley, 1996).  
Following common practice (e.g. Adams and Jaffe, 1996; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros 
and Aliyev, 2016b; Kafouros et al., 2018), we operationalize each firm’s productivity 
performance by estimating a ‘residual’ that captures increases in firm output that cannot be 
explained by firm inputs. This residual is the outcome of a function where the nominator is a 
firm’s output (firm sales) and the denominator include the two key firm inputs: labour (the 
number of employees) and capital (tangible assets). As TFP captures a firm’s ability to generate 
sales while controlling for the inputs that a firm uses to achieve that level of output, it avoids 
biases associated with the fact that different outputs may exhibit different economies of scale 
(Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b). The estimation of TFP is based on 
the fact that productivity is the intermediate transformation capacity level between inputs and 
outputs and thus reflects a firm’ ability to transform and generate value from a given number of 
inputs (Dutta et al., 2005). To be consistent with prior studies and given that economic 
relationships are rarely linear, we transform the TFP measure in its logarithmic form (Van 
Beveren, 2012; Qingwang and Junxue, 2005).  
Finally, we should acknowledge that productivity (Griliches, 1979; 1998; Cassiman et al., 2010) 
and sales growth (He and Wong, 2004; Venkatraman et al., 2007) have been used widely in the 
literature of exploration and exploitation. However, prior studies have also used various 
dependent variables, including measures of profitability such as ROE and ROA, (Aug and 
Mengue, 2005), innovativeness (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), and market-based indicators such as 
Tobin’s Q (Uotila et al., 2009; DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999) and subjective measures of firm 
performance based of manager’s perceptions regarding firm’s sales growth, profit growth, market 
share growth and operational efficiency (Cao et al., 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Given that we have available the actual R&D expenditure (in money) of firms, 











longitudinally). Similarly, because of insufficient data availability we also could not use measures 
of profitability.  
 
Estimating TFP 
To estimate total factor productivity (TFP) for each firm (i) at time (t), we need to consider the 
relationship between certain firm inputs X and firm outputs Y. This is a standard practice 
employed in the literature (Griliches, 1998; Kafouros et al., 2018). This practice is a production 
function or a transformation of the Cobb-Douglas model that considers both labour (the number 
of employees) and capital (tangible assets) as inputs (see equation 1). To estimate total factor 
productivity (TFP), we firstly estimated the production function and secondly estimated the 
residual TFP of this production function. This residual reflects variations in a firm’s output (sales) 
that cannot be explained by variations in the inputs (Temouri et al., 2008; Smarzynska Javorcik, 
2004). In the estimation, we also included industry and year dummy variables to account for 
industry-specific idiosyncrasies and changes over time (Kafouros et al., 2018). The following 
equation represents the total output (Y) as a function capital input (K), labour input (L) and 
residual !.  
"it	=		#it			+			$it			+		%t			+			It			+		!it				(1)		
The letter " represents the total input of a firm as a function of total factor productivity (A), capital 
input (K) which is measured at tangible asset, and labour input (L) which is measured as number 
of employees (Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). % and ( refers to year and industry dummies, 
respectively. The ! is residual of this equation (Temouri et al., 2008), which reflects TFP.  
KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Exploratory and Exploitative R&D investments 
Prior research has used various ways to measure exploratory and exploitative activities. For 
instance, in the context of patent analyses, exploration was measured as search scope, which 
characterized the tendency of firms to cite different patents.  Exploitation is such studies was 
measured as search depth, indicative of firms’ propensity to cite existing patents frequently 
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002). We did not use patent data to measure exploration and exploitation 
(Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) firstly because the survey questionnaire 
reported only limited information on the number of patents they file and secondly because the 
propensity to file innovations varies across industries (Cockburn and Griliches, 1987). 
The degree to which firm’s search behavior crosses both technological and organizational 
boundaries has also been suggested in the literature (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001), while other 











exploitation and exploration, respectively. However, we did not use these measures because 
exploration and exploitation may be associated with radical and incremental innovative outputs, 
but they differ conceptually given that they refer to activities (rather than an actual output). In 
addition, it may be possible for a radical innovation to be based on the combination of existing 
knowledge and technologies.  
To develop measures for our key independent variables, we rely on established practice in the 
ambidexterity literature (Jansen et al., 2006; He and Wong, 2004; Smith and Tushman, 2005), the 
organizational learning literature (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Vassolo et al., 2004; Vermeulen 
and Barkema, 2001; D’Este et al., 2017), the definition proposed in March’s (1991) seminal work 
and the definitions of R&D (OECD, 2002). Exploitative R&D consists of the systematic work 
that relies mainly upon the firm’s existing technological and knowledge base and aims mainly at 
developing and/or creating new features or refining/improving existing features of products and 
processes, extending therefore the life cycle, market fit and effectiveness of innovations. By 
contrast, when firms engage/invest in explorative R&D, firms have to conduct entirely new 
research (which can be basic or applied), accumulate new knowledge, and often engage in 
experimental work without necessarily considering its immediate practical application. Yet, the 
ideas developed when engaging in exploratory R&D are more likely to lead to new and/or 
different outputs.   
The PITEC survey provides us with a direct measure of exploratory and exploitative R&D that is 
consistent with the established measurement of R&D innovation activities (OECD, 2002). PITEC 
reports R&D investment into its distribution in exploratory and exploitative R&D. Consistent 
with established literature (March, 1991; Jansen et al., 2006; He and Wong, 2004; D’Este et al., 
2017) and the definition provided in the PITEC survey, R&D exploration consists of the creative 
work and research (both basic and applied) that is conducted as a way to accumulate new 
knowledge that may lead to something new in the firm and/or the market. By contrast, exploitation 
is captured by firms’ R&D expenditure on technological development that consists of the 
systematic work that relies mainly upon the firm’s existing knowledge base that has been 
accumulated through repetition and practical experience that aim at refining or improving 
substantially existing products and processes.  
The above line of thinking is consistent with recent work that contends that R&D is a 
heterogeneous activity (D’Este et al 2017; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Bargegil and Lopez, 2014), and 
it should not be aggregated. This line of thinking is also consistent with the recent studies that 
equate the “Research” component of R&D with exploration, and the “Development” component 
of R&D with exploitative activities (D’Este et al., 2017; Shift, 2016). As noted earlier, the 
Research component incorporates both basic and applied elements, whereas the Development 











Basic research is experimental or theoretical work in nature that aims at creating and generating 
knowledge not necessarily with a particular application (OECD, 2002), e.g. to find certain 
combinations of materials that may hold electric charge for longer. Applied research on the other 
hand aims at knowledge generation with practical applications (OECD, 2002), e.g. to use a 
combination of materials that leads to a new generation of batteries. In other words, exploitative 
R&D makes use of the extant knowledge that often emerges from the exploratory R&D (research 
phase) and is aimed at improving existing products, services devices and materials (OECD, 2002). 
The description of R&D (OECD, 2002; D’Este et al., 2017) echoes March’s (1991) terminology 
and relates the “exploration of new possibilities,” with the basic and applied research component, 
whereas the “exploitation of old certainties” is associated with the developmental component.  
Therefore, as in recent work (D’Este et al., 2017), we measure exploratory R&D using the 
expenditure (i.e. internal R&D budget) that the firm spends annually on research and exploratory 
activities (both basic and applied). We then divide the resulting figure with the number of 
employees to normalize the measure for the size of the firm, and as in the TFP measure, we 
transform it into its logarithm (Qingwang and Junxue, 2005; Van Beveren, 2012). Similarly, we 
measure exploitative R&D using the investment made in exploitative R&D (i.e. technological 
development). This measure is again divided by the number of employees to normalize it for firm 
size and it is expressed in its logarithmic form (Van Beveren, 2012). Given that these data are 
reported annually in the database, both exploratory and exploitative R&D measures are time-
variant, enabling us to observe the distribution of one over the other and how they change from 
year to year.  
 
Firm Specialization in Exploratory and Exploitative R&D vs Ambidextrous Firms. 
Following previous studies (He and Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009), we use the absolute difference 
in percentage between firms’ expenditure on exploratory and exploitative R&D. Building on the 
definition that specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their activities, we 
classify a firm as specialized in one activity when it spends over 66.6% of its internal R&D budget 
on either exploration or exploitation. This means that a firm’s investment in one of the two 
activities is at least two times higher than its investment in the other activity.  
We measure firms’ specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D investments using two 
different ways. The first measure is a year-specific measure of specialization that reflects what 
the firms does in a given year. This variable is time-variant because a firm could specialize in 
exploratory R&D in one year (i.e. they spend over 66.6% of their internal R&D budget on 
exploration), but in the next year it may spend over 66.6% of its budget on exploitation.  
Further, the theory and hypotheses discussed in certain chapters of this thesis do not concern what 











(their strategy over several years that the firms exist in the dataset). As discussed in the theoretical 
background of the thesis, cycling between the two activities from one year to the other (i.e. 
specializing in exploratory R&D in one year and then specializing in exploitative R&D in the 
next year is just a way of achieving ambidexterity (i.e., through temporal cycling or punctuated 
equilibrium). We also developed a second measure of specialization that captures the overall 
strategy of the firm. Accordingly, each firm is categorized in one of the following three groups 
(using three dummy variables): specialization in exploratory R&D (the average investment in 
exploration is higher than 66.6%), specialization in exploitative R&D (the average investment in 
exploitation is higher than 66.6%), and ambidextrous (the percentage of their budget spent on 
either is between 33.3% and 66.6%).  
 
Exploratory-Oriented, Exploitative-Oriented and Hybrid Industries   
To test the hypotheses concerning the role of industry orientation, we classify each industry in 
one of the following groups: exploratory-oriented, exploitative-oriented and hybrid industries. 
Based on prior studies (He and Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009) and in line with the way in which 
we estimated specialization at the firm level, we estimated how many firms specialize and in 
which activity in each industry (i.e. we identified where the concentration of firm is) and consider 
the absolute difference between such concentration in identifying the industry’s orientation. 
Initially, we identified the number of firms in each industry that had over 66.6% of their internal 
R&D budget spent on exploratory or exploitative activities (i.e., firms that are specialized), and 
how many firms were ambidextrous in each industry. Table 1 reports the concentration of firms 
across industries. The letters R, T, and H next to the industry sector indicate the orientation of the 
industry i.e., Exploratory and Exploitative-oriented, and Hybrid industries, respectively).   
We subsequently estimated the absolute difference between firms that specialized in each activity 
(refer to the last column in Table 1). The mean value of the absolute difference (which is 20%) 
was used to classify each industry, depending on whether this deviation was higher or lower that 
20%. The pharmaceutical sector (Industry Code 12) is highly specialized in exploratory R&D as 
it exhibits an absolute difference of 37% (54% exploration and only 17% exploitation). At the 
other end of the spectrum, an industry that is highly specialized in exploitative R&D includes the 
telecommunication services sector (Industry Code 42) that exhibits an absolute difference of 47% 
(17% exploration and 64% exploitation). When industries are not classified as oriented on either 
exploratory or exploitative R&D (i.e., with less than 20% mean value between specialised in 
exploration and exploitation R&D firms) such as industry code 20 (refer to the last column in 
Table 1), fall into the category of hybrid industries. Based on this categorization, we created 
dummy variables, one for industries that are oriented in exploratory R&D, one for industries that 































R&D in % 
Ambidextrous 













Agriculture - R 0 274 143 144 561 49% 26% 25% 23% 
Extractive - R 1 88 35 37 160 55% 23% 22% 33% 
Food and Drink - H 2 1,166 784 818 2,768 42% 30% 28% 14% 
Tobacco - H 3 11 13 2 26 42% 8% 50% 8% 
Textiles - H 4 375 384 221 980 38% 23% 39% 1% 
Clothing - H 5 55 74 28 157 35% 18% 47% 12% 
Leather and 
Footwear - H 
6 79 72 57 208 38% 27% 35% 3% 
Wood & Cork- H 7 115 110 63 288 40% 22% 38% 2% 
Paper - H 8 129 113 115 357 36% 32% 32% 4% 
Publishing, Graphic 
Arts & Reproduction 
- H 
9 97 139 90 326 30% 28% 43% 13% 
Coking Petroleum 
Refining - H 
10 12 7 21 40 30% 53% 18% 13% 












Products - R 
12 586 182 317 1,085 54% 29% 17% 37% 
Rubber and Plastic - 
H 
13 445 646 315 1,406 32% 22% 46% 14% 
Ceramic Wall and 
Floor Tiles - H 
14 76 69 31 176 43% 18% 39% 4% 
Non-Metallic 
Minerals - H 
15 346 317 309 972 36% 32% 33% 3% 
Ferrous Metallurgical 
Products - H 
16 145 227 104 476 30% 22% 48% 17% 
Non-Ferrous 
Metallurgical 
Products - T 
17 59 149 95 303 19% 31% 49% 30% 
Metallic Products - T 18 518 1,030 495 2,043 25% 24% 50% 25% 
Machinery and 
Mechanical 
Equipment - T 
19 783 1,858 1,060 3,701 21% 29% 50% 29% 
Office Machines and 
Computing 
Equipment- H 
20 21 13 43 77 27% 56% 17% 10% 
Electrical Machinery 
and Materials - T 
21 341 682 412 1,435 24% 29% 48% 24% 
Electronic 
Components - T 
22 65 164 132 361 18% 37% 45% 27% 
Radio, TV& 
Commun. Devices - T 
23 128 303 185 616 21% 30% 49% 28% 
Medical Precision 
and Optical 
Instruments - T 
24 270 511 392 1,173 23% 33% 44% 21% 











Shipbuilding - T 26 26 66 34 126 21% 27% 52% 32% 
Aircraft and 
spacecraft 
Manufacturing - T 
27 11 70 41 122 9% 34% 57% 48% 
Transport Materials - 
T 
28 27 93 53 173 16% 31% 54% 38% 
Furniture - H 29 221 273 143 637 35% 22% 43% 8% 
Toys and Games - T 30 18 46 13 77 23% 17% 60% 36% 
Manufactured Goods 
- H 
31 53 75 45 173 31% 26% 43% 13% 
Recycling - H 32 21 30 45 96 22% 47% 31% 9% 
Production and 
distribution of 
Electricity, Gas & 
Water- H 
33 92 94 119 305 30% 39% 31% 1% 
Construction - H 34 221 343 308 872 25% 35% 39% 14% 
Sale and Repair of 
Motor Vehicles - T 
35 5 30 4 39 13% 10% 77% 64% 
Wholesale Trading - 
H 
36 497 559 346 1,402 35% 25% 40% 4% 
Retail Trading - T 37 33 72 50 155 21% 32% 46% 25% 
Hotel Industry - R 38 34 21 9 64 53% 14% 33% 20% 
Transport - H 39 44 54 25 123 36% 20% 44% 8% 
Activities linked to 
Transport &Travel - 
T 











Postal & Mail 
Activities - H 
41 2 2 0 4 50% 0% 50% 0% 
Telecommunication 
Services - T 
42 46 175 54 275 17% 20% 64% 47% 
Financial 
Intermediation - T 
43 138 283 101 522 26% 19% 54% 28% 
Real Estate Activities 
- H 
44 33 36 12 81 41% 15% 44% 4% 
Machinery and 
Equipment - T 
45 7 31 8 46 15% 17% 67% 52% 
Software - T 46 351 1,312 647 2,310 15% 28% 57% 42% 
Computing Activities 
- T 
47 87 411 177 675 13% 26% 61% 48% 
Research & 
Development 
48 660 226 681 1,567 42% 43% 14% 28% 
Technical Services in 
Architecture - T 
49 346 740 480 1,566 22% 31% 47% 25% 
Trials and Technical 
Analysis - H 
50 163 171 190 524 31% 36% 33% 2% 
Business Activities - 
H 
51 215 344 201 760 28% 26% 45% 17% 
Education - H 52 35 45 37 117 30% 32% 38% 9% 
Film &Video 
Activities - H 
53 13 21 25 59 22% 42% 36% 14% 
Radio &TV activities 
- T 












Specialized Firms in Exploitative/Exploratory-oriented and Hybrid Industries 
We created 9 separate variables based on a 3X3 table. For instance, firms that specialize in 
exploratory R&D and operate in exploratory, hybrid and exploitative-oriented industries are in 
the corresponding Cells 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2 below. Firms that specialize in exploitative R&D 
and operate in an exploratory-, hybrid- and exploitative-oriented industry belong respectively to 
Cells 7, 8, and 9 of the table. Similarly, firms that are ambidextrous and operate in exploratory-, 





Table 2: The nine dummies that correspond to specialized firms in oriented industries 









Exploratory   Oriented 
Firms Specialize in 
Exploitative R&D 
Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 
Ambidextrous Firms 
Cell 4 Cell 5 Cell 6 
Firms Specialize in 
Exploratory R&D 











Patterns of Change in Exploratory and Exploitative R&D  
In addition to the above measures, we also identified seven distinct strategic patterns that firms 
follow with respect to their specialization strategy. The first three patterns focus on firms that do 
not change their specialization strategy over time, whereas the remaining four patterns concern 
situations in which firms change their specialization strategy from one activity (e.g. exploratory 
R&D) to another (e.g., exploitative R&D)  
Regarding the first three patterns, as noted earlier, they involve firms that do not change their 
specialization strategy over time, i.e. they remain specialized in the same activity for all the years. 
The three patterns include: a) firms that remain specialized in exploratory R&D, b) firms that 
remain specialized in exploitative R&D and c) firms that remain simultaneously ambidextrous 
(i.e. they spend a similar amount of money on both activities). To be consistent with the definition 
that specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their activities, we classify a 
firm as specialized in exploration or exploitation when it spends over 66.6 % of its internal R&D 
budget on either exploratory or exploitative R&D for all the observable years in the dataset.  
This classification ensures that firms do not change their chosen specialization strategy and thus 
they remain specialized every year and throughout the sampled years. For instance, Firm A spends 
75% of its innovation budget on exploratory R&D and the remaining 25% on exploitation R&D 
in year t. Next year (t+1), the same firm spends 85% on exploratory R&D and the remaining 15% 
on exploitation R&D. Although this firm has increased its spending on explorative R&D, it has 
not changed its specialization strategy.   
Further, there is a third pattern in the dataset in which firms remain c) simultaneously 
ambidextrous’. Building on the definition of ambidexterity, we classify ambidextrous firms those 
that synchronously make similar investments on both exploratory and exploitative R&D every 
year and throughout the sampled years in the dataset, (the cut-off points are between 33.3% and 
66.6%). Examples of ambidextrous firms include firms that spent 50% on exploratory R&D and 
50% on exploitative R&D, or 60% on exploratory R&D and 40% exploitative R&D). 
Simultaneous ambidexterity also requires structural ambidexterity (i.e., physical separation 
between exploration and exploitation units) (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). For this reason, it is 
less viable for resource-constrained (often smaller-size) firms. Further, there are cases where 
firms operate in stable environments such as service industries where balancing exploitative and 
exploratory R&D is not a necessity (Chen and Katila, 2008; Goosen, et al., 2012; McIver et al, 
2010; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013).  
Firms also change among three dominant patterns i.e., a) specialized in exploratory R&D, b) 
specialized in exploitative R&D, and c) simultaneous ambidextrous. Those firms may change 
either regularly (i.e., annually) or irregularly (i.e., every two, three, four years and so on).  











exploitative R&D, exploratory R&D, and ambidextrous R&D investments. We have identified 
that those firms are more likely to cycle between six different patterns in their R&D investments. 
A) exploitative R&D firms either become ambidextrous R&D or exploratory R&D firms. B) 
ambidextrous R&D firms either become exploitative or exploratory R&D, and C) exploratory 
R&D firms either become exploitative or ambidextrous R&D firms. Thus, the directionality of 
change is from A=>B or A=>C, B=>C or B=>A and C=>A or C=>B. or (A=>B and C=>B, 
A=>C, C=>A and B=>A, B=>C).   
For instance, Firm A is simultaneous ambidextrous (i.e., with R&D distribution 50% on 
exploratory and exploitative R&D in year t. Next year (t+1), the same firm decides to spend more 
on exploratory R&D with distribution 80% 20%. And in the third year (t+3), the same firm may 
decide to reverse its investments towards exploitative R&D with distribution 70% 30%. This 




As competition can affect firm performance, we control for such effects. We used two different 
measures of competition. First, we measured competition using the number of intra-industry 
competitors at the 2-digit level. However, because this measure does not capture the market share 
of firms and whether few firms control most of the market, we also estimated a measure of 
competition that relies on the Herfindahl Index. The Herfindahl Index is widely used in the 
literature and it is accepted in various studies as a good and appropriate indicator of industry 
concentration (Kafouros and Aliyev 2016; Wu and Xia, 2016). Herfindahl index is estimated as 
the sum of squared market shares of firms in the industry. Hence, it is calculated as !"# = 1 −
∑ ()#*+),- , where sij is the market share of firm i in industry j and therefore it takes values between 
0 and 1. A higher level of the Herfindahl Index suggests that there is a lower concentration level 
within an industry, which reflects lower levels of competition. We therefore use the inverse value 




Following prior studies (Auh and Menguc, 2005; Jansen et al., 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2006), we 
control for firm’s tangible assets. The literature has emphasized the importance of resource 
constrains and difficulties in changing resources when environments change (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Tushman et al., 1985). Some firms have more physical capital such as buildings 
and equipment that may affect firm performance. We measure this variable by using the firm’s 











partly control for firm size. I did not measure firm size using the number of employees as used in 
some prior studies (He and Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2006) because I use the number of 
employees to normalize other variables for size effects.  
 
Newly Created Firms  
Controlling for firm age is important as well-established firms may perform better than entrant 
firms due to their accumulated experiential learning (Jansen et al., 2006). Such experiential 
learning that is partially captured in the number of years the firm operates may influence firm 
performance. Consistent with prior studies (Kafouros et al, 2015; Cao et al., 2009), controlling 
for firm age enables us to capture heterogeneity between well-established and newly founded 
firms. Furthermore, firm age has been associated with established and difficult to change 
institutional routines and norms that stimulate inertial behaviour affecting thus firm performance 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). We control for newly created firms using a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if a firm is newly created (i.e., in the last 4 years; Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
An alternative operationalization of firm age is the number of years since the firm’s foundation 
(Lubatkin et al., 2006). However, due to a large number of missing observations, we were not 
able to use this measure.  
 
International Sales  
Firm performance is also affected by whether a firm sells its products and services nationally or 
internationally. A firm’s market is associated with firm’s growth and expansion that could also 
be affected by its linkage with global markets (He and Wong, 2004). Further, selling in 
international markets has been associated with international competitiveness and access to new 
knowledge and market information (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). To control for such 
differences, we include in our model a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that sell 
their products internationally.  
 
Affiliated Firms  
Groups can help their affiliated firms by transferring knowledge, resources, skills and capabilities. 
As a result, firms that are affiliated to groups may be able to achieve higher performance than 
firms that operate alone (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). We control for the fact that some firms 
belong to a group (affiliated business) whereas others do not, using a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for affiliated firms.   
 
Protection 











the variety of mechanisms that firms use to protect their inventions. We draw on the responses of 
firms to the question in the survey on whether the firms actually apply for any legal mechanism 
to protect their inventions. We consider whether in reality firms use those mechanisms rather than 
their perception of importance about their use. In PITEC, firms indicate whether they use four 
different types of protection namely patents, utility models, trademarks and copyrights. We use 
the sum of each firm’s response on the use of these four types of legal mechanisms for the 
protection of their inventions. Firms that score higher on a scale of 0-4 was used as an indicator 
that this firm utilizes a wider array of legal protection mechanisms to protect its inventions 
compared with their low-score counterparts. We also use the logarithmic value of the variable to 
maintain consistency in the modelling.  
 
Industry’s R&D intensity   
We control for the industry’s R&D intensity using the industry’s total R&D expenditure divided 
by total industry sales (Uotila et al., 2009). In environments with high levels of R&D spending, 
technological opportunities are more abundant than in environments with lower R&D spending 
(Zahra, 1996a; Zahra, 1996b). These opportunities may influence firm performance (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1989).  
 
High Technological Firms 
Given that high-tech firms are qualitatively different from low-tech firms, we develop a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 when a firm belongs to high-tech industries. The construction of 
this variable is based on the OECD classification given in COTEC Report (1997) as cited in 
Bayona Sáez and Arribas (2002). High-tech industries refer to sectors such as chemicals, 
pharmaceutical, computing, electronics, electrical, communication, and medical devices and 
optical instruments. By contrast, medium and low-tech industries include sectors such as textiles, 
furniture, leather, rubber and plastic (Table 2 in Appendix 1).  
 
Time Effects and Industry Dummies 
We control for time effects by incorporating year dummies (that equals 1 if associated with the 
corresponding year) to account for differences in economic trends and business cycles over years 
(Belderbos et al., 2010). In models that are not nested in industries (i.e. when they are not multi-
level), we also include industry dummies in our model to account for the different industry 















Given that firms in our sample are clustered within industries, a Multilevel Mixed Model approach, 
which is often also referred to as Hierarchical Linear regression is appropriate for estimating the 
coefficients of interest (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002; Preacher et al., 2006; Anderson, 2014). Unlike 
traditional panel data estimators, we use a multilevel analysis with mixed effects, which as the 
name suggests it considers both Fixed Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) and specify the 
model to produce results that are nested in each industry and id (firm). By nesting the effects 
within each firm (id) the analysis has the additional benefit of producing an estimator that is very 
close to FE (because it estimates the effects separately for each firm), and it has the additional 
benefit of estimating coefficients for each industry separately. Although we consider using FE 
models, the fact that we expected the effects of specialization strategies and 
exploration/exploitation investment to vary a lot depending on the industry made the Fixed Effect 
estimator less appropriate to reveal variability at both industry and firm level (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Preacher et al., 2006; Anderson, 2014). Thus, our chosen Multilevel Mixed Effect estimator 
allows us to explicitly specify the estimation with complicated clustering patterns near models 
while relies on the assumption of independence of error terms, which may be violated when firms 
are clustered in various industries (Hox et al., 2017; Preacher et al., 2006; Anderson, 2014).  
We also considered using alternative methods for estimating our empirical model. Initially, we 
considered running our model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression following practice 
of established studies (e.g., He and Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005). However, OLS regression 
often yields biased coefficients and it is not suitable for treating endogeneity (Blundell and Bond, 
2000). Endogeneity problem often arises from unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variable 
problems, errors in measurement, simultaneity problems and general discrepancy between true 
variables and their proxies. This often happens when the chosen variables are not strictly 
exogenous, but they correlate somehow with the error term in our specified model (Pindado et 
al., 2012). As for the simultaneity problem (reverse causality) often occurs when TFP and 
explanatory variables are correlated somehow. Yet, instead of explanatory variables causing some 
change in TFP, it goes the other way. In our case, this implies that the error term of the production 
function will affect the choice of inputs factors, and for this reason an association will be detected 
between the error terms and our chosen key explanatory variables (Blundell and Bond, 2000). 
Subsequently, we avoided using OLS estimates because of the high possibility of obtaining biased 
coefficients in estimating TFP.  
Similarly, we also considered using Fixed effects (FE) and Random effects (RE) models for 
analysing our dataset. The use of Fixed effects (within group estimator) was not appropriate in 
our study because when running the regressions, we could not get coefficients of the time-











Our choice not to use FE estimator was also validated using the Hausman and Mundlak test 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Mundlak, 1978) which confirmed that RE models are more suitable 
than FE for our study. Please, note that we also experimented with the RE estimator for testing 
the hypotheses of Chapter 6 and obtained consistency across the results). Yet, we decided that 
Multilevel mixed effect is more appropriate estimator for the purpose of our study for the reasons 
we explained earlier on.  
We also followed established studies on ambidexterity (e.g., Uotila et al., 2009) and used the 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimator as alternative estimator to our main Multilevel Mixed 
Model estimator. This approach would validate and establish that our results are not a product of 
a specific estimator (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell and Bond, 2000).  
As mentioned, despite the fact that our data is longitudinal (which as mentioned controlled for 
individual heterogeneity; Pindado et al., 2012), and that we run the results using also GLS models, 
we still had concerns that endogeneity might be an issue in our study. As we explained the 
endogeneity problem might occur because our dependent (TFP) affects some of the explanatory 
variables (Pindado et al., 2012). In the context of exploration and exploitation, it is that firms that 
specialize in ambidexterity may be endogenous to firm performance (TFP). Thus, in our 
models, the issue of endogeneity might occur when, for instance, ambidextrous firms may be 
better performing firms. To mitigate this problem, we followed common practice and used as 
instrumental variables the explanatory variables lagged (Pindado et al., 2012). Specifically, we 
followed established studies on ambidexterity (e.g., Uotila et al., 2009) and used the Arelano-
Bond GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Wooldridge, 2001; Hansen, 2010; Roodman, 
2006). As explained, the GMM estimation method uses the lagged values of the explanatory 
variables as main instruments and it is often adopted as a sufficient solution to endogeneity issues 
because these lagged variables are interrelated with the regressors they instrument (Pindado et al., 
2012; Uotila et al., 2009; Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, the Hansen (1982) test of 
instruments validity indicated that the fit of the instruments is not good, which the regression 
provides statistically insignificant results for the variables which are dummies (which is expected 
given that dummies do not vary a lot over time).  
We finally attempted to address the issue of endogeneity using the two-stage least squares (2SLS)  
estimator but as explained the effectiveness of this approach depends on finding appropriate and 
using valid instruments (Bollen et al., 2007). Specifically, the process involves two stages. In the 
first stage we found two variables that are uncorrelated with the error term in order to predict a 
proxy for our potentially endogenous regressor. In the second stage, we use the predicted value to 
estimate our linear regression model (Wooldridge, 2002). The choice of these two variables were 











Johnson, 2005 Cao et al., 2009; Chen and Hambrick, 1995) We used thus firm age and number 
of employees as instruments and consider the possibility that they are endogenously determined 
to ambidextrous firms.  The theoretical justification is that resource abundant firms can exploit 
and explore (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005). Equally, larger size firms have access 
to external munificent environments or are resource rich internally that allows them to be 
ambidextrous (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). In addition, we performed a post estimation test to 
ensure that the variables we chose are exogenous. The results from both the Durbin statistic and 
Wu-Hausman had very small values (Durbin (score) chi2(1) = 452.738 (p = 0.0000) and Wu-
Hausman F (1,29802) = 459.675 (p = 0.0000) (Wooldridge, 2002). We also test our odel for 
overidentification. The p values of both Sargan (score) chi2(1) =1.68566(p = 0.1942) and 
Basmann chi2(1) = 1.68558 (p = 0.1942) were large, suggesting that the choice of these two 
instrumental variables is valid, and our model is correctly specified. Subsequently, the results 
from the tests are indicative that endogeneity is not a problem in our analysis. 
 
The Empirical Model 
As mentioned, the first step before running our regression analysis was to follow established 
studies and estimate the productivity function (Equation 1) to identify differentials in TFP across 
firms of various industries operating in Spain (Kafouros et al., 2018; Temouri et al., 2008). In the 
second step we introduced the model including our key explanatory variables and controls 
(Equation 2 below). Our specified model included not only firm-specific variables but also 
industry-specific variables that all together account for variations in productivity of our sampled 
firms. We also followed common practice and included the logarithmic transformation of 
variables to allow interpretation of the results (Qingwang and Junxue, 2005; Van Beveren, 2012). 
Our approach follows established methodology and the model is the following (Temouri et al., 
2008):  
Yit= b0j+ b1X1it+ b2X2it + b3X3 it + b4X4 it + b5X5 it + b6X6 it + b7X7ij+ b8X8 it + b9X9ij + 
b10X10 it + eit  (2) 
 
Where Yit refers to our dependent variable (TFP) for an individual firm (i) in time (t) and industry 
(j). The X variables represent our key explanatory and control variables. Specifically,  
X1 represents investments in exploratory R&D 
X2 represents investments in exploitative R&D  
X3 represents the tangible resources  
X4 represents the international sales of firms  











X6 is the inverse Herfindahl Index  
X7 represents the number of legal mechanisms firm use to protect their inventions,  
X8 represents the industry intensity  
X9 represents the age of firms  
X10 represents firms that operate in high-technology industries  
In our model we further included industry and time dummies which we omit here for 






































SPECIALIZATION IN EXPLORATORY AND EXPLOITATIVE R&D: 
CONSEQUENCES FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
ABSTRACT  
This chapter contributes to organizational learning theory and to research on exploration and 
exploitation by enhancing understanding of 1) whether specializing in either exploratory or 
exploitative R&D is more beneficial than an ambidextrous strategy, and 2) whether the returns to 
exploratory and exploitative R&D differ for those firms that adopt a specialization strategy versus 
those firms that are ambidextrous. Our empirical analysis of a longitudinal dataset of 32,537 
observations indicates that for firms that specialize in exploratory R&D, the positive effects of 
such an exploratory R&D activity are stronger than the effects of exploitative R&D activity on 
firm performance. By contrast, for firms that specialize in exploitative R&D, the positive effects 
of such an exploratory R&D activity are weaker than the effects of exploitative R&D activity on 
firm performance. Our study therefore joins the discussion on ambidexterity by advancing the 
debate on whether firms should be ambidextrous or specialize in either of these two activities and 
contributes to organisational learning theory by explaining the mechanisms under which the 
effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D become weaker or strengthen depending upon the 
firm’s choice to pursue investments that are similar or deviate to their current specialization 


























The organizational learning theory and the innovation literature have long recognized the 
importance of investing in exploration and exploitation for enhancing firm performance (Benner 
and Tushman, 2002; He and Wong, 2004; Cao et al. 2009, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Lubatkin et al., 2006). However, these two types of activities involve a distinctively different 
knowledge base, different structures, processes and may lead to dissimilar performance outcomes. 
Applying the concepts of exploration and exploitation in the context of R&D, we expect 
investments in exploratory R&D to be unpredictable because firms are required to experiment 
with unfamiliar knowledge. Yet, these investments could lead to knowledge creation, 
breakthrough ideas and new opportunities (Gupta et al., 2006; Belderbos et al., 2010). By contrast, 
investments in exploitative R&D yield more predictable returns because firms leverage their 
current knowledge stock to standardize organizational routines and improve efficiency.  
Work on organizational learning emphasizes the benefits of ambidexterity and suggests that firms 
should make similar investments in both exploratory and exploitative activities (He and Wong, 
2004; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Venkatraman 
et al., 2007). However, although an ambidextrous strategy comes with certain advantages (Auh 
and Menguc, 2005; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Leonard-Barton, 1992), many prior empirical 
studies show that ambidexterity has either insignificant (Bierly and Daly, 2007) or even negative 
effects on firm performance (Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005). Such 
inconsistency in prior empirical findings points to the value of understanding why some firms do 
not benefit from investing in both activities, and whether specialization (rather than 
ambidexterity) is actually more beneficial for firm performance.  
We address this gap in our understanding by arguing that a reason for prior mixed findings in the 
literature is partly the implicit assumption of some studies that the effects of exploration and 
exploitation on firm performance does not differ across firms that are specialized and those that 
are ambidextrous. However, because exploration and exploitation involve different and 
incompatible processes, it may be the case that the economic returns to exploratory R&D may 
differ for firms that specialize in exploratory R&D. A similar argument may apply in the case of 
exploitative R&D.   
Our analysis in this chapter advances the above issue by offering a direct comparison between 
specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D versus ambidextrous R&D investment 
strategies. To our knowledge, there are no studies that explicitly make a direct comparison 











the literature whether firms should be ambidextrous or specialize (invest the vast majority of their 
time and resources in either exploratory or exploitative R&D). Equally, prior studies have not 
explicitly investigated how the impact of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance 
varies across firms that make different decisions with respect to specialization and ambidexterity. 
In other words, it is less well-understood whether the effects of R&D investments differ for firms 
that adopt a specialized (exploratory or exploitative) versus an ambidextrous R&D strategy and 
in which situations is more advantageous for firm performance.  
This first empirical chapter of this PhD thesis thus empirically test two important research 
questions: a) is specialization in either exploratory or exploitative R&D strategy more beneficial 
than an ambidextrous strategy? and b) how the economic returns of exploratory and exploitative 
R&D differ for those firms that adopt a specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy? Although 
the extant literature recognizes that the distribution between exploratory and exploitative R&D is 
contingent upon different industry dynamics, including technological dynamism and competition 
(Auh and Menguc, 2005; Jansen, et al., 2005; Uotila et., 2009), and firm idiosyncrasies, including 
firms resources and size (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Luger et al., 2018), we have 
a limited understanding of the mechanisms that make specialization in exploratory or exploitative 
R&D a better strategic option compared to ambidexterity in enhancing firm performance. 
The current chapter advances scholarly understanding of how certain mechanisms might 
influence the effectiveness of specializing in exploratory or exploitative R&D and thus firm 
performance. Drawing from organizational learning theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and 
March, 1988; March, 1991; Baum et al., 2000; Levinthal and March, 1993), we argue that a 
specialized strategy might be more beneficial over an ambidextrous one for firm performance for 
two reasons. First, because specialized firms limit the scope of their activities, they gradually 
accumulate experiential learning that is utilized to strengthen their ability to produce a 
product/service more proficiently (Capon et al., 1988; Calderini and Scellato, 2005). Second, 
because specialized firms carry on building competence in areas of already established 
competence and expertise, they gradually enhance their performance by eliminating errors when 
repeating subsequent similar investments (Levitt and March, 1988; Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 
2004). 
Accordingly, we develop a conceptual framework that clarifies the mechanisms that make 
specialization more beneficial than the joint pursuit of both. We expect that specialized in 
exploratory/exploitative R&D to be more effective in enhancing firm performance because firms 
by learning to use and reuse their existing exploratory or exploitative knowledge they gradually 
strengthen the skills required to perfect certain organisational tasks, achieve thus ultimately 
efficiency gains (Baum et al., 2000). Building on this reasoning, we examine a set of hypotheses 











Our analysis of a longitudinal dataset of 32,537 observations supports this reasoning, indicating 
that not only specialization in exploratory/exploitative R&D has a positive direct effect on firm 
performance, but also that this effect is stronger for those firm that choose to make investments 
that are similar to their existing knowledge trajectory. Exploratory R&D investments have a 
stronger positive effect on the performance of those firms that specialize in exploratory R&D, 
whereas exploitative R&D investments have a stronger positive effect on the performance of 
those firms that specialize in exploitative R&D. Conversely, the opposite pattern emerges with 
the corresponding effect of exploratory R&D on firm performance being weaker when a firm 
specializes in exploitative R&D. The importance of the differential effect on firm performance 
depends upon the firms’ current investment strategy and learning predisposition indicating that 
firms may experience different returns to their specialization strategy when they decide to make 
investments that are different to their current knowledge and learning trajectory.  
Our study seeks to make a number of contributions. First, it develops a conceptual framework 
that explains how and why the performance-enhancing effects of firms that specialize in 
explorative/exploitative R&D differ from those firms that decide to jointly pursue both R&D 
investments. Second, it helps us understand why the effectiveness of exploratory and exploitative 
R&D depends upon the firm’s choice to pursue investments that are similar to the specialization 
of the firm. As such, it contributes to exploitation and exploration research that has considered 
the effects of being ambidextrous (Auh and Menguc, 2005; He and Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 
2006; Uotila et al., 2009; Venkatraman, et al., 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2006), but has not examined 
if and how the returns from specializing in either in exploratory and exploitative R&D might be 
more beneficial for firm performance,  and whether those effects accentuate or weaken when 
firms choose to invest in activities that require knowledge that is similar to the firm’s existing 
knowledge base.  
Third, our analysis suggests that specialization is a more effective way in enhancing firm 
performance. This theoretical position does not contradict the notion of ambidexterity. Yet, it 
extends this notion by suggesting that there may be dynamics either in the environment or firm- 
specific factors that may allow firms to carry on building on what they are endowed to do well 
(i.e. specialize) and achieve ambidexterity in the broader network when interacting with other 
firms (Gupta et al., 2006; Stettner and Lavie, 2014). This is consistent with the idea that although 
balancing the conflicting demands that exploration and exploitation entail including conflicting 
routines, negative transfer, and limited specialization, these imbalances can be offset by exploring 
in one mode (e.g., through collaborations) and exploiting in another (e.g., exploiting internally 
firm’s own knowledge base; Stettner and Lavie; 2014). 
As such, this view contributes to organization learning theory that clarifies the different types of 











associated with exploration and exploitation are more effective in enhancing firm performance, 
and whether they complement or substitute each other in enhancing firm performance.  
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Organizational Learning Theory  
The overarching theoretical lens that is used in this chapter (as well as in the rest of this PhD 
thesis) is organizational learning theory (Levinthal and March, 1993; Wang and Ahmed, 2003 
(Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Fiol and Lyles, 
1985). One of the basic premises of organizational learning theory is that firms use their 
experience gained through practice to develop conceptual frameworks in order to interpret such 
experience (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991). Accumulated experience serves as a learning 
mechanism helping firms to undertake various processes. Firms as learning entities make 
inferences from their experience, incorporating their experiential learning into organizational 
routines (Levitt and March, 1988). Over time, firms become competent on specific routines 
because of their accumulated experience and repetitive use of the same knowledge. Experiential 
learning enables firms to strengthen their competence either in the form of knowledge exploitation 
or exploration (Holmqvist, 2004; March, 1991). Further, experiential learning enables firms to 
accumulate knowledge that is valuable for enhancing performance and for executing a set of 
activities (Huber, 1991). This self-reinforcing nature of learning may encourage some firms to 
maintain their current focus and trajectory (i.e. specialise in either activity) to achieve superior 
firm performance. Organizational learning theory is therefore particularly relevant in explaining 
how exploratory and exploitative R&D investments and how specialization in either of these two 
types of R&D research activities may lead to different performance outcomes. 
Since firm performance is a joint function of the potential returns from a given activity and the 
exhibited competence of a firm at it, organizations are likely to enhance their performance as they 
accumulate more experience (Baum et al., 2000). It is well accepted in organizational learning 
theory that searching for new directions where skills have to be developed from scratch reduces 
the speed with which existing skills could be improved (Holmqvist, 2004). Further, competence 
building with existing activities make the search of entirely new activities less attractive (Levitt 
and March, 1988; Kim and Miner, 2007). Subsequently, increases in competence when 
undertaking an activity increases the likelihood of returns for engaging in that activity (Argyris 
and Schon 1978; Gupta et al., 2006).  These two premises in organizational learning theory (the 
cumulative effects of both experiential learning and competence building) suggest that investment 
decisions are often guided by organisations’ experience with them, and thus the more competent 











with it and thus enhancing its performance.  
 
Exploratory R&D and Exploitative R&D  
Drawing from the organizational learning literature (Levinthal and March, 1993; Wang and 
Ahmed, 2003; Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Fiol 
and Lyles, 1985) and March’s (1991) seminal work, we suggest that when firms invest in 
exploitative R&D they engage in local search looking for knowledge that is similar to that of their 
own knowledge stock aiming at gaining efficiency in production and execution of tasks 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). By contrast, when firms invest in 
exploratory R&D, they engage in distant search looking and experimenting with knowledge 
dissimilar to that of their own knowledge stock (Gupta et al., 2006; Baum et al., 2000; He and 
Wong, 2004). Investments thus in exploitative R&D enhance firm performance mainly because 
firms strengthen their existing competencies and skills and achieve economies of scale and scope 
maintaining their overall efficiency in production (Baum et al., 2000; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; 
Auh and Menguc, 2005). On the other hand, investments in exploratory R&D enhance firm 
performance mainly because firms strengthen their ability to identify ways to become efficient 
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009) by pursuing new technological 
trajectories (Teece, 2007) and combine knowledge from different areas that could lead to 
breakthrough ideas and ways of creating products/processes (He and Wong, 2004).  
 
HYPOTHESES 
Exploratory R&D and Firm Performance  
Although we acknowledge that exploratory R&D is experimental in nature (Levinthal and March, 
1993) and may disrupt a firm’s organisational routines (Mitchell and Singh, 1993; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984), we expect exploratory R&D investments to increase firm performance for the 
following reasons.  
First, exploratory R&D strengthens firms’ ability to search for new knowledge that in turn 
expands their existing knowledge base (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Searching for new 
knowledge areas exposes firms to knowledge that is different to the knowledge that already 
resides within their organization and in the industry they compete (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
This broadening in search scope revitalizes a firm’s knowledge base because new knowledge 
elements blend in to infuse firms with fresh ideas and combinations (Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001). Knowledge heterogeneity and experimentation with new alternatives unlocks further novel 
thinking (Wu and Shanley, 2009), enhancing experimentation, knowledge generation and 
therefore firm performance. New knowledge also helps firms avoid capability rigidities (Leonard-











(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Once again, this leads to stronger firm performance.  
Second, in line with the above arguments, another view suggests that exploratory R&D strengthen 
a firm’s ability to search for knowledge that is sufficiently distant to that of the firm, i.e. to go 
beyond its own technological trajectories (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). Seeking for distant knowledge is likely not only to complement a firm’s existing 
knowledge stock (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) but also reduces competency traps (i.e. cases in 
which firms gravitate towards areas of already established competencies; Leonard-Barton, 1995), 
knowledge overlap and replication of prior practices (Baum et al., 2000; Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001). These in turn, help the firm undertake current and new tasks and enhance firm 
performance.  
Third, investments in exploratory R&D are likely to accelerate a firm’s generative learning and 
stimulate a new stream of ideas and develop entirely different technologies. By definition, 
exploratory R&D stimulates a firm’s generative learning (Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Jerez-
Gomez, 2005; Senge, 1990; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Argyris, 1976). The proactive nature of 
exploratory R&D stimulates risk-taking behavior and facilitates the generation of novel ideas 
(Morgan and Berthon, 2008). Experimentation with new ideas could change the utility and 
application of knowledge elements, creating a mindset that encourages a continuous stream of 
new ideas (Lee et al., 2012). As a result, generative learning can unsettle an existing technological 
trajectory (Gatignon et al., 2002) by inviting firms to question their existing knowledge and 
understanding (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005). Hence, experimentation with novel ideas can 
help the firm to move beyond adaptive learning (which only helps at refining existing products) 
and engage into generative learning that further enhances exploration. 
Fourth, exploratory R&D is likely to enhance a firm’s absorptive capacity (i.e., a firm’s ability to 
identify, internalize and exploit commercially valuable knowledge; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Firms with adequate exploratory activity function proactively and experiment with emerging 
opportunities (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009). This means that 
those firms are more likely to sense potentially promising technological opportunities, make 
strategic decisions about what technologies to pursue, choose carefully what markets to enter and 
decide what innovative outputs will have the greater commercial value to exploit further (Teece, 
2007). As a result, firms that engage in exploratory R&D are better able to identity evolutionary 
paths that translate technological opportunities into valuable outputs. Accordingly, we introduce 
the following hypothesis that serves as the starting point for our analysis: 
H1a: Investment in exploratory R&D has a positive direct effect on firm performance. 
 
Exploitative R&D and firm performance 











firms invest in exploitative R&D, they often engage in local search and look for knowledge that 
exhibits technological and geographical similarity to that of their own knowledge (Baum et al., 
2000; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). In exploitative R&D, firms often exploit knowledge that 
has been used successfully in the past, searching for opportunities with knowledge similarity to 
that of their own, and building additional expertise in their chosen domain (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). Searching in areas of established competence not only is less resource-intense, but 
also reduces unpredictability because firms mainly replicate past behavior (Levitt and March, 
1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Baum et al., 2000) and accumulate knowledge through repetition 
and experiential learning.  
Once the utilization of existing knowledge is repeated, it becomes routinized and refined through 
informed experience (Baum et al., 2000). Firms make inferences from their experiential learning 
that is coded into organisational rules that allows them to work more efficiently in similar tasks 
(Holmqvist, 2004). The focus on the same task and accumulated expertise in a firm’s chosen 
domain allows them to build capabilities that contribute towards greater effectiveness of 
exploitation (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Therefore, experiential learning improves 
investments in exploitative activities because the generation of experiential rules is directly used 
by the firm to refine products and processes (Dodgson, 1993; Holmqvist, 2004), which in turn 
enhances firm performance by ensuring that there is a constant stream of revenue. Repetition also 
enhances the firm’s knowledge of how to do it better next time, and therefore leads to 
improvements in execution. 
Second, investments in exploitative R&D strengthens the firm’s ability to build on its existing 
knowledge base (March, 1991). Because exploitative R&D investments rely on the firm’s chosen 
technological trajectory (Baum, et al., 2000) they require little diversity and variety in the firm’s 
existing knowledge base. Hence, there is a lower need for firms to cross organizational and 
technological boundaries (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). This enables firms to operate within 
their comfort zone and remain efficient by shifting from existing product lines to product 
extensions. Efficiency and flexibility in firms’ operations derive mainly from knowledge that has 
been gained in the firm’s already chosen technological and organizational trajectory since its 
purpose is mainly to extend the life cycle of current products and services (Morgan and Berthon, 
2008). Furthermore, there are significant economies of scale, scope and learning in exploitative 
strategies, enhancing once again firm profitability (Auh and Menguc, 2005). In summary, the 
knowledge gained in the firm’s chosen trajectory helps the firm make incremental changes to 
existing products and processes, which in turn increases the effectiveness of a firm’s investments 
in exploitative activities.  
Third, exploitative R&D investments can be enhanced by adaptive learning (Auh and Menguc, 











involves an iterative process and refers to changes and refinements (Tyre and Von Hippel, 1997; 
Schilling et al., 2003) that create changes to improve output (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). This implies 
that exploitative R&D investments aims at refining and adapting existing product innovations to 
markets’ current needs (Benner and Tushman, 2003). Its main purpose is that firms learn to do 
minor refinements to existing products and processes. Adaptive learning therefore is the type of 
learning (i.e., survival learning) by which firms exploit or even copy existing knowledge (Senge, 
1990). As firms make changes to prior errors they accumulate experience, enhancing gradually 
their adaptive learning. They learn from their mistakes and make adaptations to satisfy existing 
customers’ needs. As adaptive learning leads to improvements and refinements in existing 
products and processes, it increases efficiency in undertaking further exploitative tasks and 
enhances overall firm performance. Accordingly, we introduce a second hypothesis that also 
serves (together with H1a) as the starting point for our analysis: 
H1b: Investment in exploitative R&D has a positive direct effect on firm performance.  
 
The interaction between Explorative R&D and Exploitative R&D  
A natural question that follows from Hypotheses 1a and 1b is whether explorative R&D and 
exploitative R&D complement or substitute each other in increasing firm performance. If there 
are synergies between the two activities, then they will increase the effectiveness of each other in 
improving firm performance and in this case their joint interaction effect is expected to be 
positive. By contrast, if they involve competing processes that do not improve the processes of 
the other activity, their joint interaction effect is expected to be negative. We should acknowledge 
that an overarching argument in the literature is that there is a key advantage when firms engage 
simultaneously in both exploratory and exploitative R&D (He and Wong, 2004; Lavie et al., 2010; 
Dover and Dierk, 2010; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013; Junni et al., 2013) because the ideas that 
are generated by the exploratory R&D team can be used by the exploitative R&D team. Although 
this view points to a complementary relationship (He and Wong, 2004; Hess and Rothaermel, 
2011), a number of other arguments suggest that they do not benefit each other (Markides et al., 
2013; Turner et al., 2013; Junni et al., 2013).  
Drawing on theoretical knowledge from organizational learning theory, we expect that 
exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D are antithetical learning mechanisms and involve 
different activities, processes and tasks (Duncan, 1976; March, 1991; Baum et al., 2000; 
Holmqvist, 2004; Simsek, 2009; Turner et al., 2013). In addition, whereas exploitative R&D aims 
at refinement and efficiency, exploratory R&D focuses on experimentation (Gupta et al., 2006). 
The different demands and processes of the two activities means that they require different 
knowledge, searches, expertise and scientists. This means that the personnel that specializes in 











contribute and add value to it.  
Similarly, it is less likely that the members of staff who focus on exploratory R&D will be 
competent in engaging in exploitative R&D given that the two activities require different 
knowledge, capabilities, learning (single vs. double-loop learning) and organizational structures 
and culture (Tushman et al., 2010; Wang and Rafiq, 2014). Given that R&D exploration and R&D 
exploitation are by definition two different types of investment (Markides, 2013; Turner et al., 
2013; Martini et al., 2013; Stettner and Lavie, 2014), we also expect that they will compete for 
financial resources in the firm. This implies that for a given level of resources, when investment 
in one activity increases, investment in the other activity will have to decrease. This may create 
tension between teams and once again it may lead to situations that are not synergetic.  
In summary, based on the notion that R&D exploration and R&D exploitation require not only 
different but also incompatible types of learning, processes, expertise and members of staff, we 
expect such incompatibility to affect the returns to each activity and therefore their joint 
moderating effect on firm performance (Figure 1 summarizes these relationships). We therefore 
introduce the following hypothesis about their joint moderating effect:  
H2: The joint moderating effect of exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D on firm performance 
is negative. 
 











The role of Specialization in Exploratory and Exploitative R&D  
We define specialization as a strategy by which firms invest more time and resources in either 
exploratory or exploitative R&D, aiming at becoming very competent in this activity in order to 
gain efficiency within the overall system (Gupta et al., 2006). We expect specialization strategy 
to come with efficiency gains that make it more advantageous than an ambidextrous strategy (i.e., 
invest in both exploratory and exploitative R&D to a similar extent). More specifically, the 

























exploitation will secure a firm’s current cash flow, whereas exploration will ensure the generation 
of new ideas and a position in future markets (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw; 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). Although certain 
conditions may require firms to engage in both (Koryak et al., 2018; Cao et al., 2009; Uotila et 
al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2006), there might be significant benefits for firms that can specialize in 
either one (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988).  
First, a specialized in exploratory or exploitative R&D strategy could lead to greater returns to a 
given set of activities because a firm strengthens its ability to undertake a certain set of tasks more 
efficiently as it accumulates experiential learning faster in areas of familiar knowledge and prior 
established expertise (Baum et al., 2000; Koryak et al., 2018). A specialized firm increases its 
ability and competence in producing a product or service more proficiently. Such proficiency 
derives mainly from the repetitive execution and engagement with the same activities (Hanks and 
Chandler, 1994). 
Second, specialization may enhance firm performance by leading to efficiency gains. Efficiency 
gains derive mainly from the fact that firms carry on building competence on areas of already 
established competence. With the repetitive execution of the same tasks and processes, firms 
accumulate experience and confidence, diminish unpredictability and strengthen their capabilities 
(Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; 
Argyris, 1976; Bierly and Daly, 2007).  By inference, when firms invest in either exploratory or 
exploitative R&D, they strengthen their skills required to undertake such specific investments, 
diminish errors in execution of processes involved in those activities and perfect the execution of 
processes involved in these activities.  
Efficiency gains are more likely to occur from prior repeated actions rather than actions for which 
firms have limited knowledge, experience and understanding (Levitt and March, 1988; Baum et 
al., 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). This echoes the idea that when a process or activity 
becomes standardized, the time required to accomplish it reduces while the quality of executing 
such activity improves (March, 1991; Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014). In the context of 
exploratory or exploitative R&D, firms learn to use and reuse their existing exploratory or 
exploitative knowledge strengthening the required skills involved to perfect organisational tasks 
to achieve such efficiency gains. By contrast, firms that are ambidextrous will not benefit from 
the above efficiency gains and performance advantages. Accordingly, we introduce the following 
two hypotheses (Figure 2 summarizes these relationships):  
 













H3b: Pursuing exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D simultaneously and to a similar extent 
(ambidextrous strategy) has a negative effect on firm performance.  
 



















How do the effects of Exploratory and Exploitative R&D differ for Firms that pursue a 
Specialization Strategy?  
We further investigate whether the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance differ for firms that choose to specialize in either activity. For several reasons, we 
hypothesize that the positive effects of exploratory R&D on firm performance are stronger for 
firms that specialize in exploration and weaker for firms that specialize in exploitation. Equally, 
we expect the positive effects of exploitative R&D on firm performance to be stronger for firms 
that specialize in exploitation and weaker for firms that specialize in exploration. Our 
argumentation relies on the premise that the effectiveness of exploratory and exploitative R&D 
in enhancing firm performance depends on the similarity between the knowledge that is needed 
for the activity and the knowledge base in which the firm specializes. Our argument is consistent 
with the idea that increases in knowledge overlap causes improvements in a firm’s absorptive 
capacity and therefore increases the likelihood of a firm to create value from knowledge similarity 




































therefore to higher performance.  
Drawing on organizational learning theory (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; March, 1991), 
we develop the view that the effectiveness of exploratory and exploitative R&D in enhancing 
firm performance depends on the firm’s ability to carry on building on its existing knowledge 
base. According to this view, exploratory and exploitative R&D are more likely to lead to further 
advancement when undertaken in the firm’s already established knowledge base and 
technological trajectory due to similarities with its current knowledge stock and expertise (Baum, 
et al., 2000). Hence, exploratory R&D investments are expected to be particularly advantageous 
for performance when firms specialize in exploration activities (similarly, exploitative R&D 
investments are more advantageous for firms that specialize in exploitation activities).  
When there is knowledge overlap between exploratory or exploitative R&D activities and the 
firm’s knowledge base, there is no need for the firm to cross its technological boundaries and this 
may strengthen its expertise (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Knowledge similarity and overlap 
between a firm’s current knowledge base and area of specialization enables a firm to further 
strengthen its skills and enhance its expertise because it operates within its comfort zone by 
remaining efficient through repeating tasks and undertaking activities the firm already knows and 
is familiar with (Sears and Hoetker, 2014).  
Efficiency in firm’s operations derive mainly from knowledge accumulation in familiar tasks, 
processes and activities. This may enable the firm to avoid errors in execution and engagement 
of activities required in either exploratory or exploitative R&D investments. Therefore, as 
knowledge accumulates and is compatible with the firm’s current trajectory and knowledge 
predisposition it enhances the firm’s established expertise and ability to undertake subsequent 
(similar) investments more successfully (March 1999; Holmqvist, 2004; Rosenkopf, and Nerkar, 
2001).  
Second, the strengthening effect of investing in exploratory or exploitative R&D activities that 
align with the firm’s specialization could also be explained by the notion of absorptive capacity. 
Because a firm’s absorptive capacity depends largely on the overlap between prior and new 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Sears and Hoetker, 2014; Volderba et al., 2010), the 
greater the knowledge overlap between exploratory and exploitative R&D and firm’s knowledge 
base the better the knowledge assimilation and utilisation the firm could gain from undertaking 
activities of similar nature. By contrast, the low degree of knowledge overlap between a 
specialization strategy and the firm’s current knowledge is likely to weaken a firm’s absorptive 
capacity. When firms invest in R&D activities that are unrelated to those undertaking currently, 
they will have to develop or modify their knowledge base to accommodate the knowledge 
requirements of the new R&D investment. Although this may still be beneficial in many respects, 











Therefore, the higher the degree of relatedness in knowledge base between the existing and 
current R&D investments the more likely is to facilitate knowledge assimilation and successful 
application of new elements into the firm’s current routines, strengthening its performance 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Lane et al., 2006; Choi and McNamara, 
2018). Consistent with this line of thinking, studies on technological acquisitions (Choi and 
McNamara, 2018) suggest that acquirer firms exhibit integrated knowledge leverage when they 
merge, combine and assimilate the acquired knowledge into their existing knowledge base using 
both knowledge inputs to enhance firm performance. Investment in explorative or exploitative 
activities that deviates from what the firm is currently doing is likely to disrupt certain 
organizational routines, structures and processes increasing the cost when trying to experiment 
with novel and unfamiliar ideas and technological opportunities (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Zollo 
and Winter, 2002). This once again will bear negative consequences for the firm’s performance 
and efficiency. Accordingly, we introduce the following two hypotheses (Figure 3 summarizes 
these relationships): 
H4: For firms that specialize in R&D exploration, the positive effects of exploratory R&D 
investment on firm performance are stronger than the effects of exploitative R&D investment on 
firm performance.  
H5: For firms that specialize in R&D exploitation, the positive effects of exploratory R&D 
investment on firm performance are weaker than the effects of exploitative R&D investment on 
firm performance.  
 
How do the effects of Exploratory and Exploitative R&D differ for Firms that pursue an 
Ambidextrous Strategy?  
Given that being ambidextrous requires firms to make similar investment in both exploratory and 
exploitative R&D, firms are familiar to a similar extent with the processes and activities required 
for exploratory and exploitative R&D. As such, we expect the returns to exploratory and 
exploitative R&D to be similar for firms that choose to be ambidextrous (rather than specialized). 
Ambidextrous firms that choose to engage in both activities have to acquire and integrate new 
knowledge into their organisational routines, but also utilize and develop different capabilities 
and skills to those that are habitually use (Turner et al., 2013; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Koryak et al., 2018). This in turn builds their competence into advancing their know-how in order 
to gain greater expertise and insights relevant to their specific investments (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). Given that the firm chooses to pursue both 
exploratory and exploitative R&D, the accumulation of new skills and capabilities associated with 











investments to be similar. (Figure 3 summarizes this relationship). Building on the above views, 
we introduce the following hypothesis: 
H6: For firms that pursue an ambidextrous strategy, the effects of exploratory R&D investment 
on firm performance are similar with the effects of exploitative R&D investment on firm 
performance.  
 


















DATA AND METHODS 
The Data and Methods used in this study are described in greater detail in the Method Section of 
Chapter 4 of this PhD thesis.  
 
Sample 
To test the hypotheses, we need firm-level longitudinal data as the effects of exploration activities 
take time to materialize (March, 1991) and exploratory competencies require time to accumulate 
and strengthen (Rhee and Kim, 2014). We collect data from a national innovation survey that is 
designed to monitor the economic development and technological activities of Spanish firms. 
Similar to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in other countries, there is high reliability in 
the reported data because the survey is administered every two years by the National Statistics 


































2018; D’Estee et al., 2017). As a result, over 90% response rate is achieved. This dataset is 
appropriate for testing our hypotheses because it provides a detailed breakdown of the distribution 
of R&D expenditure by type (exploitative and exploratory R&D). Our analysis focuses on firms 
with more than 10 employees. Instead of focusing on a single industry (Rothaermel, 2001; He 
and Wong, 2004), we examine 56 industries to increase variability in our data and test the effects 
of specialization in industries with different orientation. The initial sample consisted of 41,196 
firm-year observations that had information on exploratory and exploitative investments. 
However, after deleting missing and ambiguous observations, and firms that had less than four 
years of information, the final sample resulted in an unbalanced panel of 32,527 observations 
(5567 firms) over the 2003-2012 period.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
Following common practice and the literature on R&D (Kafouros et al., 2018; Adams and Jaffe, 
1996; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b), we measure firm performance 
by estimating its productivity performance (TFP). As explained in detail in Chapter 4, the choice 
of TFP as our dependent variable was based on three reasons. First, TFP considers the firm’s 
outputs (i.e., sales both from products and services) but also inputs i.e., the firm’s investment in 
labour (reflected in number of employees) and tangible assets (or capital). Thus, TFP reflects the 
ability of the firm to make sales while controlling for the cost of inputs that a firm utilizes to 
achieve a certain level of output. By implication, TFP measures avoid biases that often derive 
from the fact that different outputs may exhibit different economies of scale (Kafouros and 
Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b). Second, TFP reflects that R&D investments could 
lead to both product and process innovations. This implies that although the development of new 
products could affect a firm’s sales, process innovations may influence the firm’s cost or modify 
its labour capital and thus enhance its productivity by leading to efficiency gains due to better 
allocation of resources. Third, while other measures such as firm profitability are unstable and 
often take negative values, productivity measures remain stable regardless of fluctuations in the 
market, variations of exchange rate, and accounting standards (Buckley, 1996). 
In estimating TFP, we estimate a ‘residual’. This residual (with nominator the firm’s output (firm 
sales) and denominator the firm’s inputs (labour and capital) reflects variations in firm output that 
cannot be explained by variations in firm inputs. The estimation of TFP (is given in Equation 1 
in Chapter 4) and as explained, it reflects the intermediate capacity of inputs into outputs which 
reflects the firm’ proficiency in generating value from specific input.  Since economic 
relationships are rarely linear and to ease the interpretation of our results, we followed standard 
methodology and transform the TFP measure in its logarithmic form (Van Beveren, 2012; 














Firms’ Exploitative and Exploratory R&D  
Consistent with prior research (D’Este et al., 2017; March, 1991; Jansen et al., 2006; He and 
Wong, 2004; Shift, 2016) and the survey’s definitions (PITEC), exploration consists of the 
creative basic & applied research conducted by firms in order to develop new knowledge that 
aims at creating something new to business and market. By contrast, exploitation consists of the 
systematic technological development that relies upon the firm’s existing knowledge that has been 
accumulated through repetition and practical experience that aims at refining or improving 
substantially existing products and processes. As explained in detail in Chapter 4, firms in the 
survey report the distribution of their current R&D expenditure by type of research. Accordingly, 
we measure exploration using the log of each firm’s annual investment in 
exploratory/experimental research activities (once again, we divide it by the number of employees 
to normalize for firm size). Similarly, we measure exploitation using the log of each firm’s annual 
investment in exploitative activities (normalized for firm size).  
 
Firms’ Specialization in Exploratory, Exploitative R&D and Ambidexterity (for the 
convenience of the examiners, we have reproduced this section from Chapter 4. Nevertheless, for 
greater details on operationalization of variables please refer to Chapter 4) 
Following previous studies (He and Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009) we use the absolute 
(percentage) difference between firms’ expenditure on exploratory and exploitative activities. 
Building on the definition that specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their 
activities, we classify a firm as specialized in one activity when it spends over 66.6% of its internal 
R&D budget on either exploration or exploitation. This means that a firm’s investment in one of 
the two activities is at least two times higher than its investment in the other activity. In 
operationalising the specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D variables we used two 
different approaches. First, we use is a year-specific measure of specialization that reflects what 
the firms does in a given year. This variable is time-variant because a firm could specialize in 
exploratory R&D in one year but not in the next year. Second, we estimate the average percentage 
of each firm’s budget spent on exploratory and exploitative R&D throughout the sampled years. 
This classification ensures that a firm remains specialized in one activity over a long period of 
time (rather than for just 2-3 years). We accordingly create two variables, one for specialization 
in exploration and one for specialization in exploitation, that take the value of 1 when a firm 
specializes in one of the two activities (and 0 otherwise). Further, when the percentage of the 











ambidextrous investments (i.e., ambidextrous firms).  
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
We further control for various firm- and industry-specific factors that may affect firm 
performance. First, we control for each firm’s tangible resources (Auh and Menguc, 2005; Jansen 
et al., 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2006), measured as the log of each firm’s gross investment in tangible 
resources in each year. This may account for the difficulties that resource-constrained firms 
encounter in different industrial environments (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tushman et al., 
1985). Second, we control for newly created firms using a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm is newly created (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This variable may affect firm 
performance by influencing a firm’s ability to find collaborators, establish itself in an industry 
and accumulate different types of knowledge.  
Third, we control for each firm’s international sales (dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for firms that sell their products abroad) because a firm’s market expansion is associated with its 
growth (He and Wong, 2004), international competitiveness and access to new market knowledge 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Fourth, we control for affiliated firms using a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for firms that are affiliated to groups (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 
Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014) and may therefore enjoy certain advantages that enhance 
their performance. Fifth, given that a firm’s appropriability strategy may affect its performance 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; 2014), we control for the mechanism that each firm uses to protect its 
inventions (Vega-Jurado et al., 2008). These mechanisms include the use of four protection 
mechanisms (patents, utility models, trademarks and copyrights. This variable therefore ranges 
from 0 to 4, depending on how many of these mechanisms each firm employs.   
However, firm performance can also be affected by industry-specific attributes. We control for 
industry’s intensity of competition operationalized using the number of 2-digit intra-industry 
competitors (Jansen et al., 2006) because in highly competitive industries firms are forced to 
improve operational efficiency (Matusik and Hill, 1998) and avoid risk-taking behavior (Miller 
and Friesen, 1983; Auh and Menguc, 2005) or experiment with novelties to avoid obsolescence 
(Uotila et al., 2009). Because this measure does not capture the market share of firms and whether 
few firms control most of the market, we also estimated Herfindahl Index (the results from the 
regressions of this chapter Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition). As explained in the 
general method section of this thesis, Herfindahl Index (HI) is an appropriate measure of industry 
concentration (Kafouros and Aliyev 2016; Wu et al. 2016). We estimated HI by summing of 
squared market shares of firms in the industry. It is thus calculated as !"# = 1 − ∑ ()#*+),- , where 
sij is the market share of firm i in industry j and therefore it takes values between 0 and 1. The 











reflective thus of low levels of competition. We therefore use the inverse value of the Herfindahl 
Index (i.e. 1- Herfindahl Index) so that a higher value indicates high levels of competition.  
We control for time effects by including in the model year dummies (that equals 1 that corresponds 
to specific year) to account for differences in economic trends over years (Belderbos et al., 2010). 
In models that are not nested in industries (i.e. when they are not multi-level), we also include 
industry dummies in our model to account for the different industry characteristics and variations 
in their nature, both technological and economic. Further, we include in the model a binary 
variable that represents those firms that operate in high-technological industries. As explained in 
the method section of this thesis, in constructing this variable we use the OECD classification 
(given in COTEC Report 1997 cited in Bayona Sáez and Arribas, 2002).  High-tech industries 
refer to sectors such as chemicals, pharmaceutical, computing, electronics, electrical, 
communication, and medical devices and optical instruments. By contrast, medium and low-tech 
industries include sectors such as textiles, furniture, leather, rubber and plastic (taking the value 
of 1 when firms operate in high tech industries and 0 otherwise). We also control for the industry’s 
R&D intensity using the industry’s total R&D expenditure divided by total industry sales (Uotila 
et al., 2009) because in environments with high levels of R&D spending, there are abundancy of 
technological opportunities than in environments with lower R&D spending (Zahra, 1996). These 
opportunities may influence firm performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). Finally, when 
using GLS as an alternative estimator, we included industry dummies in our model to control for 
technological and economic variations. 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD (Since the estimation method remains the same across the three 
empirical chapters of this thesis, we have reproduced below a cut-down version for the 
convenience of examiners. Please refer to the method section of Chapter 4 for greater details and 
reasoning for our choice) 
As explained in Chapter 4, given that our sampled firms are clustered within industries, a 
Multilevel Mixed Model approach was better suited for estimating TFP (Bliese and Ployhart, 
2002; Preacher et al., 2006; Anderson, 2014; Pindado et al., 2012). As explained the choice of 
Multilevel Mixed estimator was driven by two factors: First, in contrast to traditional panel data 
estimators, multilevel analysis with mixed effects considers both FE and RE effects. Second, the 
model is specified at different levels, meaning that it produces coefficients that are nested in each 
industry and firm. Third, by nesting the effects within each firm the analysis has the additional 
benefit of producing an estimator that is very close to FE since it estimates the effects separately 
for each firm and industry separately (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell and Bond, 2000). Although as 
we explained, we experimented with other estimators such as FE and RE, the fact that we expected 











depending on the industry made this estimator less appropriate to reveal variability at both 
industry and firm level. Thus, our chosen estimator allows us to explicitly specify the estimation 
with complicated clustering patterns near models while relies on the assumption of independence 
of error terms, which may be violated when firms are clustered in various industries (Hox et al., 
2017; Anderson, 2014; Preacher et al., 2006). As a robustness check, we also used alternative 
estimators to establish consistency across our results, including the generalized least squares 
(GLS) estimator which is appropriate when using longitudinal data (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell 
and Bond, 2000). 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the PhD thesis, we followed established practice and 
specified our model (refer to equation 2) (Temouri et al., 2008). We also transform the variables 
in their logarithmic form to ease the interpretation of our findings (Qingwang and Junxue, 2005; 
Van Beveren, 2012). However, in equation 2 for testing the hypotheses of Chapter 5, we also 
added the specialization variables and interaction terms.   
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables used in the model and 
Table 2 reports the regression results. Consistent with prior studies, we mean-centered those 
variables that were included in the interactions to mitigate potential problems with 
multicollinearity (Cao et al., 2009; He and Wong, 2004; Lin et al., 2012). We also estimated VIF 
(Variance Inflation Factor) to avoid multicollinearity in the variables chosen (Wooldridge, 2001; 
Hansen, 2010). The maximum VIF obtained in any of the models for substantive variables was 
significantly below the cut-off of 2 for regression models (O’Brien, 2007; Lin et al., 2012). 
Specifically, the highest VIF we obtained from our analysis was 1.55 with average 1.15. Thus, 
since VIF is considerably lower than the critical value, we rule out the potential bias in our 











Table 1 – Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Total Factor Productivity 1.000 
             
2  Specialization in Exploratory R&D  0.015 1.000 
            
3  Specialization in Exploitative R&D  0.001 -0.544 1.000 
           
4 Specialization in ambidexterity  -0.016 -0.427 -0.527 1.000 
          
5 Exploratory R&D  -0.042 0.477 -0.822 0.403 1.000 
         
6 Exploitative R&D  -0.066 -0.791 0.464 0.302 -0.202 1.000 
        
7 Tangible Assets 0.227 0.013 -0.036 0.025 0.085 0.044 1.000 
       
8 International Sales  0.246 0.004 -0.023 0.021 0.025 0.003 0.069 1.000 
      
9 Affiliated Firms 0.355 -0.020 0.012 0.007 -0.032 -0.013 0.094 0.106 1.000 
     
10 Industry Competition 0.071 0.057 -0.069 0.016 0.062 -0.040 0.039 0.153 -0.016 1.000 
    
11 Protection 0.144 -0.003 -0.036 0.042 0.053 0.020 0.083 0.166 0.143 0.102 1.000 
   
12 Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.316 0.035 -0.100 0.072 0.244 0.149 0.028 -0.062 -0.096 0.038 0.024 1.000 
  
13 Newly Created Firms  -0.055 -0.007 -0.007 0.014 0.030 0.031 0.018 -0.051 -0.007 -0.006 -0.021 0.050 1.000 
 
14 High Technological Firms 0.157 0.065 -0.079 0.020 0.130 0.005 0.027 0.137 0.037 0.177 0.093 -0.087 -0.014 1.000 
 
Mean 0.066 0.306 0.401 0.292 4389 4917 8.786m 0.770 0.465 0.925 -3.863 0.070 0.005 0.219 
 
Std. Dev. 0.841 0.461 0.490 0.455 20822 17295 86.8m 0.421 0.499 0.088 3.541 0.198 0.073 0.413 
 
Min -3.812 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 29.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.908 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
Max 3.660 1.000 1.000 1.000 2371429 1489540 3bn 1.000 1.000 0.988 1.386 8.726 1.000 1.000 












Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 
Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1a: Exploratory R&D    0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.029*** 0.007 0.000 
H1b: Exploitative R&D    0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.029*** 0.007 0.000 
H2: Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D       -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 
H3a: Specialization in Exploratory R&D          
H3a: Specialization in Exploitative R&D          
H3b: Specialization in Ambidexterity          
Tangible Assets -0.002 0.004 0.629 -0.003 0.004 0.416 -0.0037 0.004 0.382 
International Sales 0.036* 0.015 0.017 0.035* 0.016 0.022 0.035* 0.015 0.023 
Affiliated Firms 0.123*** 0.016 0.000 0.124*** 0.016 0.000 0.125*** 0.016 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.274† 0.152 0.071 0.269† 0.151 0.075 0.268† 0.151 0.075 
Protection 0.004** 0.002 0.008 0.003* 0.002 0.012 0.003* 0.002 0.011 
Industry’s R&D intensity -0.205† 0.107 0.055 -0.212* 0.105 0.043 -0.219* 0.105 0.037 
Newly Created Firms -0.305*** 0.080 0.000 -0.309*** 0.080 0.000 -0.307*** 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.067 0.115 0.560 0.051 0.116 0.658 0.042 0.115 0.718 
Time Effects inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.204 0.128 0.112 -0.266* 0.130 0.040 -0.418** 0.134 0.002 
Industry Variance 0.2588 0.0684  0.2622 0.0682  0.2621 0.0683  
Firm Variance 0.4973 0.0437  0.4965 0.0437  0.4951 0.0435  
Residual Variance 0.1266 0.0148  0.1264 0.0148  0.1262 0.0148  
Wald chi2 (18-20) 175.92 P> 0.000 233.720 P> 0.000 266.860 P> 0.000 
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; †p < 0.10. 
Table 2 – Regression results (cont.) (Mixed Multilevel Model) 











  Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1a: Exploratory R&D  0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.009*** 0.003 0.000 
H1b: Exploitative R&D  0.013*** 0.003 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.012*** 0.003 0.000 
H2: Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D              
H3a: Specialization in Exploratory R&D  0.057** 0.022 0.008       0.052* 0.022 0.015 
H3a: Specialization in Exploitative R&D     0.035* 0.015 0.016    0.028† 0.015 0.053 
H3b: Specialization in Ambidexterity        -0.041** 0.014 0.003 0.000 (omitted) 
Tangible Assets -0.004 0.004 0.376 -0.004 0.004 0.392 -0.004 0.004 0.357 -0.004 0.004 0.361 
International Sales  0.035* 0.016 0.023 0.035* 0.016 0.022 0.035* 0.016 0.023 0.035* 0.016 0.023 
Affiliated Firms  0.124*** 0.016 0.000 0.124*** 0.017 0.000 0.125*** 0.017 0.000 0.124*** 0.016 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.267† 0.151 0.075 0.268† 0.151 0.075 0.268† 0.149 0.073 0.266* 0.150 0.076 
Protection 0.003* 0.002 0.015 0.003* 0.002 0.014 0.003* 0.002 0.016 0.003* 0.002 0.015 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.216* 0.105 0.039 -0.214* 0.105 0.041 -0.216* 0.105 0.039 -0.217* 0.105 0.038 
Newly Created Firms  -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 -0.309*** 0.080 0.000 -0.307*** 0.080 0.000 -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.047 0.116 0.686 0.047 0.116 0.689 0.052 0.115 0.653 0.046 0.116 0.693 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.305* 0.135 0.024 -0.294* 0.134 0.028 -0.283* 0.131 0.031 -0.321* 0.138 0.020 
Industry Variance 0.0009 0.0007  0.0009 0.0010  0.0017 0.0019  0.0009 0.0007  
Firm Variance 0.4965 0.0437  0.4961 0.0437  0.4958 0.0435  0.4962 0.0437  
Residual Variance 0.1262 0.0148  0.1263 0.0148  0.1262 0.0148  0.1262 0.0148  
Wald chi2 (18-20) 220.08 P> 0.000 268.920 P> 0.000 236.62 P> 0.000 267.710 P> 0.000 















Table 2 – Regression results (cont.) (Mixed Multilevel Model) Model 8  Model 9  Model 10  
 
Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.003 0.000 
Exploitative R&D 0.011*** 0.003 0.000 0.019*** 0.004 0.000 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 
Specialization in Exploratory R&D -0.110 0.058 0.057 0.103*** 0.029 0.000    
Specialization in Exploitative R&D       0.021 0.050 0.675 
Specialization in Ambidexterity 
      
   
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploratory R&D 0.020** 0.007 0.003 
   
   
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D 
   
-0.007† 0.004 0.069    
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploitative R&D 
      
0.002 0.006 0.750 
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploratory R&D 
      
   
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploratory R&D 
      
   
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploitative R&D 
      
   
Tangible Assets -0.0039 0.004 0.348 -0.004 0.004 0.351 -0.004 0.004 0.388 
International Sales 0.035* 0.016 0.024 0.035* 0.016 0.022 0.035* 0.016 0.022 
Affiliated Firms 0.124*** 0.016 0.000 0.125*** 0.016 0.000 0.124*** 0.017 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.266† 0.151 0.078 0.266* 0.150 0.075 0.267† 0.150 0.075 
Protection 0.003* 0.002 0.015 0.003* 0.002 0.015 0.003*** 0.002 0.013 
Industry’s R&D intensity -0.221* 0.102 0.030 -0.216* 0.105 0.039 -0.214* 0.105 0.041 
Newly Created Firms -0.308*** 0.079 0.000 -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 -0.309*** 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.045 0.116 0.696 0.045 0.116 0.701 0.049 0.116 0.671 
Time Effects 
         
Constant -0.280* 0.135 0.037 -0.343** 0.133 0.010 -0.288* 0.134 0.031 
Industry Variance 0.0014 0.0006  0.0014 0.0006  0.0000 0.0000  
Firm Variance 0.4961 0.0436  0.4961 0.0437  0.4962 0.0437  
Residual Variance 0.1261 0.0148  0.1262 0.0148     
Wald chi2 (18-20) 237.27 P> 0.000 225.060 P> 0.000 281.090 P> 0.000 












      Table 2 – Regression results (cont.) (Mixed Multilevel Model) 
 
Model 11   Model 12   Model 13   
 
Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D  0.028*** 0.006 0.000 0.009*** 0.002 0.000 0.009*** 0.002 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 
Specialization in Exploratory R&D    
       
Specialization in Exploitative R&D  0.179*** 0.045 0.000 
      
Specialization in Ambidexterity  
   
-0.109** 0.041 0.008 -0.110* 0.038 0.004 
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploratory R&D  
         
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D  
         
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploitative R&D  
         
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploratory R&D  -0.021*** 0.006 0.000 
      
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploratory R&D  
   
0.009† 0.006 0.087 
   
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploitative R&D  
      
0.009† 0.005 0.068 
Tangible Assets -0.004 0.004 0.313 -0.004 0.004 0.341 -0.004 0.004 0.341 
International Sales  0.035* 0.016 0.024 0.035* 0.016 0.022 0.035* 0.016 0.023 
Affiliated Firms  0.125*** 0.017 0.000 0.125*** 0.017 0.000 0.125*** 0.017 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.260† 0.150 0.082 0.266† 0.149 0.074 0.265* 0.149 0.075 
Protection 0.003* 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.016 0.003* 0.002 0.016 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.218* 0.102 0.033 -0.215* 0.105 0.040 -0.215* 0.105 0.040 
Newly Created Firms  -0.308*** 0.079 0.000 -0.307*** 0.080 0.000 -0.307*** 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.044 0.116 0.701 0.052 0.115 0.652 0.052 0.115 0.652 
Time Effects  
         
Constant -0.410** 0.139 0.003 -0.275* 0.131 0.036 -0.274* 0.132 0.038 
Industry Variance 0.000 0.000 
 
0.0017 0.0018  0.0017 0.0018  
Firm Variance 0.496 0.049 
 
0.4959 0.0435  0.4959 0.0435  
Residual Variance 0.126 0.015 
 
0.1262 0.0148  0.1262 0.0148  
Wald chi2 (18-20) 272.030 0.139 0.003 229.260 P> 0.000 234.32 P> 0.000 
Number of observations  32527     32527     32527     











Model 1 is our basic model and includes only the control variables. We test the performance 
effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D investments on firm performance (TFP) in Model 2. 
This corresponds to H1a which suggests that investments in exploratory R&D has a positive direct 
effect on firm performance and H1b which predicts that investments in exploitative R&D have a 
positive direct effect on firm performance. These effects are positive and statistically significant 
at 0.1% level, indicating that investment in exploratory and exploitative R&D enhances firm 
performance. Hence, these results support H1a and H1b.  
Model 3 tests the interaction effects between exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance. It therefore tests the validity of H2a that postulates that the joint moderating effect 
of exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D on firm performance is negative. The results of the 
analysis indicate that these effects on firm performance (TFP) are negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level. Therefore, these results support H2. They also support the notion 
that the two activities do not involve compatible processes and they do not necessarily increase 
the effects of each other on firm performance.  
Models 4-7 test whether the effect of being specialized in either exploratory R&D or exploitative 
R&D is more advantageous than being ambidextrous. These effects tests H3a (which states that 
specialization in either exploratory R&D or exploitative R&D has a positive effect on firm 
performance) and H3b (which suggests that pursuing exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D 
simultaneously and to a similar extent (ambidextrous strategy) has a negative effect on firm 
performance). These results show that although the performance effects of specialization in 
exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D are positive, the effects of being ambidextrous are 
negative. Therefore, it seems that being specialized in either activity is more beneficial for firm 
performance than being ambidextrous.  
Models 8 and 9 test H4 according to which ‘for firms that specialize in R&D exploration, the 
positive effects of exploratory R&D investment on firm performance are stronger than the effects 
of exploitative R&D investment on firm performance’. The interaction effects of exploratory R&D 
and specialization in explorative R&D are positive at the 1% level, while the interaction effects 
of exploitative R&D are negative at the 10% level, supporting therefore our theoretical prediction.   
Models 10 and 11 test H5. This hypothesis predicts that ‘for firms that specialize in exploitative 
R&D, the positive effects of exploratory R&D investment on firm performance are weaker than 
the effects of exploitative R&D investment on firm performance’. Our analysis indicates that the 
interaction effects between exploratory R&D and specialization in exploitation are negative at the 
0.1% level, while the interaction effects between exploitative R&D and specialization in 
exploitation are positive (but statistically insignificant), partly supporting our theoretical 
prediction stated in H5.  











R&D and exploitative R&D investment differ for firms that are ambidextrous. According to H6, 
‘for firms that pursue an ambidextrous strategy, the effects of exploratory R&D investment on 
firm performance are similar with the effects of exploitative R&D investment on firm 
performance’.  The results indicate that the interaction effects of both exploratory R&D and 
exploitative R&D are similar and positive at the 10% level, thus supporting Hypothesis 6.   
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Results using Alternative Estimators 
To check the robustness of the above results to alternative estimation methods, we also used 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) as an alternative estimator to Multilevel Mixed Model 
(Wooldridge, 2001; Hansen, 2010). The new results using the GLS estimator are reported in Table 
3. Overall, the majority of the hypotheses are supported. Specifically, the results in Model 2 
indicate that the direct effects of both exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance are positive and statistically significant at the 0.1% level, supporting thus H1a and 
H1b. Model 3 shows that the interaction between exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance is negative and statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is also 
supported with the GLS estimator. Models 4-7 indicate that while specialization in exploratory 
and exploitative R&D has a positive effect on firm performance (at 1% and 5% level of 
significance, respectively), being ambidextrous has a negative effect on firm performance (at 1% 
level), supporting H3a and H3b.  
Models 8 and 9 support H4, indicating that the interaction effects of exploratory R&D are positive 
at the 1% level, while the interaction effects of exploitative R&D are negative at the 10% level. 
Those findings give support to the idea that for firms that specialize in exploratory R&D, the 
effects of engaging in the same activity (i.e., exploratory R&D) are stronger than the effects of 
engaging in the opposite activity (i.e., exploitative R&D) on firm performance. Models 10 and 11 
indicate that for firms that specialize in exploitation R&D, the effects of exploratory R&D 
investment are negative at the 0.1% level, while the effects of exploitative R&D are positive but 
statistically insignificant (i.e., H5 is partly supported). Models 12 and 13 indicate that the 
interaction effects of both exploratory and exploitative R&D (an ambidextrous strategy) are 
similar and positive at the 10% level, supporting thus H6.  
Overall, the results are in favour of a specialization over an ambidextrous strategy, indicating that 
specialized in exploratory R&D firms may benefit from exploratory R&D investments, whereas 











 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Table 3: Regression Results (using GLS, RE) Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1a: Exploratory R&D     0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.029*** 0.005 0.000 
H1b: Exploitative R&D     0.007*** 0.002 0.000 0.029*** 0.005 0.000 
H2: Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D       -0.003*** 0.001 0.000 
H3a: Specialization in Exploratory R&D           
H3a: Specialization in Exploitative R&D           
H3b: Specialization in Ambidexterity           
Tangible Assets -0.002 0.003 0.579 -0.003 0.003 0.306 -0.003 0.003 0.259 
International Sales  0.039** 0.014 0.004 0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.03** 0.014 0.005 
Affiliated Firms  0.131*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.133*** 0.014 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.293* 0.128 0.022 0.287* 0.129 0.026 0.287* 0.129 0.025 
Protection 0.004* 0.001 0.004 0.004* 0.001 0.007 0.004** 0.001 0.006 
Industry’s R&D  -0.197† 0.101 0.052 -0.204* 0.100 0.041 -0.213* 0.100 0.034 
Newly Created Firms  -0.307*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.309*** 0.092 0.001 
High Tech. Firms 0.068 0.122 0.579 0.062 0.123 0.612 0.061 0.122 0.617 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.539*** 0.167 0.001 -0.614*** 0.168 0.000 -0.777*** 0.171 0.000 
Wald chi2/F statistic (70-73) 12432 P> 0.000 12457 P> 0.000 12519 P> 0.000 
R squared 0.3333   0.335   0.337   
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   
Number of firms 5567     5567     5567     












     Table 3: Regression Results, cont. (using GLS, RE) Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   Model 7   
 Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1a: Exploratory R&D  0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.009*** 0.002 0.000 
H1b: Exploitative R&D  0.013*** 0.003 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.012*** 0.003 0.000 
H2: Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D             
H3a: Specialization in Exploratory R&D  0.050*** 0.016 0.001       0.045* 0.016 0.004 
H3a: Specialization in Exploitative R&D     0.036* 0.017 0.027    0.029† 0.017 0.082 
H3b: Specialization in Ambidexterity        -0.037*** 0.011 0.001 (omitted) 
Tangible Assets -0.003 0.003 0.259 -0.0032 0.003 0.276 -0.003 0.003 0.243 -0.0034 0.003 0.242 
International Sales  0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 
Affiliated Firms  0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.285* 0.129 0.027 0.285* 0.129 0.027 0.283* 0.129 0.028 0.283* 0.129 0.028 
Protection 0.003** 0.001 0.008 0.003** 0.001 0.008 0.003** 0.001 0.008 0.003** 0.001 0.008 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.206* 0.100 0.038 -0.206* 0.100 0.039 -0.208* 0.100 0.037 -0.208* 0.100 0.037 
Newly Created Firms  -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.311*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 
High Technological Firms 0.066 0.123 0.593 0.061 0.123 0.619 0.064 0.123 0.605 0.064 0.123 0.600 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.655*** 0.167 0.000 -0.640*** 0.168 0.000 -0.634*** 0.167 0.000 -0.672*** 0.168 0.000 
Wald chi2/F statistic (73) 12474 P> 0.000 12475 P> 0.000 12478 P> 0.000 12492 P> 0.000 
R squared 0.335   0.335   0.335   0.335   
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   32527   
Number of firms 5567     5567     5567     5567     













Table 3: Regression Results, cont. (using GLS, RE) Model 8   Model 9   Model 10   
 Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D  0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.003 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.011*** 0.003 0.000 0.019*** 0.004 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 0.000 
Special. Explor.R&D  0.099† 0.053 0.060 0.099** 0.033 0.003    
Special. Exploit. R&D        0.021 0.046 0.650 
Special. Ambid.          
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploratory R&D  0.017** 0.006 0.005       
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D     -0.007** 0.005 0.098    
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploitative R&D        0.002 0.005 0.726 
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploratory R&D           
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploratory R&D           
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploitative R&D           
Tangible Assets -0.003 0.003 0.227 -0.003 0.003 0.232 -0.003 0.003 0.274 
International Sales  0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 
Affiliated Firms  0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.284* 0.129 0.028 0.284* 0.129 0.028 0.285* 0.129 0.027 
Protection 0.003** 0.001 0.008 0.003*** 0.001 0.008 0.003** 0.001 0.008 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.211 0.098 0.031 -0.207* 0.100 0.038 -0.206* 0.100 0.039 
Newly Created Firms  -0.310 0.091 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.311*** 0.092 0.001 
High Technological Firms 0.067 0.123 0.583 0.064 0.123 0.605 0.061 0.123 0.620 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.635*** 0.167 0.000 -0.695*** 0.168 0.000 -0.637*** 0.168 0.000 
Wald chi2/F statistic (74) 12485*** P> 0.000 12471*** P> 0.000 12480*** P> 0.000 
R squared 0.335   0.335   0.335   
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   
Number of firms (n) 5567     5567     5567     











Table 3: Regression Results, cont. (using GLS, RE) Model 11   Model 12   Model 13   
 Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D  0.029*** 0.005 0.000 0.009*** 0.002 0.000 0.009*** 0.002 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.006*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.000 
Special. Explor.R&D           
Special. Exploit. R&D  0.181*** 0.038 0.000       
Special. Ambid.    -0.099* 0.047 0.033 -0.101* 0.044 0.02 
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploratory R&D           
H4: Specialization in Exploratory R&D X Exploitative R&D           
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploitative R&D           
H5: Specialization in Exploitative R&D X Exploratory R&D  -0.022*** 0.005 0.000       
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploratory R&D     0.009 0.006 0.187    
H6: Specialization in Ambidexterity X Exploitative R&D        0.009 0.006 0.143 
Tangible Assets -0.004 0.003 0.188 -0.004 0.003 0.228 -0.004 0.003 0.227 
International Sales  0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.038** 0.014 0.005 
Affiliated Firms  0.133*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.132*** 0.014 0 
Industry Competition 0.278* 0.129 0.031 0.281* 0.129 0.029 0.280* 0.129 0.03 
Protection 0.003** 0.001 0.008 0.003** 0.001 0.008 0.003** 0.001 0.008 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.210* 0.098 0.032 -0.207* 0.1 0.037 -0.207* 0.1 0.037 
Newly Created Firms  -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 
High Technological Firms 0.065 0.123 0.596 0.063 0.123 0.606 0.063 0.123 0.606 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.766*** 0.17 0 -0.626*** 0.168 0 -0.625*** 0.168 0 
Wald chi2/F statistic (74) 12516*** P> 0 12491*** P> 0 12490*** P> 0 
R squared 0.3352   0.335   0.3353   
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   
Number of firms (n) 5567     5567     5567     












The Role of Time Lags 
The results reported in the previous tables rely on exploratory and exploitative R&D measures 
that are not lagged. To examine the sensitivity of the hypothesized findings to changes in the lag 
structure of the exploratory and exploitative R&D measures, we estimated new variables using 1- 
and 2-year lags to allow for the fact that exploratory and exploitative R&D may take a few years 
to affect the performance of firms. We then estimated the key models after replacing the initial 
measures with the lagged ones. This analysis showed that the effects of exploratory and 
exploitative R&D on firm performance became statistically insignificant. This result implies that 
exploratory and exploitative R&D generate performance effects rather quickly. Although this 
result is to some extent surprising, it can be justified by the fact that the firms of the sample 
undertake exploratory and/or exploitative R&D for several years and therefore there is a stream 
of output associated not only with a given year but also with previous years. 
 
Differences across High-Tech and Low-Tech Industries 
The results presented in the above tables rely on the full sample. I further examine how the 
hypothesised effects differ across firms that operate in high-tech and low-tech industries. In doing 
so, I split the sample into those firms that are classified (according to COTEC Report 1997 cited 
in Bayona Sáez and Arribas, 2002) as firms operating in high-tech industries (such as chemicals, 
pharmaceutical, computing, electronics, electrical, communication, medical devices and optical 
instruments) and low-tech industries (such as textiles, furniture, leather, rubber and plastic). I then 
estimated all the models for those two sub-samples separately. Overall, the results exhibit 
consistency across high- and low-tech firms and yield a pattern that is almost identical to the 
results for the full sample.  
Specifically, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed for firms in both high- and low-tech industries (with the 
only exception being that the effects of exploitative R&D on firm performance for high-tech firms 
loses its statistical significance). Similarly, the results for Hypothesis 2 yield similar coefficients 
(even though the statistical significance changes from 1% to 5% for those firms that operate in 
high-tech industries). Likewise, Hypothesis 3 is also supported for both high- and low- tech firms, 
suggesting once again that there are no significant differences across the two sub-samples (with 
the only exception being that the level of significance for firms that specialize in exploratory and 
exploitative R&D is now at 10% from 5% and that those firms that specialize in exploratory R&D 
become statistically insignificant). Likewise, Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed for both high- and 
low- tech firms (even though the statistical significance changes from 1% to 5% only for those 











industries, and from 10% to no significant effects for those firms that operate in low-tech 
industries. 
Hypothesis 5 however is not supported for firms in high tech industries. It appears that it does not 
support our theoretical prediction that the effects of exploitative R&D are stronger and positive 
for those firms that specialize in exploitative R&D. Precisely, the effects of specializing in 
exploitative R&D for those firms that invest in exploitative R&D are negative, yet the level of 
significance is at 10% and not significant for those firms operating in low-tech industries. 
Nevertheless, our theoretical prediction that the effects of specializing in exploitative R&D and 
invest in exploratory R&D is supported for firms operating both in high and low-tech industries 
(with the only exception being that the level of significance is from 0.1% to 1%).   
Finally, Hypothesis 6 is also supported, and the level of significance improves from 10% to 1% 
for firms in high-tech industries, but loses its significance for firms in low-tech industries, yet the 
directionality of the relationship remains the same (i.e., positive). As for ambidextrous firms the 
effects of exploitative R&D for ambidextrous are stronger and positive, providing thus further 
support for the hypothesized effects and the level of significance improves from 10% to 1% for 
firms in high-tech industries, but it loses its significance for firms in low- tech industries, yet the 
directionality of the relationship remains the same (i.e., positive). 
 
Outliers 
We also tested whether the hypothesised effects hold after removing the outliers from the dataset. 
In doing so, we created the standardised residuals variable and remove from the dataset those 
cases that were over 3 and less than -3 standard deviations (Howell, 1998; Miller 1991). The final 
sample were reduced from n=32,527 to n=32,077. Overall, the hypothesised effects were 
consistent and often improved their significant levels with the exception of hypothesis 6. 
Specifically, hypothesis 4 which tested the theoretical prediction that for firms that specialize in 
exploratory R&D, the effects of exploratory R&D investments on firm performance are stronger 
than the effects of exploitative R&D investment on firm performance improved its significance 
level from 10% to 0.1%. The same pattern emerged for hypothesis 5. For hypothesis 5, when we 
treated the dataset for outliers and tested our theoretical prediction that for specialized in 
exploitative R&D firms the effects of exploitative R&D on firm performance, the statistical 
significance of the results was improved. Nevertheless, the results for hypothesis 6 for which we 
predicted similar returns from exploratory and exploitative R&D for ambidextrous firms lost its 














Results for Firms in Manufacturing Industries  
We further investigated whether the hypothesised effects hold only for manufacturing firms 
including those firms that operate in service industries (i.e. industry codes 36; 37; 38; 43; 44; 49; 
50; 51; 52; 53; 54; 55). The final sample excluding those firms is estimated at n=27341. Overall, 
the hypothesised effects were confirmed, exhibiting consistency across the full sample and by 
excluding those firms that operate in service industries. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 which suggests 
that investment in exploratory/exploitative R&D has a positive direct effect on firm performance 
is also supported and is statistically significant at 0.1% level.  
Hypothesis 2 tests the interaction effect of exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D. Specifically, 
pursuing exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D simultaneously and to a similar extent 
(ambidextrous strategy) has a negative effect on firm performance is confirmed (the only 
difference being that it loses its significance from 0.1% to 10%.  
Similarly, Hypothesis 3 which indicates that specialization in either exploratory R&D or 
exploitative R&D is more advantageous than being ambidextrous is also supported (the only 
difference being that it loses its significance from 1% to 5% for firms that specialize in exploratory 
R&D, and from 5% to 10 % for firms that specialize in exploitative R&D, and for ambidextrous 
firms from 0.1% to 1% level of significance).  
Hypothesis 4 which indicates that when specializing in exploratory R&D, the effects of 
exploratory R&D investment on firm performance are stronger than the effects of exploitative 
R&D investment on firm performance is partly supported. Although the directionality of the 
relationship is confirmed, the hypothesised effects of exploratory R&D investment for firms that 
specialize in exploratory R&D do not reach statistical significance. Yet, the hypothesised effects 
of exploratory R&D investment for firms that specialize in exploitative R&D are supported.  
Also, the results for Hypothesis 5, which theoretically predict that for firms that specialize in 
exploitative R&D, the positive effects of exploratory R&D investment on firm performance are 
weaker than the effects of exploitative R&D investment on firm performance, are consistent with 
those obtained when running the regressions for the full sample (i.e., they partly support our 
theoretical prediction) and yet the directionality of the hypothesized relationships remains as 
stated in our initial predictions. 
Finally, Hypothesis 6, which tests whether the effects of exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D 
investment differ for firms with ambidextrous R&D investments, were also confirmed. This 















Transition Probability Matrices (TPM) 
TPM discloses information about the probability of firms changing status i.e., the specialization 
strategy across years. Overall, the results from the analysis indicate that there is less than 25% 
(ranging from 11% to 25%) chance for firms in our sample to change specialization strategy from 
one year to the next. Specifically, the rows in Tables 4a, b, c reflect the initial values, and the 
columns reflect the final values. In Table 4a, each year, 88.85% of the firms that do not specialize 
in exploratory R&D in the data remained specialized in exploratory R&D in the next year; the 
remaining 11.15% became specialized in exploratory R&D. Although those that specialize in 
exploratory R&D had only a 25.36% chance of not specializing in R&D in each year, those firms 
that specialize in exploratory R&D had 74.64% chance of remaining specialized in the trajectory 
they had chosen. Similarly, In Table 4b the chances of firms that specialize in exploitative R&D 
to change strategy from one year to the next is only 13.52% and 19.26% for those firms that 
specialize in exploitative R&D. The same pattern is observed for ambidextrous firms (Table 4c). 
There is only a 10.11% chance that not ambidextrous firms change their strategy to from one year 
to the next and 25.59% chance for a firm that is ambidextrous to become either exploitative or 
exploratory the next year. Overall, the firms in our sample exhibit less chances to change their 
strategy, they are more likely to carry on doing what they currently do in terms of their exploratory 
and exploitative activities.  
 
 
Table 4a - Transition Probability Matrices (TPM) For Exploratory Firms 
 
 
Firms that do not 
specialize in 
Exploratory R&D (%) 
Firms that specialize in 
Exploratory R&D (%) 
Do not specialize in Exploratory R&D 88.85 11.15 
Specialize in Exploratory R&D 25.36 74.64 
















Table 4b - Transition Probability Matrices (TPM) For Exploitative Firms 
 
Do not Specialize in 
Exploitative R&D (%) 
Specialize in 
Exploitative R&D (%) 
Do not specialize in Exploitative R&D 86.48 13.52 
Specialize in Exploitative R&D 19.26 80.74 






Table 4c - Transition Probability Matrices (TPM) For Ambidextrous Firms 
 
No Ambidextrous Firms 
(%) Ambidextrous Firms % 
Not Ambidextrous Firms 89.89 10.11 
Ambidextrous Firms 25.59 74.41 




In the previous models, the implicit assumption was made that the effects of exploratory and 
exploitative R&D on firm performance were linear. This implied that the higher the firm’s 
investment in exploratory and exploitative R&D is, the stronger the positive effects on 
performance will be. However, both exploratory and exploitative R&D are associated with 
various advantages and disadvantages that may be more pronounced in lower or higher levels of 
investment. Subsequently, the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on performance might 
curvilinear. For example, they may follow a U-shape or an inverted U-shape pattern. In order to 











squared terms of exploratory and exploitative R&D. Table 5 reports the results for the full sample 
of firms. As we can observe, the squared terms are in both models statistically insignificant. They 
do not therefore support the notion of curvilinear effects.   
Although the above results do not support the curvilinear effects for the full sample, it may be 
argued that the pattern of the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance 
may differ for firms that specialize in one of the two activities. According to the reasoning that 
was discussed in the theoretical section of the chapter, we expect the effects of exploratory R&D 
on firm performance to decline more slowly for firms that specialize in exploration, while the 
effects of exploitative R&D on firm performance should decline more slowly for firms that 
specialize in exploitation. To explore whether this is the case and whether the curvilinear effects 
differ between firms that specialize in exploration and those that specialize in exploitation, the 
models with squared terms were re-estimated for each sub-group of firms separately (i.e. for firms 
that specialize in exploration and firms that specialize in exploitation).  
Table 5 also reports the additional results whereas Figures 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b depict the marginal 
effects for each subgroup and activity separately. These reveal an interesting pattern of results 
that shows that the effects differ. Although many of the terms are still statistically insignificant, 
it is interesting that in the case of firms that specialize in exploration, the effects are steeper for 
exploratory R&D but much flatter for exploitative R&D. However, the opposite occurs in the 
case of firms that specialize in exploration, i.e. the effects are steeper for exploitative R&D and 
flatter for exploratory R&D. To compare the effects more directly, we have also graphically 
depicted them in Figures 6a and 6b. Overall, these graphical representations of the analysis 
support the view that specialization in one activity increases the returns to this activity by 











Table 5: Regression Results for curvilinear effects 
  Full sample 
Firms that specialize in Exploratory R&D (9,820 
obs) 
Firms that specialize in Exploitative R&D 
(12,876 obs) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Coeff se sig Coeff se sig Coeff se sig Coeff se sig Coeff se sig Coeff se sig 
Explorative R&D 0.003 0.003 0.267 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.071 0.034 0.037 0.030 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.230 0.002 0.003 0.545 
Exploitative R&D 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.094 0.007 0.005 0.134 0.005 0.012 0.654 0.025 0.008 0.001 0.105 0.032 0.001 
Explorative R&D - Squared 0.000 0.000 0.374 
   
-0.003 0.002 0.175 
   
-0.001 0.001 0.322 
   
Exploitative R&D - Squared 
   
0.000 0.000 0.371 
   
0.000 0.002 0.896 
   
-0.005 0.002 0.009 
Tangible Assets -0.010 0.003 0.000 -0.010 0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.004 0.086 -0.007 0.004 0.069 -0.009 0.004 0.015 -0.008 0.004 0.026 
International Sales  0.035 0.011 0.002 0.035 0.011 0.002 0.041 0.022 0.060 0.042 0.022 0.061 0.069 0.019 0.000 0.069 0.019 0.000 
Affiliated Firms  0.110 0.014 0.000 0.110 0.014 0.000 0.166 0.019 0.000 0.165 0.019 0.000 0.141 0.023 0.000 0.142 0.023 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.253 0.142 0.075 0.254 0.142 0.074 0.429 0.234 0.066 0.430 0.234 0.066 0.113 0.110 0.306 0.098 0.110 0.375 
Protection 0.003 0.002 0.054 0.003 0.002 0.054 0.005 0.003 0.161 0.005 0.003 0.183 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.183 0.092 0.047 -0.182 0.092 0.049 -0.308 0.147 0.037 -0.311 0.143 0.030 -0.764 0.221 0.001 -0.762 0.217 0.000 
Newly Created Firms  -0.183 0.036 0.000 -0.183 0.036 0.000 -0.215 0.099 0.030 -0.218 0.101 0.030 -0.099 0.067 0.138 -0.098 0.067 0.142 
High Technological Firms 0.064 0.117 0.581 0.064 0.117 0.582 0.103 0.112 0.358 0.104 0.113 0.359 0.083 0.105 0.427 0.081 0.104 0.435 












Constant -0.190 0.137 0.165 -0.189 0.136 0.165 -0.732 0.225 0.001 -0.585 0.231 0.011 -0.219 0.124 0.077 -0.514 0.177 0.004 
























































































We have also examined how firms that remain specialized in one activity every year (or remained 
simultaneously ambidextrous every year) without changing their strategy perform. We term this 
pattern as “constant specialization”. As noted in the General Methodological Chapter of this 
thesis, there are three distinct patterns of firms in our dataset that adopt a constant specialization 
strategy (i.e., do not change their specialization strategy throughout their life in the dataset).  
These patterns include a) firms that remain specialized in exploratory R&D, b) firms that remain 
specialized in exploitative R&D and c) firms that remain simultaneously ambidextrous (i.e. they 
spend a similar amount of money and resources on both activities). As already discussed, since 
specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their activities, we classify a firm as 
specialized in exploratory or exploitative R&D when this firm spends over 66.6 % of its internal 
R&D budget on either exploring new technologies or exploiting existing ones. The results from 
the regression analysis (Table 6) indicate that the effects of remaining constantly specialized on 
firm performance are statistically insignificant except for those firms that specialize in 














 Table 6: Regression Results for the effects of Constant Specialization on Firm Performance 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
  Coef. S. E P Coef. S. E P Coef. S. E P 
Exploratory R&D  0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 
Constant specialization in Exploration 0.016 0.045 0.719       
Constant specialization in Exploitation    0.034 0.035 0.328    
Constant Ambidexterity       -0.007 0.046 0.885 
Tangible Assets -0.003 0.004 0.415 -0.003 0.004 0.412 -0.003 0.004 0.416 
International Sales  0.036 0.016 0.022 0.035 0.016 0.022 0.035 0.016 0.022 
Affiliated Firms  0.125 0.017 0.000 0.124 0.017 0.000 0.125 0.016 0.000 
Ind. Competition 0.269 0.151 0.075 0.270 0.151 0.074 0.269 0.151 0.075 
Protection 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.004 0.002 0.012 
Industry’s R&D    -0.212 0.105 0.043 -0.212 0.105 0.043 -0.213 0.105 0.043 
Newly Created   -0.310 0.080 0.000 -0.309 0.080 0.000 -0.309 0.080 0.000 
High Tech. Firms 0.034 0.112 0.760 0.056 0.117 0.634 0.051 0.116 0.658 
Time Effects  Inc Inc Inc Inc Inc Inc Inc Inc Inc 
Constant -0.267 0.129 0.038 -0.276 0.131 0.035 -0.267 0.130 0.040 
Ind.Variance 0.032 0.019 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm Variance 0.494 0.043 0.416 0.494 0.044 0.416 0.497 0.044 0.418 
Residual Variance 0.126 0.015 0.100 0.126 0.015 0.100 0.126 0.015 0.100 
Wald chi2 (19) 240.250 P> 0.000 279.390 P> 0.000 246.940 P> 0.000 
Number of observations  32527     32527     32527     












Table 6: Regression Results for the effects from Constant 
Specialization on Firm Performance (cont.) 
Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
 Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 
Exploitative R&D 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 
Constant specialization in Exploration -0.193 0.118 0.102 -0.008 0.052 0.874    
Constant specialization in Exploitation       -0.095 0.089 0.284 
Constant Ambidexterity          
Constant specialization in Exploration X Exploratory R&D 0.026† 0.015 0.087       
Constant specialization in Exploration X Exploitative R&D    0.009 0.008 0.265    
Constant specialization in Exploitation X Exploitative R&D       0.016 0.011 0.157 
Constant specialization in Exploitation X Explorative R&D          
Constant Ambidexterity X Explorative R&D          
Constant Ambidexterity X Exploitative R&D          
Tangible Assets -0.004 0.004 0.398 -0.003 0.004 0.412 -0.004 0.004 0.398 
International Sales 0.036 0.016 0.022 0.035 0.016 0.023 0.035 0.016 0.022 
Affiliated Firms 0.125 0.017 0.000 0.125 0.016 0.000 0.124 0.017 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.268 0.151 0.076 0.269 0.151 0.075 0.272 0.151 0.072 
Protection 0.004 0.002 0.014 0.004 0.002 0.014 0.004 0.002 0.012 
Industry’s R&D intensity -0.211 0.104 0.043 -0.212 0.105 0.043 -0.212 0.105 0.044 
Newly Created Firms -0.312 0.080 0.000 -0.310 0.080 0.000 -0.308 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.033 0.112 0.771 0.034 0.112 0.759 0.054 0.117 0.642 
Time Effects Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl 











Ind. Variance 0.034 0.019 0.012 0.034 0.019 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.003 
Firm Variance 0.493 0.043 0.416 0.494 0.043 0.416 0.494 0.044 0.416 
Residual Variance 0.126 0.015 0.100 0.126 0.015 0.100 0.126 0.015 0.100 
Wald chi2 (19-20) 245.400 P> 0.000 282.750 P> 0.000 278.700 P> 0.000 
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; †p < 0.10. 
 
 
Table 6: Regression Results for the effects from Constant Specialization on Firm Performance (cont.) 
  Model 7   Model 8   Model 9   
  Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D  0.008 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.008 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 
Constant specialization in Exploration          
Constant specialization in Exploitation 0.036 0.038 0.349       
Constant Ambidexterity    -0.202 0.220 0.360 -0.278 0.210 0.186 
Constant specialization in Exploration X Exploratory R&D           
Constant specialization in Exploration X Exploitative R&D           
Constant specialization in Exploitation X Exploitative R&D           
Constant specialization in Exploitation X Explorative R&D  -0.001 0.005 0.888       











Constant Ambidexterity X Exploitative R&D        0.034 0.023 0.144 
Tangible Assets -0.003 0.004 0.412 -0.003 0.004 0.404 -0.003 0.004 0.399 
International Sales  0.035 0.016 0.023 0.036 0.015 0.022 0.036 0.015 0.021 
Affiliated Firms  0.124 0.017 0.000 0.125 0.016 0.000 0.125 0.016 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.270 0.151 0.074 0.268 0.151 0.076 0.266 0.151 0.078 
Protection 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.012 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.213 0.105 0.043 -0.212 0.105 0.043 -0.212 0.105 0.043 
Newly Created Firms  -0.309 0.080 0.000 -0.309 0.080 0.000 -0.309 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.056 0.117 0.634 0.052 0.116 0.657 0.052 0.116 0.657 
Time Effects  Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl Incl 
Constant -0.277 0.131 0.035 -0.264 0.129 0.041 -0.261 0.129 0.043 
Ind. Variance 0.014 0.010 0.003 0.263 0.068 0.158 0.263 0.068 0.158 
Firm Variance 0.494 0.044 0.416 0.496 0.044 0.418 0.496 0.044 0.418 
Residual Variance 0.126 0.015 0.100 0.126 0.015 0.100 0.126 0.015 0.100 
Wald chi2 (19-20) 280.210 P> 0.000 242.670 P> 0.000 242.710 P> 0.000 
Number of observations  32527   32527   32527   











Results using Split Analysis 
Although the correlation between specialization strategies and exploratory/exploitative R&D is 
not particularly high, we have further tested Hypotheses 4 and 5 using split analysis rather than 
moderated regression analysis (interactions). Hypothesis 4 suggested that for firms that specialize 
in exploratory R&D, the positive effects of exploratory R&D investment on firm performance are 
stronger than the effects of exploitative R&D investment on firm performance. Hypothesis 5 
suggested that for firms that specialize in exploitative R&D, the effects of exploratory R&D 
investment on firm performance are weaker than the effects of exploitative R&D investment on 
firm performance. To test these hypotheses using split analysis, we re-run the main model 
separately for groups of firms that specialize in exploratory R&D and groups of firms that 
specialize in exploitative R&D.  
Table 7 reports the new results. The results confirm H4 and H5 and the hypothesised effects are 
consistent with those results when running the regressions on the sub-samples. The theoretical 
prediction that the effect of exploitative R&D on firm performance is stronger for those firms that 
specialize in exploitative R&D is confirmed in Model 1 (whereas exploratory R&D is not 
significant). A similar pattern is also observed when firms specialize in exploratory R&D with its 
effects being stronger for specialized in exploratory R&D firms (whereas the effects of 


















Table 7: Regression Results using Split Analysis for firms with Different Specialization 
Specialize Exploitative R&D                   Specialize Explorative R&D            Ambidextrous 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
Exploratory R&D 0.001 0.003 0.769 0.034* 0.014 0.017 0.035** 0.011 0.002 
Exploitative R&D 0.025** 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.192 0.012 0.010 0.216 
Tangible Assets 0.003 0.006 0.571 -0.004 0.003 0.227 -0.007 0.008 0.418 
International Sales 0.084*** 0.023 0.000 0.027 0.029 0.345 0.039 0.026 0.138 
Affiliated Firms 0.154*** 0.027 0.000 0.186*** 0.028 0.000 0.226*** 0.029 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.297** 0.115 0.010 0.342 0.268 0.202 0.069 0.148 0.641 
Protection 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.006† 0.004 0.089 0.004* 0.002 0.024 
Industry’s R&D 
intensity 
-0.647*** 0.186 0.001 -0.352† 0.171 0.039 -0.450** 0.174 0.010 
Newly Created Firms -0.196** 0.072 0.007 -0.292† 0.153 0.055 -0.328** 0.121 0.007 
High Technological 
Firms 
0.025 0.107 0.815 0.104 0.118 0.381 -0.009 0.137 0.945 
Time Effects inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.471*** 0.139 0.001 -0.558* 0.230 0.015 -0.377* 0.154 0.014 
Industry Variance 0.179 0.035  0.2517 0.0531  0.2641 0.0619  
Firm Variance 0.490 0.045  0.5285 0.0520  0.4753 0.0539  
Residual Variance 0.1091 0.0155  0.1161 0.0216  0.1111 0.0158  
Wald chi2 (18-20) 672.63 P> 0.000 254.750 P> 0.000 266.860 P> 0.000 
Number of 
observations 











DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Theoretical Contributions  
Prior studies have considered the advantages of exploration and exploitation and the performance 
effects of being ambidextrous (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Junni et al., 2013; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Dover and Dierk, 2010; Turner et al., 2013; Martini et al., 2013). 
Despite prior contributions, the literature has not explicitly made a direct comparison between 
ambidextrous and specialization strategies. Therefore, it remains unclear which strategy 
(ambidexterity or specialization) is more beneficial for firm performance. The literature has also 
made the implicit assumption that the returns to exploration and exploitation are similar for 
ambidextrous and specialized firms. However, it may well be the case that specialization may 
change the extent to which exploratory and exploitative R&D investments influence firm 
performance.  
This chapter contributes to organization learning and ambidexterity literatures (Argyris, and 
Schön, 1978; Atuahene-Gima, and Murray, 2007; Levinthal and March, 1993; Tushman et al., 
2010; O'Reilly, and Tushman, 2013) by addressing the above issues. The value of the chapter lies 
in a) specifying how specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D directly affects the 
performance of the firm and b) identifying how the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D 
on firm performance differ for firms that adopt a specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy. 
From the point of view of organizational learning theory, this analysis advances our understanding 
of this subject by explaining why the effectiveness of exploratory and exploitative R&D on 
performance is affected by the firm’s choice to invest in activities that require knowledge that is 
similar with (or different from) the firm’s current knowledge base and specialization choice.  
In this chapter, we developed a reasoning that explains why firms are on average better-off when 
they specialize in either exploratory R&D or exploitative R&D, rather than when they make a 
similar amount of investment in both exploratory and exploitative R&D (i.e., being 
ambidextrous). We theorize that specialization improves firm performance because firms build 
up their expertise by repeating and investing over and over again in the same tasks, processes and 
activities (Levitt and March, 1988; 1965; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, 1981; Cyert and 
March, 1963). This enables them to accumulate experiential learning and to decrease the 
likelihood of doing errors in subsequent similar investments. We advance prior thinking by 
showing that the effects of specializing in either exploratory or exploitative R&D on firm 
performance might be stronger and positive compared to an ambidextrous strategy. Our reasoning 
indicates that the experiential learning that the firm gains when it engages in either exploratory 
or exploitative R&D contributes to strengthening its ability to perform competently related 
processes and activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Volderba et al., 2010; Sears and Hoetker, 











Our theoretical contribution is threefold. First, we extend theoretical knowledge on exploration 
and exploitation (March, 1991; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013) by 
showing how specializing in either of these two activities in the context of R&D affects firm 
performance. Drawing from organizational learning theory and on the role of experiential learning 
in competence building we argue that the accumulation of experiential learning enables firms to 
build competence either in the form of exploitation or exploration (March 1999; Holmqvist, 2004; 
Baum et al., 2000; Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014). Such competence allows firms to 
become proficient at activities they undertake regularly. Learning through direct experience helps 
firms to accumulate beneficial knowledge that could easily be incorporated into their routines, 
affecting thus subsequent engagement with similar investments strengthening further their 
expertise on their chosen R&D investments. This reasoning helps us explain why specialization 
is beneficial.  
 Second, we contribute to the ambidexterity-firm performance debate by making a direct 
comparison between ambidextrous and specialization strategies and by hypothesizing that the 
effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance differ for firms that pursue a 
specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy. Drawing on organizational learning theory (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991; Levinthal and 
March, 1993; Baum et al., 2000; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Wang and Ahmed, 2003), we suggest that 
specializing in either exploratory or exploitative R&D is likely to affect firm performance 
positively for two main reasons. Specialization limits the scope of the firm’s activities while 
strengthening its competence in areas of prior established competence. Specialization also enables 
firms to exploit and build on their current knowledge with no need to engage in distant search or 
cross its own technological boundaries (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf, and Nerkar, 
2001). Consequently, specialized firms could replicate past behaviour, utilize what they already 
know and use ideas and technologies that have been tested successfully in the past (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988). Those firms thus enhance their 
performance compared to those firms that invest in both and run the risk of performing less well 
at both, given the differential knowledge-base and structures that are required to make similar 
investments in both exploratory and exploitative R&D (March, 1991; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Junni 
et al., 2013). 
Third, we contribute to organisational learning theory. The theory explains the importance of 
different learning mechanisms (i.e., double-loop/generative learning which is often equated with 
exploratory knowledge and single loop/adaptive learning which reflects exploitative knowledge; 
Argyris and Schon, 1978; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Argyris, 1976). It also recognizes that 
different types of learning matter for firm performance (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; 











organisational learning theory does not explicitly clarify the conditions under which their value 
and therefore their effects on performance may accentuate or weaken. In the context of 
exploratory and exploitative R&D, our results show that there is a performance-enhancing effect 
when there is knowledge similarity between current R&D investments and a firm’s existing 
knowledge base. By contrast, we show that there is a performance-weakening effect when there 
is knowledge dissimilarity between current R&D investments and a firm’s knowledge base.   
 
Managerial Implications  
Because our findings are related with R&D investments they have practical implications for 
managerial decision. Precisely, as our study explains why and how specializing in either 
exploratory or exploitative R&D is more beneficial than making simultaneous investments in both 
exploratory and exploitative R&D, it can help managers to develop an optimal 
exploratory/exploitative R&D investment strategy. Importantly however, our analysis could help 
managers to understand why limiting the scope of their investments and corresponding activities 
is likely to enhance their firm performance.  
Since our analysis is in favour of specializing strategies and our results are suggestive that 
exploratory and exploitative strategies that focuses on investing over 66.6% of their R&D budget 
in either exploring new ideas and technologies (exploratory R&D) or exploiting (exploitative 
R&D) existing ones may be more beneficial than ambidextrous one. Investments for which firms 
follow the same technological trajectory, underpinned by the same knowledge base they are 
currently undertake, utilising therefore and building upon their existing knowledge stock are more 
likely to enhance their firm performance. The firm-enhancing effect of those strategies often 
derives from the fact that those firms repetitively engage with the same investments, and thus 
they are more likely to strengthen their competence and expertise on the tasks and activities they 
undertake regularly. Further, because specialized firms narrow the focus of their activities, often 
replicating prior successful behaviour, they minimize this way the likelihood of doing errors in 
subsequent similar investments.  
Further, our analysis suggests that the equal distribution between exploratory and exploitative 
R&D is not always the most optimal strategy for enhancing firm performance. For this reason, 
our results could assist managerial decisions on how to make a better distribution in their 
resources, given the fact that exploratory and exploitative R&D are distinctively different 
activities, and thus require different physical structures, knowledge base and personnel to manage 
them successfully. Importantly however, since our findings are in favour of specialization 
strategies, they could assist managers in understanding the importance of accumulating 












Limitations and Future Research  
Our findings are subject to a number of limitations, some of which may provide opportunities for 
future research. First, although we used a multi-industry context to test our hypotheses and 
increase sample heterogeneity, our empirical analysis of the Spanish dataset is for a single country 
and thus our findings may apply only to those firms with similar attributes to that of the Spanish 
firms. For instance, there are differences in the innovation systems of different members of the 
OECD countries (Bayona Sáez and Arribas, 2002). Those differences are more prominent across 
countries of the European Union, Japan and the USA (OECD, 2000). Although Spain belongs in 
countries of the European Union, the Spanish innovation system is distinct from that of other 
countries mainly because R&D expenditure in Spain is below average compared to that of other 
European countries (Eurostat statistics, 2016). Despite this distinctive characteristic of Spanish 
firms, we would expect the effects of specialization to accentuate (be more positive and stronger) 
if R&D expenditure was higher in Spain and Spanish firms had to operate in a more stimulating 
environment like that of the rest of the European countries (European Commission, 2000). Future 
research thus may build on our study using firms from different countries of varied innovation 
system and explore whether the R&D expenditure of a country matters for the returns to 
specialization.  
Second, although our longitudinal analysis and the choice of different estimators, we try to 
minimize the omitted variable problem and endogeneity issues, in the absence of appropriate 
instrumental variables we suggest caution in indicating causal relationships (Wooldridge, 2002).  
Third, although in the robustness section of our analysis we tested whether the patterns of constant 
specialization and constant ambidexterity affect differently firm performance (no significant 
results found), it would be interesting to explore whether and how these different patterns of 
specialization e.g.,  sequential specialization (i.e., change from being specialized in one activity 
in year t to becoming either ambidextrous or specialized in the other activity in year t+1) versus 
focused specialization (those firms that persistently specialize for many years) differ in countries 
with strong and weak appropriability regimes (IPR). For instance, we would expect the effects of 
sequential specialization on firm performance to be stronger than the effects of focused 
specialization in industries with weak protection because greater access to knowledge leakage 
(Kafouros and Forsans, 2012; Ho and Wang, 2015) and thus abundance of knowledge will allow 
firms with sequential specialization strategies to exploit easier ideas developed by other 
competitor firms and explore (experiment) by being exposed to new technologies and 
opportunities. 
Third, we demonstrated how a firm’s specialization strategy had different returns depending on 
whether the firm specializes in exploratory/exploitative R&D or is ambidextrous. Nevertheless, 











strategies to affect firm performance. Since larger-size firms have abundance of resources (Ebben 
and Johnson, 2005; Cao et al., 2009), and greater access to a larger pool of specialist knowledge 
(Chen and Hambrick, 1995), we would expect that a specialization strategy may be more viable 
and beneficial compared to an ambidextrous strategy, given the differential knowledge base and 

























Although prior research has identified the benefits of being ambidextrous (i.e. of pursuing both 
knowledge exploration and exploitation), two strategically important questions remain 
unanswered. First, are there certain conditions in the industry in which the focal firm operates 
that make specialization in either exploration or exploitation more beneficial than ambidexterity? 
Second, in cases in which specialization is beneficial, which specialization strategy (exploratory 
or exploitative) and under what conditions is more advantageous to the firm? In this study, we 
address the above questions by examining how firm performance is influenced by specialization 
in exploration or exploitation. We posit that the answer to these questions depends on a particular 
industry characteristic (industry orientation). We argue that industry orientation affects the 
availability, value and transaction costs of accessing of collaborative opportunities and, in turn, 
influences how beneficial an exploratory or exploitative specialization strategy is for the firm. To 
test our framework, we develop a typology of industry orientation that captures cross-industry 
regularities and variations in the concentration of the exploration and exploitation activity. Our 
empirical analysis of 32,537 firms shows that pursuing an exploitation strategy affects negatively 
performance when firms operate in an exploitative-oriented industry. Conversely, pursuing an 
exploitation strategy affects positively performance when firms operate in a hybrid or in an 
exploratory-orientated industry. Our analysis shows that two firms that adopt the same 
specialization strategy may experience different effects on their performance when the orientation 
of their industry varies, implying that certain industry dynamics make it possible to achieve 
ambidexterity at the industry level.  
 




















Knowledge exploitation and exploration have long been identified as essential innovation 
activities in achieving firm competitiveness (March, 1991; Chen and Katila, 2008; Auh and 
Menguc, 2005; Koryak et al., 2018; Junni, et al., 2013). Knowledge exploitation enables firms to 
leverage existing knowledge to refine products and services, standardize processes and improve 
efficiency, whereas knowledge exploration involves distant search and experimentation activities 
that help firms generate new ideas, knowledge and discoveries (Gupta et al., 2006; Belderbos et 
al., 2010; Turner et al., 2013; Chang et al., 2009). Prior research has focused on the advantages 
of pursuing both exploitation and exploration (Benner and Tushman, 2002; He and Wong, 2004; 
Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Martini et al., 2013; Tushman et al., 2010; Koryak et al., 2018). This 
strategy is achieved either by making a similar investment in both activities every year, or by 
engaging in ‘temporal cycling’ whereby the firm switches between exploration and exploitation 
every one or two years.  
Such a balanced strategy may assist firms in improving efficiency and generating rents (Auh and 
Menguc, 2005) while avoiding getting trapped in outdated technologies (Ahuja and Lampert, 
2001; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Jansen et al., 2006). Conversely, other studies show that engaging 
in both activities has an insignificant (Bierly and Daly, 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2007) or even 
a negative effect on firm performance (Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 
2005; Lavie et al., 2011) because the knowledge and processes needed to undertake the two 
activities are incompatible (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Lubatkin et al., 2006; Floyd and Lane, 
2000). As such, not only there is an ongoing debate of whether firms should be ambidextrous 
(invest in both activities) or specialize (invest the vast majority of their time and resources in 
either exploration or exploitation over a long period of time), but it is also less well understood 
which specialization strategy (exploratory or exploitative) and in which situations is more 
advantageous for firm performance.  
Such conflicting findings prompt the need to conduct research aimed at identifying the boundary 
conditions under which exploration and exploitation lead to superior performance. One research 
avenue for enhancing understanding of such conditions is to examine the industry context in 
which firms specialize and conceptualize how it may facilitate or impede certain exploration and 
exploitation processes and, in turn, influence their effects of firm performance. As prior research 
suggests, a given strategy or asset by itself is not useful unless it can be applied to a specific 
context (Sirmon et al., 2008), emphasizing the value of advancing research that has begun to 
examine the context in which exploration and exploitation is conducted (Auh and Menguc, 2005; 










To understand why exploration or exploitation are more beneficial in certain contexts than in 
others, we develop a typology of industry orientation that conceptualizes cross-industry 
regularities and variations in the concentration of the exploration and exploitation activity. 
According to this typology, industries may be exploitative-oriented (whereby most firms in these 
industries specialize in exploitation and only few firms specialize in exploration), exploratory-
oriented (they exhibit the opposite pattern), or hybrid (approximately the same percentage of 
firms specialize in exploratory and exploitative R&D and are ambidextrous. Drawing from 
industrial organization economics (Bain, 1968; Porter, 2000; McGahan and Porter, 1997; 
Dranove et al., 1998; Jacobides et al., 2006), we contend that industry orientation affects three 
key factors that in turn influence how beneficial an exploratory or exploitative specialization 
strategy is. First, industry orientation affects the availability of collaborative and knowledge-
sourcing opportunities that firms are exposed to. It therefore makes the pool of potentially 
complementary opportunities in the market to be numerous and important in some industries, but 
scarcer and less significant in other industries. Second, the level of availability in turn affects the 
difficulty and transaction costs of accessing opportunities and expertise from the market. The 
higher the availability in a given industry is, the lower the difficulty and transaction costs of 
accessing these opportunities will be. Third, industry orientation affects how valuable these 
opportunities are by influencing the similarity (or overlap) between the explorative or exploitative 
activities that a firm undertakes and those offered by other firms in the industry. A higher degree 
of such similarity makes external opportunities redundant and decreases their marginal value.  
Building on this reasoning, we examine how the relationship between specialization in 
exploration or exploitation and firm performance is influenced by the orientation of the industry 
in which a firm operates. Accordingly, we develop a conceptual framework that clarifies the 
mechanisms that make specialization more beneficial in a given industry context. Given that firms 
that choose to specialize may focus on either exploration or exploitation, our analysis helps us 
understand which specialization strategy (exploratory or exploitative) is more advantageous and 
in which industry contexts. We expect specialization over a given time timeframe to be more 
effective in enhancing firm performance when the industry in which the firm operates is 
characterized by a higher availability of collaborative and knowledge sourcing opportunities that 
complement the firm’s internal innovation activities. These environments enable firms that 
specialize in one activity (e.g. exploitation) to use external markets in their industry to access 
expertise and opportunities related to the activity they do not pursuit (e.g. exploration), thus 
increasing their performance (Chesbrough, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006; Lichtenthaler and 
Lichtenthaler, 2009; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Chesbrough, 2006). 
Our analysis of a longitudinal dataset of 32,537 observations supports this reasoning, indicating 
that the adoption of specialization in exploitation has a negative effect on performance when the 










opportunities for complementing its internal activities. Conversely, the opposite pattern emerges 
with the corresponding effect on performance being positive when a firm that specializes in 
exploitation operates in a hybrid or exploratory-oriented industry. The importance of 
differentiating industry contexts in this manner lies in showing that firms that adopt a similar 
specialization strategy in exploration or exploitation may experience different returns to 
specialization when the orientation of their industry differs.  
Our study seeks to make a number of contributions. First, it develops a new typology for industry 
contexts and a conceptual framework that together explain how and why the performance-
enhancing effects of exploration and exploitation vary across industries. Second, it helps us 
understand which specialization strategy firms should pursue and how certain context-specific 
characteristics should determine the effectiveness of these strategies. As such, it contributes to 
exploitation and exploration research that has considered the role of the environment (Auh and 
Menguc, 2005; Jansen et al., 2006; Thornhill and White, 2007; Uotila et al., 2009) but has not 
examined how the orientation of each industry affects the returns to exploration and exploitation 
for the focal firm. Our analysis also implies that although some firms maintain a specialization 
strategy over time, certain industry dynamics make it possible to achieve ambidexterity at the 
industry level, whereby some firms specialize in exploration and other firms specialize in 
exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Chesbrough, 2006). This 
theoretical position does not necessarily contradict the logic of ambidexterity; yet it extends this 
notion from the context of a single firm to the context of the broader industry.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND   
Exploration, Exploitation and Organizational learning  
Within the organizational learning literature (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988; 
Huber, 1991; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Wang and Ahmed, 2003; Levinthal and March, 1993), it has 
been established that although knowledge exploration and exploitation can be complementary in 
enhancing firm performance, they involve different processes and activities and therefore 
compete for resources within firms (March, 1991; Gupta et al., 2006; Wilden et al., 2018; Koryak 
et al., 2018; Junni et al., 2013). Exploitation relies on a firm’s existing knowledge base. It requires 
local search and, as an activity, focuses on efficiency (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf 
and Almeida, 2003). Exploration requires distant knowledge and experimentation (March, 1991; 
Gupta et al., 2006; Baum et al., 2000; He and Wong, 2004; Wilden et al., 2018; Koryak et al., 
2018; Junni et al., 2013). Exploration and exploitation also differ in terms of learning. Double-
loop and generative learning in exploration enables firms to generate a stream of ideas (Argyris 
and Schon, 1978; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Chiva et al., 2010), whereas single loop adaptive 
learning in exploitation facilitates incremental changes to existing products and processes 










Exploitation improves performance by helping firms strengthen established competencies, extend 
the life cycles of their products, achieve economies of scale and scope, and sustain rent generation 
(Baum et al., 2000; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Auh and Menguc, 2005). Because exploitation 
focuses on products familiar to both the innovating firm and its customers, it is also less risky and 
has predictable returns (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). On the other hand, exploration affects firm 
performance by helping firms to identify opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and 
George, 2002; Lane et al., 2006; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009), 
pursuit new technological trajectories (Teece, 2007) and combine knowledge from different 
domains that may result in the creation of entirely new markets (He and Wong, 2004; Sears and 
Hoetker, 2014) and first-mover advantages (Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2007). 
Although some firms invest time, effort and resources in both exploration and exploitation 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw; 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013; Uotila et al., 2009; Wilden et al., 
2018), other firms adopt a specialization strategy (and sustain this over time). In this study, we 
define specialization as a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their activities and invest the 
vast majority of their resources, time and effort in either exploitation or exploration for a long 
period of time. Specialization provides two significant advantages (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 
1988; Brusoni et al., 2001; Calderini and Scelato, 2005; Romer, 1987). First, it increases the 
efficiency with which firms perform a set of explorative or exploitative activities. Such efficiency 
gains result from the repetition in execution and the accumulated expertise and experiential 
knowledge gained by focusing on specific tasks (Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Holmqvist, 2004; 
Cassillas and Moreno- Moreno-Menéndez, 2014). Second, specialization can increase the returns 
to certain activities by enabling firms to perform such activities at a lower marginal cost and risk. 
Lower marginal cost and higher returns are the result of becoming better in undertaking certain 
activities because learning pertaining to these activities accumulates faster in areas of established 
expertise (Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004).  
As firms operate in a broader network of organizations (Gupta et al., 2006; Lavie et al., 2010; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), some firms may specialize in activities they are endowed to do 
well and use the market to transact and exchange outputs, skills and expertise with firms that 
perform well in other activities. As noted earlier, this view implies that although balance between 
exploration and exploitation may not be achieved within the firm, it is achieved at the market or 
industry level. Access to the market is facilitated by three key mechanisms. First, firms may 
engage in formal collaboration, such as alliances and joint ventures, or simply acquire technology. 
Second, they may engage in knowledge sourcing or license technologies and inputs from other 
organizations. Finally, firms can engage in informal collaboration or exploit external knowledge 
spillovers (involuntary leakage of knowledge) (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006; 











Industrial Organization and the Role of the Industry  
Prior studies have largely focused on how firms can (internally) balance exploration and 
exploitation (Raich et al., 2009; Uotila et al., 2009; Junni et al., 2013 for a review) and what are 
the consequences for their performance (He and Wong, 2004; Birkinshaw, and Gupta, 2013; 
Markides, 2013; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013 for a review). However, with few notable 
exceptions (Jansen et al., 2006; Auh and Menguc, 2005; Luger et al., 2018), prior studies paid 
little attention to how the environment or industry in which the firm operates may make 
specialization in one of these activities more beneficial and change its effect on firm performance. 
For this reason, it is important to consider how industrial organization theory enhances our 
understanding of the phenomenon. Specifically, industrial organization theory explains 
performance variations across firms based on the structural characteristics of the industries they 
operate (Bain, 1968; Mason, 1953; Schumpeter, 1950; McGahan, and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 
1991). It suggests that the structure of the industry determines a firm's behavior (conduct), its 
chosen strategy and, in turn, its performance. Empirical evidence confirms the importance of 
industry effects (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Rummelt, 1991; Kamasak, 2011; Lee et al., 
2001; Markides, 1999). Industry structure accounts for 19% and 30% of the aggregate variance 
in firm profitability (McGahan and Porter, 1997; McGahan, 1999).  
Two branches of the IO theory, namely neoclassical theory and transaction cost theory are 
particularly useful in explaining why some firms may choose to specialize in either exploration 
or exploitation and why they may perform well even when they do not balance internally the two 
activities (Conner, 1991). The neoclassical theory conceptualizes firms as “input combiners” 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). In short, it suggests that because a firm’s performance depends on 
the combination of various inputs, we have to consider how the industry in which the firm 
operates influences the availability of external markets as well as the likelihood and effectiveness 
of collaborations. In a similar manner, transaction-cost thinking focuses on how certain 
characteristics of the industry influence the opportunities as well as the cost that firms face for 
using the market and transact (exchange) with other organizations (Williamson, 1981; Coase, 
1992; Geyskens et al., 2006; Baldwin, 2007; Stoelhorst and Raaij, 2004).  
 
Typology of Industry Orientation  
Although specialization has certain advantages, we expect its effectiveness in enhancing firm 
performance to differ considerably across industries. Building on industrial organization 
economics (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Stoelhorst and Raaij, 2004), we argue that such 
variations are driven by contextual industry factors and, in particular, by the availability of 
collaborative and knowledge-sourcing opportunities as well as the difficulty and transaction costs 










These variations, in turn, influence the likelihood and effectiveness of collaboration, knowledge 
sourcing, the exchange between organizations and, subsequently, the value of such opportunities. 
With few notable exceptions (Jansen et al., 2006; Auh and Menguc, 2005; Luger et al., 2018), 
prior studies paid little attention to how a firm’s industry influences the effect of specialization 
and its performance. Certain characteristics or regularities in industries affect firm performance 
(Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939) by determining how effective a firm’s chosen strategy is in a particular 
context (McGahan and Porter, 1997; McGahan, 1999; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; 
Kamasak, 2011; Rumelt, 1991; Markides, 1999). Our typology of industry orientation captures 
the regularities of exploratory and exploitative R&D across industries. The development of this 
typology rests upon research that points to differences in the architecture of industries (Jacobides 
et al., 2006; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007) and to the existence of 
strategic groups within industries (Dranove et al., 1998; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997; Porter, 1979; 
Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988; McGee and Thomas, 1996; DeSarbo and Grewal, 2008). Each 
industry has a distinct architecture that provides the contours for its members to interact and try 
to minimize transaction costs (Jacobides et al., 2006). These contours lead to the formation of 
groups of firms that share path-dependent research strategies, invest in similar technologies and 
are bound by a similar scope of commitments (Porter, 1979; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988; 
McGee and Thomas, 1996; DeSarbo and Grewal, 2008). As such, some firms can compete in an 
industry by providing activities and outputs that complement those of the majority of rival firms, 
and by using these to gain competitive advantages (Jacobides et al., 2006 Schmiedeberg, 2008) 
or create alliances to influence the industry’s trajectory (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998; Lavie et 
al., 2011; Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006).  
To capture such differences in the exploration and exploitation strategies of firms, our typology 
of industry orientation is based on two key dimensions: 1) the concentration (number) of firms 
that specialize in either exploration or exploitation within each industry, and 2) the main strategic 
intent (objective) of those firms to either refine existing products and processes (i.e. exploit) or 
invent something entirely new (explore). Based on these criteria and as noted earlier, we 
distinguish industries into exploitative-oriented, exploratory-oriented and hybrid. Exploitative-
oriented industries are characterized by a large number of firms that specialize in exploitation, 
whereas the concentration of firms that specialize in exploration is low. By contrast, exploratory-
oriented industries exhibit the opposite trend. In hybrid industries, approximately the same 
percentage of firms specialize in exploratory and exploitative R&D and are ambidextrous.  
 
The Competitive and Comparative Advantages of Specialization 
Applying these two branches of the IO theory to the exploration-exploitation literature is 
important because they enable us to explain why certain industries enable firms to be successful 










advantages of specialization. More specifically, the literature on ambidexterity suggests that firms 
have to balance their investments because exploitation will secure a firm’s current cash flow, 
whereas exploration will ensure the generation of new ideas and a position in future markets 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003; Gibson and Birkinshaw; 2004; Lubatkin et al., 2006; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2013). Although certain conditions may require firms to engage in both (Cao et al., 
2009; Uotila et al., 2009; Jansen et al., 2006), there might be significant benefits for firms that 
specialize in either one (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Romer, 1987).  
Specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their activities and outputs in order 
to benefit from efficiency within the overall system (Rumer, 1987; Gupta et al., 2006). A 
specialization strategy provides the firm with two significant advantages. First, a firm that 
specializes in one activity increases its ability to produce a specific output or perform a set of 
activities more efficiently. Such efficiencies are accomplished because of the repetition in 
execution, accumulated expertise and experiential knowledge gained by engaging in a specific 
task (Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Romer, 1987; Brusoni et al., 2001; Calderini and Scelato, 2005). 
The adoption of specialization strategies is largely justified by contextual factors, such as 
environmental and technological complexity in the industry in which the firm operates (Burns 
and Stalker, 1961; Brusoni et al., 2001). Such factors as well as the availability of external markets 
and the ease of accessing the market also affects the extent of specialization in a firm (Jarillo, 
1989; Watson, 2007). For instance, being able to establish strategic alliances may allow a firm to 
access resources and expertise that the firm does not possess internally (Hans and Gaylen, 1994; 
He and Wang, 2015; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006).  
Second, specialization leads to higher returns to a given set of activities by increasing a firm’s 
ability to perform such activities at a lower marginal cost and risk compared to other firms. Lower 
marginal costs and higher returns are both the result of being better in undertaking a specific set 
of activities because experiential learning pertaining to that activity accumulates faster in areas 
of prior or established expertise (Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004; Chiva et al., 2010). 
Although lower marginal costs and higher returns are sources of competitive advantage, 
specialization is also the fundamental mechanism underlying the comparative advantages 
associated with the use of the market (Ricardo, 1817). Applying the principle of comparative 
advantage in our context implies that because firms do not have to be self-sustained entities, they 
can enhance their performance by focusing on activities they are endowed to do well (e.g. 
exploration) and exchange their outputs and expertise to firms that are superior in performing 
other activities (e.g. exploitation). Firms thus that adopt a specialized innovation strategy instead 
of balancing their exploratory and exploitative activities can still be successful if they operate in 
an industry where there are greater opportunities to internalize what they are competent to produce 
themselves and acquire either formally (e.g., through licensing or patent acquisition) or informally 














Market Mechanisms that Firms use for Intra-industry Collaboration and Knowledge 
Sourcing   
Firms use different mechanisms to access the market (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006; Laursen and 
Salter, 2006) and complement their exploitative or exploratory activities. These mechanisms 
include 1) formal collaborative alliances, joint ventures, and mergers & acquisitions 2) knowledge 
sourcing and licensing and 3) informal collaboration and interaction, and involuntary knowledge 
leakage or spillovers.  
Alliances involve voluntary knowledge exchange and collaboration (Gulati, 1998; Yamakawa et 
al., 2011). They are used as means for exploring new prospects and exploiting existing knowledge 
(Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Firms may form exploration alliances with 
other firms in order to discover new ideas, opportunities and technologies, build new 
competencies (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Dittrich and Duysters, 2007) and pursue exploitation 
alliances to leverage existing firm resources and competences by sourcing complementary assets 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Regardless of whether firms expand their existing network of 
alliances by adding new partners or reinforcing their existing alliance network by interacting with 
prior partners (Podolny, 1994), they aim at eliminating environmental uncertainty and 
technological complexity, but also at accelerating knowledge diffusion and achieving cost-
efficiency (Chesbrough, 2003; Beckmann, 2006). Strategic alliances thus allow firms to assemble 
partners’ resources to explore and exploit internal and external resources (Yamakawa et al., 2011).  
Similarly, joint ventures provide firms with opportunities to pool capital and expertise (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; 1993), and control environmental changes by shifting the risks to outsiders (Yiu 
and Makino, 2002). Similarly, acquisition is another way to obtain technological know-how and 
advance technical capabilities (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Phene et al., 2012). More importantly 
however, via acquisitions firm-bound advantages are often fuse with the assets of the acquired 
firm to effectively improve firm performance because of their attenuated combined value (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001). Likewise, firms seek to overcome pressures for balancing exploratory and 
exploitative activities by engaging in mergers. Firms choose to merge with firms of a comparable 
knowledge base in achieving synergies and facilitating exploitation activities (Phene et al., 2012). 
By contrast, other firms choose to merge with firms of a dissimilar knowledge base to reconfigure 
their existing businesses and change their strategic intent (Capron et al., 1998). 
Knowledge sourcing through contracting out research is also another channel that firms use to 
outsource their specialized knowledge (Powel et al., 1996). The realization that it is no longer 










rights give specialized in exploration firms more chances to get their ideas and technologies 
exploited by others. The technological know-how needed to advance drugs is complicated, and 
the competencies involved testing them and putting them into the market similarly complex that 
no single firm could guarantee that promising exploratory ideas will be successful. For instance, 
the highly exploratory biotech firm, FIT BIOTECH, developed the Gene Transport Unit (GTU) 
technology to be used in DNA vaccines and gene therapy (http://www.fitbiotech.com/fit-
biotech/). Despite the value of this technology, its application will be limited if the FIT BIOTECH 
firm did not choose to license its proprietary GTU technology to pharmaceutical firms for the 
development of the next generation of medical treatments with a need for cost effective, safer and 
efficacious drugs. Firms that specialize in exploration thus need to find ways to accelerate the 
pace of their ideas, technologies and discoveries in order to reach successful application and 
commercialization. Operating therefore in industries where other firms can leverage a firm’s 
exploratory investments is vital for helping those ideas to pass onto the stage of implementation.   
Firms could also benefit from informal networks that are often formed for knowledge sharing 
rather than organizational interaction (Granovetter, 1983; Hansen, 1999). Since informal 
networks do not require formal contractual agreements to access knowledge, knowledge leakages 
are greater and thus firms could benefit from accessing this knowledge. Similarly, firms could 
benefit from localized knowledge spill overs. For instance, investments in R&D by firms and 
Universities spill over unintentionally to other firms for exploitation (Jaffe, 1989; Acs et al., 1992; 
1994; Issakson et al., 2016). Finally, network research acknowledges the extent to which 
knowledge (tacit) is embedded in informal knowledge sharing among firms (Cooke and Morgan, 
1993), confirming the importance of organisational linkages for knowledge flows (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984; Drifield et al., 2016) emphasizing that network embeddedness increases the 
frequency of social interactions and exchanges across firms. Hence, the existence of both 
knowledge-seeking and knowledge-creating firms in an industry is likely to give specialized in 
either exploratory or exploitative R&D firms greater prospects to use the market. 
HYPOTHESES 
To explain how the performance of specialized firms is affected by the orientation of the industry 
in which they operate, we focus on how variations in the concentration of the exploration and 
exploitation activity across industries affects a) the availability, b) value of collaborative and 
knowledge sourcing opportunities across industries and c) the difficulty and transaction costs of 
accessing these collaborative and knowledge-sourcing opportunities which in turn determines 
which specialization strategy (exploratory or exploitative) is more advantageous for firm 
performance. In the cells of Table 1, we summarize the nine possible combinations of firms’ 
specialization strategy (vertical axis) and industry orientation (horizontal axis). Table 1 also 
summarizes the key differences that each combination exhibits in terms of opportunities, value 










combinations (cells).  








































Cell 1 (-) Cell 2 (+) Cell 3 (+) 












(2) High difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(2) Moderate difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(2) Low difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(3) Exploitation-specific 
assets exhibit low value added 
(3) Exploitation-specific 
assets exhibit moderate value 
added 
(3) Exploration-specific assets 











Cell 4 (-) Cell 5 (+) Cell 6 (-) 
(1) High availability of 
exploitation-specific 
collaborative opportunities 
and assets but Low 
availability of exploration-
specific collaborative 
opportunities and assets 




(1) High availability of 
exploration-specific 
collaborative opportunities 




(2) Moderate difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(2) Exploitation-specific 
assets exhibit less value added 
(3) Exploitation-specific 
assets exhibit moderate value 
added 
(2) Exploitation-specific 



















Cell 7 (+) Cell 8 (+) Cell 9 (-) 












(2) Low difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(2) Moderate difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(2) High difficulty and 
transaction costs in 
accessing/acquiring such 
opportunities and assets 
(3) Exploitation-specific 
assets exhibit high value 
added 
(3) Exploitation-specific 
assets exhibit moderate value 
added 
(3) Exploration-specific assets 
exhibit low value added 
 
Exploitative-oriented industry Hybrid industry Exploratory-oriented industry 












Pursuing a Specialization in Exploitative R&D strategy in Exploitative-Oriented Industries 
(cell 1) 
Due to the abovementioned mechanisms pertaining to the availability, transaction costs and value 
of collaborative and knowledge sourcing opportunities, we expect specialization in exploitation 
to have a negative effect on performance when the focal firm operates in an exploitative-oriented 
industry. First, industrial organization theory views firms as input combiners (Conner, 1991; 
Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939). In our context, firms may find advantageous to specialize in 
exploitation as long as it is possible and efficient to use the market to collaborate and/or source 
knowledge, expertise and inputs. When firms that specialize in exploitation operate in 
exploitative-oriented industries, they are exposed to a limited number of exploration-specific 
opportunities (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Jacobides et al., 2006). Limited availability, in turn, 
impedes the focal firm’s ability to find new ideas to explore, decreasing therefore the marginal 
returns to its specialization in exploitation strategy. This reasoning is consistent with the notion 
that firms that are exposed to expertise that is similar to their own (Henderson and Clark, 1990) 
cannot broaden their horizons (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Wu and Shanley, 2009).  
Second, in such industries, the limited number of firms that specialize in exploration slows down 
the generative learning of firms that specialize in exploitation (Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Auh 
and Menguc, 2005; Argyris and Schon, 1978) and decreases the likelihood of changing the scope 
of their activities, locking them within the same exploitative trajectory (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013; Zahra and George, 2002). When explorative opportunities are 
limited, and firms have to over-utilize existing ideas (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Uotila et al., 2009), 
they face higher difficulties in identifying and establishing collaborative and knowledge sourcing 
agreements. The limited number of explorative firms in such industries also increases their 
bargaining power. Hence, in such situations, not only the transaction costs of accessing the market 
are likely to be higher for firms that specialize in exploitation (Coase, 1992; Williamson, 1981; 
Geyskens et al., 2006) but also the terms of such agreements are likely to be less favourable for 
these firms, resulting once again in diminishing returns to exploitation. 
Third, the knowledge, expertise and outputs of firms that specialize in exploitation may easily 
become redundant in exploitative-oriented industries because many other firms also specialize in 
exploitation. A high degree of similarity in knowledge, orientation, objectives and outputs of 
firms that specialize in exploitation erodes their uniqueness, may inhibit creativity (Baum et al., 
2000) and may therefore decrease the value of these outputs. This argument is consistent with 
prior research that shows that the value of technological investments declines when firms make 
similar investments or focus on similar offerings (Vassolo et al., 2004; Wassmer et al., 2010; 










performance. Accordingly, we expect specialization in exploitation to be less beneficial in 
exploitative-oriented industries:   
H1 (cell 1): The pursuit of a specialization in exploitation strategy has a negative effect on 
performance when the firm operates in an exploitative-oriented industry 
 
Pursuing a specialization in exploratory R&D strategy in exploratory-oriented industries 
(cell 9) 
Due the abovementioned mechanisms, we further expect specialization in exploration to be a less 
beneficial strategy when the focal firm operates in an exploratory-oriented industry. First, 
although inter-firm performance variations are driven by firms’ ability to achieve differentiation 
(Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Conner, 1991; Comanor and Wilson, 1974), the clear majority of firms 
in exploratory-oriented industries engage in the development of new ideas and technologies. Due 
to the lower number of firms that specialize in exploitation in such industries, exploratory firms 
have fewer opportunities to use the market and find formal and informal means of collaboration 
in order to ensure that their ideas will get exploited. As the low likelihood of accessing 
exploitative-specific opportunities increase the difficulty and transaction costs of using the 
market, the returns to exploratory specialization strategies will decrease in exploratory-oriented 
industries.  
Second, although exploratory-oriented industries are characterized by the abundance of 
technological opportunities and ideas (Uotila et al., 2009; Zahra, 1996), the nature of these 
industries makes new ideas and technologies to become obsolete quickly (Sorensen and Stuart, 
2000). Although the high concentration of exploratory firms contributes to an industry’s 
knowledge reservoir, the marginal value and usefulness of each additional idea added to this pool 
is decreasing due to the large number of ideas that exist. In such situations, the knowledge and 
outputs of firms that specialize in exploration are likely to have a decreasing effect on their 
performance because many of these ideas do not get exploited. Reinforcing this premise, prior 
research found decreasing returns when firms that operate in dynamic industries focus intensively 
on exploratory activities (Uotila et al., 2009).  
Third, homogeneity in knowledge resources increases the likelihood of creating substitutable 
outputs (Barney, 1991; 2001; Aug and Mengue, 2005) that in turn become less valuable. A 
specialization in exploration strategy is less beneficial when pursued in exploratory-oriented 
industries because the high availability of ideas in these markets increases their substitutability 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004). Although exploratory firms 
do not possess exactly the same knowledge resources, they often use equivalent knowledge, 
technologies and components to compete (Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). As a result, 
the likelihood of creating substitutable outputs to that of competitors is higher. In such cases, their 










thus decreasing the returns to specialization in exploration. Hence: 
H2 (cell 9): The pursuit of a specialization in exploration strategy has a negative effect on 
performance when the firm operates in an exploratory-oriented industry 
 
Pursuing a specialization in exploitation (exploration) strategy in hybrid and exploratory-
oriented (exploitative-oriented) industries (cells 2-3 & 7-8) 
Although hybrid and exploratory-oriented industries differ in the availability of exploitation-
specific factors, they both feature high availability of exploration-specific opportunities. Building 
on the logic of previous hypotheses, we expect firms in such industries to be more effective in 
taking advantage of collaborative and knowledge sourcing opportunities from the market to 
enhance their performance (Conner, 1991; Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939). In hybrid and exploratory-
oriented industries, the greater availability of exploratory-specific knowledge and expertise 
means that firms that specialize in exploitation have more opportunities to use the market 
(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Kogut and Zander, 1992), increasing the returns to exploitative 
specialization strategies. 
Second, in hybrid and exploratory-oriented industries the easier access to exploratory knowledge, 
ideas and expertise enables exploitative firms to reduce costs by internalizing exploitation-
specific functions while acquiring ideas from the market (Williamson, 1981). Transaction cost 
logic also suggests that the structure of hybrid and exploratory-oriented industries offsets the 
negative consequences of specializing in one innovation strategy at the expense of the other by 
allowing firms to source ideas more easily as bargaining power in such situations is not high. A 
richer set and greater availability of opportunities decreases the transaction costs of accessing 
expertise and collaborative agreements, increasing thus the effects of exploitation on 
performance. 
Third, exploitative firms that operate in hybrid and exploratory-oriented industries are more likely 
to accelerate their generative learning because they are exposed to a large volume of ideas (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Morgan and Berthon, 2008). Firms that specialize 
in exploitation may acquire new knowledge (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Koryak et al., 2018) while 
firms that specialize in exploration have better chances of getting their ideas exploited (Junni et 
al., 2013). In such situations, firms come together to explore new opportunities (Gupta et al., 
2006; Baum et al., 2000), exploit technologies and confront an industry’s uncertainties (Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt, 2009; Anderson and Tushman, 2001). Additionally, in hybrid and exploratory-
oriented industries, the knowledge base and outputs of firms are more likely to be diverse and are 
therefore less likely to become redundant and substitutable (Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Zhao, 
2006; Yang et al., 2014). Accordingly, we expect specialization in exploitation to have greater 










H3a&b (cells 2-3): The pursuit of a specialization in exploitation strategy has a positive effect 
on performance when the firm operates a) in a hybrid industry or b) in an exploratory-oriented 
industry.  
Applying the same logic, we expect specialization in exploratory R&D to be more beneficial 
when the focal firm operates in a hybrid or an exploitative-oriented industry. First, hybrid- and 
exploitative-oriented industries feature high availability of exploitation-specific knowledge and 
skills and therefore provide firms that specialize in exploratory R&D with a richer set of 
opportunities to get their ideas exploited in the market. Second, the establishment of collaborative 
agreements is easier to occur but also the transaction costs associated with the collaboration are 
likely to be lower given the high number of firms that possess complementary to exploration 
expertise. Third, for the reasons discussed earlier, such industry dynamics may also accelerate 
learning within organizations and make collaborative agreements more valuable due to synergies 
and complementarities. Finally, the ideas and technologies developed by exploratory firms will 
face lower competition in hybrid and exploitative-oriented industries. Hence, specialization in 
exploratory R&D is likely to be more advantageous in hybrid and exploitative-oriented industries:  
H4a&b (cells 7 & 8): The pursuit of a specialization in exploration strategy has a positive effect 
on performance when the firm operates a) in a hybrid industry or b) in an exploitative-oriented 
industry.  
 
Pursuing an ambidextrous strategy in hybrid, exploratory-oriented and exploitative-
oriented industries (cells 4, 5 & 6) 
The next set of hypotheses concerns those firms that are ambidextrous and operate in different 
industries. Hybrid industries feature similar availability of exploration- and exploitation-specific 
R&D opportunities. About a third of firms in those industries make similar investments in both 
exploratory and exploitative R&D, about a third specializes in exploratory R&D and the 
remaining third specializes in exploitative R&D.  
For a number of reasons, I expect the pursuit of an ambidextrous strategy to have a positive effect 
on performance when the firm operates in a hybrid industry. First, the diversity of both 
exploratory and exploitative-specific knowledge, expertise and capabilities in hybrid industries 
helps ambidextrous firms to identify collaborative opportunities while inducing low to moderate 
difficulty and transaction costs in accessing such opportunities. These conditions therefore 
increase the likelihood of getting firms’ exploratory ideas utilized and commercialized, while 
accelerating their ability to produce new knowledge and technologies.   
 Hybrid industries can also offer ambidextrous firms more chances to come together to either 
explore new technologies (Gupta et al., 2006; Cassiman and Veugeulers, 2006; Hess and 
Rothaermel, 2011) or exploit existing ones to respond to industry uncertainty (Ozcan and 










exploratory-specific collaborative agreements are easier to occur in hybrid industries and the 
transaction costs associated with those are likely to be lower given the high number of firms that 
possess skills and knowledge that could complement (rather than substitute) both exploration- 
and exploitation-specific needs. Furthermore, ambidextrous firms in hybrid industries have better 
chances to accelerate their adaptive and generative learning by making a better use of 
collaborative agreements to accentuate their own knowledge base due to complementary synergic 
skills between receiver and receptor firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
Argyris, 1976; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; Ho and Wang, 2015). 
Once again, this suggests that ambidextrous strategy is likely to influence firm performance 
positively when the firm operates in a hybrid industry.  
By contrast, I expect that being ambidextrous and operate in a highly-specialized industries (either 
exploratory or exploitative-oriented) will have negative consequences for firm performance. The 
theoretical justification for this expectation relies on the notion that the value of the ideas and 
outputs of an ambidextrous firm are likely to be partially redundant or be less valuable in 
industries that are oriented towards one particular direction (Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Zhao, 
2006; Li and Chi, 2013). First, the ideas, technologies and knowledge developed by specialized 
firms are likely to be ahead of those ideas and knowledge that an ambidextrous firm can produce 
and offer in specialized industries. Therefore, their value is likely to be limited due to their 
restricted utility in those industries (Vassolo et al., 2004; Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Yang et al., 
2014).  
Furthermore, in hybrid industries the knowledge base and outputs of specialized in exploratory 
R&D firms are more likely to be dissimilar and distinct from specialized in exploitative R&D 
firms (Brusoni et al., 2001). Specialization is such environments therefore is difficult to compete 
when firms are ambidextrous and therefore the ideas and outputs of ambidextrous firms are likely 
to become either redundant or substitutable by expert knowledge. Accordingly, competing in 
highly-specialized industries will impact negatively the performance of ambidextrous firms.  
Based on the above discussion, I introduce the following hypotheses:  
H5a&b (cells 4, 5 & 6): The pursuit of an ambidextrous strategy (a) has a positive effect on 
performance when the firm operates in a hybrid industry, but (b) a negative effect on performance 
when the firm operates in either an exploitative-oriented or explorative-oriented industry.  
 
DATA AND METHODS  
(For the convenience of the examiners, we have reproduced the data and methods sections from 
other chapters of this PhD. thesis. However, for greater details please refer to the Method section 
of Chapter 4 of the thesis).  
Sample 










take time to materialize (March, 1991). We collect data from a national innovation survey that is 
designed to monitor the economic development and technological activities of Spanish firms. 
Similar to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) in other countries, there is high reliability in 
the reported data because the survey is administered every two years by the National Statistics 
Institute (INE) in Spain and sent to firms that are legally obliged to respond. As a result, over 
90% response rate is achieved. This dataset is appropriate for testing our hypotheses because it 
provides a detailed breakdown of the distribution of R&D expenditure by type (exploitative and 
exploratory R&D). Our analysis focuses on firms with more than 10 employees. Instead of 
focusing on a single industry (Rothaermel, 2001; He and Wong, 2004), we examine 56 industries 
to increase variability in our data and test the effects of specialization in industries with different 
orientation. The initial sample consisted of 41,196 firm-year observations that had information 
on exploratory and exploitative investments. However, after deleting missing and ambiguous 
observations, and firms that had less than four years of information, the final sample resulted in 
an unbalanced panel of 32,527 observations (5567 firms) over the 2003-2012 period.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
As explained in greater detail in chapter 4, we follow common practice (e.g. Adams and Jaffe, 
1996; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b), and operationalize each firm’s 
productivity performance by estimating a ‘residual’ that captures increases in firm output that 
cannot be explained by firm inputs. This residual is the outcome of a function where the nominator 
is a firm’s output (firm sales) and the denominator include the two key firm inputs: labour (the 
number of employees) and capital (tangible assets). As TFP captures a firm’s ability to generate 
sales while controlling for the inputs that a firm uses to achieve that level of output, it avoids 
biases associated with the fact that different outputs may exhibit different economies of scale 
(Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b). The estimation of TFP is given in 
equation 1 in Chapter 4 and it is based on the fact that productivity is the intermediate 
transformation capacity level between inputs and outputs and thus reflects a firm’ ability to 
transform and generate value from a given number of inputs. To be consistent with prior studies 
and given that economic relationships are rarely linear, we transform the TFP measure in its 
logarithmic form (Van Beveren, 2012; Qingwang and Junxue, 2005).  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Firms’ Exploitative and Exploratory R&D   
Consistent with prior research (March, 1991; Jansen et al., 2006; He and Wong, 2004) and the 
survey’s definitions, exploration consists of the creative basic & applied research conducted by 
firms in order to develop new knowledge that aims at creating something new to business and 










upon the firm’s existing knowledge that has been accumulated through repetition and practical 
experience that aims at refining or improving substantially existing products and processes. Firms 
in the survey report the distribution of their current R&D expenditure by type of research. 
Accordingly, we measure exploration using the log of each firm’s annual investment in 
exploratory/experimental research activities (once again, we divide it by the number of employees 
to normalize for firm size). Similarly, we measure exploitation using the log of each firm’s annual 
investment in exploitative activities (normalized for firm size).  
 
Firms’ Specialization in Exploratory and Exploitative R&D  
Following previous studies (He and Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009) we use the absolute 
(percentage) difference between firms’ expenditure on exploratory and exploitative activities. 
Building on the definition that specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their 
activities, we classify a firm as specialized in one activity when it spends over 66.6% of its internal 
R&D budget on either exploration or exploitation. This means that a firm’s investment in one of 
the two activities is at least two times higher than its investment in the other activity. In 
operationalising the specialization in exploratory and exploitative R&D variables we used two 
different approaches. First, we use is a year-specific measure of specialization that reflects what 
the firms does in a given year. This variable is time-variant because a firm could specialize in 
exploratory R&D in one year but not in the next year. Second, we estimate the average percentage 
of each firm’s budget spent on exploratory and exploitative R&D throughout the sampled years. 
This classification ensures that a firm remains specialized in one activity over a long period of 
time (rather than for just 2-3 years). We accordingly create two variables, one for specialization 
in exploration and one for specialization in exploitation, that take the value of 1 when a firm 
specializes in one of the two activities (and 0 otherwise). Further, when the percentage of the 
firm’s budget is thus between 33.3% and 66.6%, these firms were categorized as firms with 
ambidextrous investments (i.e., ambidextrous firms).  
 
Hybrid, Exploitative- and Exploratory-Oriented Industries   
In line with the way we estimated specialization at the firm level, we consider the absolute 
difference between exploration and exploitation in identifying the industry’s specialization. We 
first identified for each year separately the number of specialized firms in each industry that spend 
over 66.6% of their internal R&D budget on either exploratory or exploitative activities and 
estimated the percentage of these firms over each industry’ total number of firms. Secondly, we 
estimated for each industry the absolute difference between the percentage of firms that specialize 
in exploration and those that specialize in exploitation. We finally estimated that the absolute 
difference for the 56 industries of our sample was on average 20% and used this value to 










20%) from other industries that were less oriented towards one activity (i.e. hybrid industries, 
please refer to Table 1 of Chapter 4).   
For example, only 17% of firms in the telecommunication sector specialized in exploration while 
64% of firms specialized in exploitation. As this industry exhibits an absolute difference of 47%, 
it was classified as an exploitation-oriented industry. Other exploitation-oriented industries 
include sectors such as machinery, mechanical equipment, electrical, motor vehicles and 
computing. At the other end of the spectrum, 54% of firms in the pharmaceutical industry 
specialized in exploration and only 17% of firms specialized in exploitation. We thus classified 
this industry as exploratory-oriented. Other exploratory-oriented industries in our sample include 
the extractive, health-related and chemicals sectors. Industries that were not oriented towards 
exploitation or exploration (e.g. electricity, textiles, petroleum refining and minerals) fell into the 
hybrid industries (Table 1 of Chapter 4). Based on this categorization, we create three variables 
that take the value of 1 when an industry is hybrid or oriented towards exploitation or exploration 
(and 0 otherwise). On average, exploitative-oriented industries are characterized by a high 
concentration of firms that specialize in exploitation (51%) and only 21% of firms specialize in 
exploration. By contrast, exploratory-oriented industries have a high concentration of firms (47%) 
that specialize in exploration and only 21% of firms in such industries specialize in exploitation. 
In hybrid industries, approximately the same percentage of firms specialize either in exploratory 
and exploitative R&D and are ambidextrous (refer to descriptive statistics of Table 1 in Appendix 
2). This distinction is also reflected on the spending on exploration and exploitation. In 
exploitative-oriented industries, spending on exploitative R&D strategies is approximately three 
times higher than the corresponding spending on exploration. By contrast, spending on 
exploration in exploratory-oriented industries is double compared to that on exploitation, whereas 
investment in exploration and exploitation is similar in hybrid industries (Table 1, Appendix 2).  
 
Specialized Firms operating in Hybrid, Exploitative- and Exploratory-Oriented Industries 
To test our hypotheses, we needed to create variables that capture that firms that specialize in 
exploitation or exploration may operate in hybrid, exploitative- or exploratory-oriented industries. 
As Table 1 of Chapter 4 exhibits, there are 9 different combinations (i.e. each cell represents one 
of the nine possible combinations in this 3x3 table). For example, firms that specialize in 
exploitation and operate in an exploitative-oriented industry are represented by Cell 1, whereas 
those that specialize in exploitation and operate in a hybrid or exploratory-oriented industries 
belong to Cell 2 and Cell 3, respectively. Similarly, ambidextrous firms that operate in 
exploitative-, hybrid and exploratory-oriented industries are represented by Cells 4, 5, 6 
respectively of the 3x3 table. Specialized in exploration firms that operate in exploitative-
oriented, hybrid or exploratory-oriented industries fall into Cell 4, Cell 5 and Cell 6, respectively. 










belongs to one of these nine cells (and 0 otherwise). 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
We further control for various firm- and industry-specific factors that may affect firm 
performance. First, we control for each firm’s tangible resources (Auh and Menguc, 2005; Jansen 
et al., 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2006), measured as the log of each firm’s gross investment in tangible 
resources in each year. This may account for the difficulties that resource-constrained firms 
encounter in different industrial environments (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tushman et al., 
1985). Second, we control for newly created firms using a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm is newly created (Laursen and Salter, 2006). This variable may affect firm 
performance by influencing a firm’s ability to find collaborators, establish itself in an industry 
and accumulate different types of knowledge.  
Third, we control for each firm’s international sales (dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for firms that sell their products abroad) because a firm’s market expansion is associated with its 
growth (He and Wong, 2004), international competitiveness and access to new market knowledge 
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Fourth, we control for affiliated firms using a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for firms that are affiliated to groups (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; 
Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014) and may therefore enjoy certain advantages that enhance 
their performance. Fifth, given that a firm’s appropriability strategy may affect its performance 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; 2014), we control for the mechanism that each firm uses to protect its 
inventions (Vega-Jurado et al., 2008). These mechanisms include the use of four protection 
mechanisms (patents, utility models, trademarks and copyrights. This variable therefore ranges 
from 0 to 4, depending on how many of these mechanisms each firm employs.   
However, firm performance can also be affected by industry-specific attributes. We control for 
industry’s intensity of competition operationalized using the number of 2-digit intra-industry 
competitors (Jansen et al., 2006) because in highly competitive industries firms are forced to 
improve operational efficiency (Matusik and Hill, 1998) and avoid risk-taking behavior (Miller 
and Friesen, 1983; Auh and Menguc, 2005) or experiment with novelties to avoid obsolescence 
(Uotila et al., 2009). Because this measure does not capture the market share of firms and whether 
few firms control most of the market, we also estimated Herfindahl Index (the results from the 
regressions of this chapter Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition). As explained in the 
general method section of this thesis, Herfindahl Index is widely accepted in various studies as 
an appropriate measure of industry concentration (Kafouros and Aliyev 2016; Wu et al. 2016). 
We estimated by summing of squared market shares of firms in the industry. It is thus calculated 
as "#$ = 1 − ∑ )*$+,*-. , where sij is the market share of firm i in industry j and therefore it takes 










level within an industry, and thus low levels of competition. We therefore use the inverse value 
of the Herfindahl Index (i.e. 1- Herfindahl index) so that a higher value indicates high levels of 
competition.  
We control for time effects by including in the model year dummies (that equals 1 that corresponds 
to specific year) to account for differences in economic trends over years (Belderbos et al., 2010). 
In models that are not nested in industries (i.e. when they are not multi-level), we also include 
industry dummies in our model to account for the different industry characteristics and variations 
in their nature, both technological and economic. Further, we include in the model a binary 
variable that represents those firms that operate in high-technological industries. As explained in 
the method section of this thesis, in constructing this variable we use the OECD classification 
given in COTEC Report 1997 cited in Bayona Sáez and Arribas (2002).  High-tech industries 
refer to sectors such as chemicals, pharmaceutical, computing, electronics, electrical, 
communication, and medical devices and optical instruments. By contrast, medium and low-tech 
industries include sectors such as textiles, furniture, leather, rubber and plastic (taking the value 
of 1 when firms operate in high tech industries and 0 otherwise). Finally, we control for the 
industry’s R&D intensity using the industry’s total R&D expenditure divided by total industry 
sales (Uotila et al., 2009) because in environments with high levels of R&D spending, there are 
abundancy of technological opportunities than in environments with lower R&D spending (Zahra, 
1996). These opportunities may influence firm performance (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989).  
 
ESTIMATION METHOD (As explained in prior empirical chapters, since the estimation 
method remains the same across the three empirical chapters of this thesis, we have reproduced 
below a cut-down version for the convenience of examiners. Please refer to the method section 
of Chapter 4 for greater details and reasoning for our choice) 
As explained in Chapter 4, given that our sampled firms are clustered within industries, a 
Multilevel Mixed Model approach was better suited for estimating TFP (Bliese and Ployhart, 
2002; Preacher et al., 2006; Anderson, 2014; Pindado et al., 2012). As explained the choice of 
Multilevel Mixed estimator was driven by two factors: First, in contrast to traditional panel data 
estimators, multilevel analysis with mixed effects considers both FE and RE effects. Second, the 
model is specified at different levels, meaning that it produces coefficients that are nested in each 
industry and firm. Third, by nesting the effects within each firm the analysis has the additional 
benefit of producing an estimator that is very close to FE since it estimates the effects separately 
for each firm and industry separately (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell and Bond, 2000). Although as 
we explained, we experimented with other estimators such as FE and RE, the fact that we expected 
the effects of specialization strategies and exploration/exploitation investment to vary a lot 
depending on the industry made this estimator less appropriate to reveal variability at both 










with complicated clustering patterns near models while relies on the assumption of independence 
of error terms, which may be violated when firms are clustered in various industries (Hox et al., 
2017; Anderson, 2014; Preacher et al., 2006). As a robustness check, we also used alternative 
estimators to establish consistency across our results, including the generalized least squares 
(GLS) estimator which is appropriate when using longitudinal data (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell 
and Bond, 2000). 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the PhD thesis, we followed established practice and 
specified our model (refer to equation 2) (Temouri et al., 2008). We also transform the variables 
in their logarithmic form to ease the interpretation of our findings (Qingwang and Junxue, 2005; 
Van Beveren, 2012). However, in equation 2 for testing the hypotheses of Chapter 6, we also 
added apart from the specialization variables at firm level, the variables regarding the orientation 
of the industry.   
 
RESULTS       
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the model’s variables (Table 1 in 
Appendix 2 at the end of the chapter provides further descriptive statistics depending on the 
orientation of the industry). The maximum VIF value obtained in any of the models was below 
the cut-off point of 2 (O’Brien, 2007; Lin et al., 2012). The highest VIF value we obtained from 
our analysis was 1.73 with average 1.21. Table 4 reports the regression results using Multilevel 
Mixed Effects Model (Hierarchical Linear Model) with results that are nested both in each 
industry and firm (Bliese et al., 2002). Unlike traditional panel data, this estimator has the 
additional benefit of producing coefficients that are very close to FE estimators. Model 1 is the 
baseline model. Model 2 introduces variables that test how firm performance (TFP) is influenced 
when firms that specialize in exploitative R&D operate in a exploitative-oriented industry (cell 
1), how performance is affected when ambidextrous firms compete in exploitative-oriented (cell 
4) and exploratory-oriented industries (cell 6) respectively, and how firm performance is affected 
when firms that specialize in exploratory R&D operate in an equally exploratory-oriented industry 
(cell 9). Model 3 tests the corresponding effects for firms that specialize in exploitative R&D and 
operate in hybrid (cell 2) and exploratory-oriented industries (cell 3), the performance effects for 
firms that are ambidextrous and operate in an equally hybrid industry (cell 5) and whether those 
effects change for firms that specialize in exploratory R&D and compete in an exploitative-
oriented (cell 7) hybrid industry (cell 8). In the first three models, the operationalization of the 
specialization variable relies on a year-specific estimation (i.e., it is measured every year).  
In Models 4 and 5, the specialization variable is based on average-specific estimation (i.e., it is 
measured as the average of all the years of the sample for each firm)). Accordingly, Model 4 tests 










similarly exploitative-oriented industry (cell 1), how performance is affected when ambidextrous 
firms compete in exploitative-oriented (cell 4) and exploratory-oriented industries (cell 6) 
respectively, and how firm performance is affected when firms that specialize in exploratory R&D 
operate in an equally exploratory-oriented industry (cell 9). Model 5 reports the corresponding 
effect on firm performance for the remaining cells, i.e., the corresponding effects for firms that 
specialize in exploitative R&D and operate in hybrid (cell 2) and exploratory-oriented industries 
(cell 3), the performance effects for firms that are ambidextrous and operate in an equally hybrid 
industry (cell 5) and whether those effects change for firms that specialize in exploratory R&D 











Table 3- Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Total Factor Productivity 1.000          
2 Exploitative Firms in Exploitative industries -0.036 1.000         
3 Exploitative Firms in Hybrid Industries 0.077 -0.121 1.000        
4 Exploitative Firms in Exploratory Industries -0.041 -0.103 -0.121 1.000       
5 Ambidextrous Firms in Exploitative Industries -0.044 -0.082 -0.097 -0.082 1.000      
6 Ambidextrous Firms in Hybrid Industries 0.068 -0.106 -0.124 -0.106 -0.085 1.000     
7 Ambidextrous Firms in Exploratory Industries -0.048 -0.122 -0.143 -0.121 -0.097 -0.125 1.000    
8 Exploratory Firms in Exploitative Industries 0.013 -0.067 -0.079 -0.067 -0.054 -0.069 -0.079 1.000   
9 Exploratory Firms in Hybrid Industries 0.064 -0.126 -0.147 -0.125 -0.100 -0.129 -0.148 -0.082 1.000  
10 Exploratory Firms in Exploratory Industries -0.049 -0.175 -0.206 -0.175 -0.140 -0.180 -0.207 -0.114 -0.214 1.000 
11 Exploratory R&D  -0.050 0.288 0.216 0.240 0.215 0.157 0.248 -0.174 -0.452 -0.517 
12 Exploitative R&D  -0.059 -0.308 -0.532 -0.364 0.169 0.098 0.198 0.145 0.170 0.352 
13 Tangible Assets 0.207 0.041 0.028 -0.054 0.051 0.055 -0.053 0.040 0.021 -0.080 
14 International Sales  0.240 -0.004 0.009 0.001 0.007 -0.007 0.022 -0.014 0.008 -0.021 
15 Affiliated Firms 0.328 0.004 -0.007 -0.039 0.009 0.028 -0.021 -0.003 0.009 0.015 
16 Industry Competition 0.055 0.114 -0.027 0.002 0.101 -0.040 -0.016 0.075 -0.056 -0.066 
17 Protection 0.131 0.035 -0.020 -0.017 0.045 0.016 0.008 -0.002 -0.022 -0.022 
18 Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.301 0.218 -0.095 -0.050 0.300 -0.082 -0.053 0.093 -0.101 -0.077 
19 Newly Created Firms  -0.066 -0.001 -0.008 -0.006 0.021 -0.013 0.016 0.007 -0.006 -0.004 
20 High Tech. Firms 0.142 0.309 -0.193 0.010 0.220 -0.163 0.019 0.210 -0.202 -0.032 
 
Mean 0.059 0.093 0.124 0.093 0.062 0.098 0.125 0.042 0.133 0.229 
 
Std. Dev. 0.937 0.291 0.330 0.290 0.241 0.297 0.331 0.201 0.339 0.420 
 
Min -11.01611 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 













Table 3- Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (cont.) 
 
Variable 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Total Factor Productivity           
2 Exploitative Firms in Exploitative industries           
3 Exploitative Firms in Hybrid Industries           
4 Exploitative Firms in Exploratory Industries           
5 Ambidextrous Firms in Exploitative Industries           
6 Ambidextrous Firms in Hybrid Industries           
7 Ambidextrous Firms in Exploratory Industries           
8 Exploratory Firms in Exploitative Industries           
9 Exploratory Firms in Hybrid Industries           
10 Exploratory Firms in Exploratory Industries           
11 Exploratory R&D 1.000          
12 Exploitative R&D -0.221 1.000         
13 Tangible Assets 0.086 0.046 1.000        
14 International Sales 0.020 0.003 0.069 1.000       
15 Affiliated Firms -0.031 0.003 0.091 0.102 1.000      
16 Industry Competition 0.056 -0.041 0.038 0.146 -0.015 1.000     
17 Protection 0.054 0.023 0.082 0.171 0.141 0.104 1.000    
18 Industry’s R&D intensity 0.239 0.138 0.028 -0.067 -0.082 0.039 0.018 1.000   
19 Newly Created Firms 0.028 0.033 0.021 -0.052 -0.002 -0.003 -0.018 0.052 1.000  
20 High Tech. Firms 0.129 0.005 0.027 0.134 0.031 0.170 0.092 -0.082 -0.013 1.000 
 
Mean 4281 4790 7463471 0.755 0.449 0.924 -3.978 0.068 0.006 0.215 
 
Std. Dev. 19806 16427 79900000 0.430 0.497 0.089 3.520 0.192 0.074 0.411 
 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 -6.90775 0.0006376 0 0 
 













Table 4 - Regression Results (Multilevel Mixed Model)                 
             year-specific specialization                                                                                 average-specific specialization  
  
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   
  
Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1: Specialized in exploitation firms in 
exploitative-oriented industries (Cell 1)     -0.055* 0.028 0.047    -0.357*** 0.074 0.000    
H2: Specialized in exploration firms in 
exploratory-oriented industries (Cell 9)    -0.033† 0.017 0.052    -0.233*** 0.027 0.000    
H3a: Specialized in exploitation firms 
in hybrid industries (Cell 2)       0.409*** 0.039 0.000    0.427*** 0.045 0.000 
H3b: Specialized in exploitation firms 
in exploratory-oriented industries (Cell 
3) 
      0.024 0.019 0.206    0.022 0.043 0.590 
H4a: Specialized in exploration firms 
in hybrid industries (Cell 8)       0.363*** 0.034 0.000    0.339*** 0.042 0.000 
H4b: Specialized in exploration firms 
in exploitative-oriented industries (Cell 
7) 
      0.006 0.026 0.816    0.013 0.064 0.843 
H5b: Ambidextrous firms in 
exploitative-oriented industries (Cell 4)     -0.074** 0.029 0.010    -0.298*** 0.082 0.000    
H5a: Ambidextrous firms in hybrid 










H5b: Ambidextrous firms in 
exploratory-oriented industries (Cell 6)     -0.044** 0.017 0.008    -0.296*** 0.034 0.000    
Exploratory R&D  0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.002 0.012 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 0.008*** 0.002 0.000 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.000 
Tangible Assets -0.003 0.004 0.416 -0.001 0.003 0.796 -0.001 0.003 0.689 -0.001 0.003 0.796 -0.001 0.003 0.727 
International Sales  0.035* 0.016 0.022 0.051*** 0.014 0.000 0.049† 0.014 0.000 0.050*** 0.014 0.000 0.049*** 0.014 0.000 
Affiliated Firms  0.124*** 0.016 0.000 0.129*** 0.015 0.000 0.129*** 0.015 0.000 0.130*** 0.015 0.000 0.130*** 0.015 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.269† 0.151 0.075 0.334** 0.112 0.003 0.335** 0.111 0.003 0.334** 0.111 0.003 0.334** 0.111 0.003 
Protection 0.003* 0.002 0.012 0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.004** 0.002 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.003 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.212* 0.105 0.043 -0.572* 0.242 0.018 -0.525* 0.217 0.016 -0.529* 0.231 0.022 -0.523* 0.219 0.017 
Newly Created Firms  -0.309*** 0.080 0.000 -0.300*** 0.091 0.001 -0.302*** 0.091 0.001 -0.302*** 0.091 0.001 -0.302*** 0.091 0.001 
High Technological Firms 0.051 0.116 0.658 0.267*** 0.030 0.000 0.415*** 0.033 0.000 0.365*** 0.042 0.000 0.412*** 0.034 0.000 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.266* 0.130 0.040 -0.417*** 0.106 0.000 -0.618*** 0.106 0.000 -0.307** 0.107 0.004 -0.599*** 0.107 0.000 
Industry Variance 0.2622 0.0682              
Firm Variance 0.4965 0.0437  0.0235 0.6255  0.0229 0.6508  0.658 0.023  0.650 0.023  
Residual Variance 0.1264 0.0148  0.1270 0.0067  0.0067 0.1268  0.127 0.007   0.127 0.007  
Wald chi2 (22-23) 233*** P> 0.000 310*** P> 0.000 600*** P> 0.000 490*** P> 0.000 609*** P> 0.000 
Number of observations  32527     32527     32527     32527     32527     











The results in Models 2 and 4 indicate that a specialization in exploitation strategy has a negative 
effect on firm performance when firms operate in exploitative-oriented industries. The results 
therefore corroborate H1. The results yield a similar pattern when the opposite case is considered. 
According to Models 3 and 4, a specialization in exploration strategy has a negative effect on firm 
performance when firms operate in exploratory-oriented industries. They therefore provide 
empirical support to H2 and to the theoretical prediction that certain advantages become partially 
redundant when they are offered by several other firms in the same industry.  
Models 3 and 5 test the hypothesized effects of H3a and H3b. The pursue of a specialization in 
exploitation strategy enhances firm performance when firms compete in hybrid industries, thus 
providing support for H3a. Despite our expectations, the corresponding effects of this 
specialization strategy appear to be statistically insignificant when firms operate in exploratory 
oriented industries. Hence H3b is not supported. A similar pattern in the results (Models 3 and 5) 
emerges when we consider the effects of a specialization in exploration strategy. This strategy 
makes a positive contribution to firm performance when firms operate in hybrid industries. Hence, 
H4a is supported. However, we do not find support for H4b that suggests that pursuing a 
specialization in exploration strategy is beneficial when firms compete in exploitative-oriented 
industries.  
Furthermore, Models 2-5 allow us to test H5a&b. These hypotheses state that “the pursue of an 
ambidextrous strategy has a) a positive effect on performance when the firm operates in a hybrid 
industry but b) a negative effect on performance when the firm operates in either an exploitative-
oriented or explorative-oriented industry”. The results in Models 2-5 fully support these 
predictions. Specifically, in Models 2 and 4, the coefficients for the relevant hypotheses are 
negative when firms that are ambidextrous operate in either in either exploitative-oriented or 
explorative-oriented industries. By contrast, in Models 3 and 5, the corresponding coefficients are 
positive when firms that are ambidextrous operate in hybrid industries.  
Overall, the results suggest that firm strategies are less beneficial when firms operate in industries 
that exhibit an orientation that is similar to their own specialization strategy. However, a 
specialization strategy in either exploration or exploitation appears to be advantageous for firms 
that compete in hybrid industries. Although we got statistically insignificant results when we seek 
to find support that specialized firms benefit from operating in industries with an orientation that 
is dissimilar to their own strategy, the results overall suggest that the comparative advantages of 















ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES       
Alternative Estimators  
First, to check the robustness of the above results to alternative estimation methods, we rerun the 
models using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator as an alternative estimator to 
Multilevel Mixed Model. Table 5 reports the new results for both year-specific and average-
specific measures (the latter measure classifies specialized firms those that spend over 66.6% of 
their internal R&D budget on either exploratory or exploitative R&D). The new results for the 
hypothesized effects are similar with those reported in Table 4. Specifically, all the hypotheses 
are confirmed with the exception of H3b and H4b which do not give a statistically significant 
coefficient (H3b and H4b were also not confirmed in Table 4 that used Multilevel Mixed Model).  
Second, we examined the sensitivity of the results to changes in the operationalization of the firm 
specialization variable. Rather than categorizing as specialized firms those that spend over 66.6% 
of their internal R&D budget on either exploratory or exploitative R&D, we experimented with 
the value of 75%. This change has resulted in findings that were consistent with those reported in 
Table 4. It therefore seems that by changing the cut-off point of specialization does not lead to 
significant changes in the results.  
Thirdly, we conducted a similar robustness analysis after changing the operationalization of 
industries’ classification. Specifically, rather than using the number of firms (i.e. concentration) 
in each industry to classify the orientation of the industry, we used an alternative industry 
classification that is based on the overall investment in exploration and exploitation within each 
industry. We accordingly categorize industries as exploitative- or exploratory-oriented when they 
spend over 66.66% of their internal R&D budget on either of these two activities. For one more 
time, the new results using this classification led to similar effects for the hypotheses as those 
reported in Table 4.  
 
Outliers 
Further, we also examined whether the hypothesised effects are supported after eliminating from 
the dataset the outliers. In doing so, we created the standardised residuals variable and eliminate 
from the dataset those firms that were over 3 and less than -3 standard deviations. The final sample 
were reduced from n=32,527 to n=32,077.  Overall, the hypothesised effects were consistent with 
the only exception being that cell 9 from 10% level of significance (for the time-variant 
specialization) lost its significance, yet the directionality of the relationship remained 
qualitatively the same. And cell 4 reduced its significance from 1% to 5% when tested with the 











Table 5 - Regression Results (GLS Estimator)                 
 
 
Year-specific Specialization  Average-specific Specialization 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 5  
 Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1: Specialized in exploitation 
firms in exploitative-oriented 
industries (Cell 1)  
      -0.059* 0.030 0.048    -0.343*** 0.076 0.000 
H2: Specialized in exploration 
firms in exploratory-oriented 
industries (Cell 9) 
      -0.042* 0.017 0.013    -0.231*** 0.027 0.000 
H3a: Specialized in exploitation 
firms in hybrid industries (Cell 2)    0.402*** 0.039 0.000     0.419*** 0.045 0.000    
H3b: Specialized in exploitation 
firms in exploratory-oriented 
industries (Cell 3) 
   0.024 0.019 0.221     0.021 0.043 0.620    
H4a: Specialized in exploration 
firms in hybrid industries (Cell 8)    0.355*** 0.034 0.000     0.332*** 0.043 0.000    
H4b: Specialized in exploration 
firms in exploitative-oriented 
industries (Cell 7) 
   0.006 0.026 0.806     0.019 0.064 0.764    
H5b: Ambidextrous firms in 
exploitative-oriented industries 
(Cell 4)  
      -0.076* 0.030 0.012    -0.282*** 0.084 0.001 
H5a: Ambidextrous firms in 










H5b: Ambidextrous firms in 
exploratory-oriented industries 
(Cell 6)  
      -0.051** 0.017 0.002    -0.292*** 0.034 0.000 
Exploratory R&D  0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.024 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 0.000 
Exploitative R&D  0.007*** 0.002 0.000 0.008*** 0.002 0.000 0.005** 0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.003 
Tangible Assets -0.003 0.003 0.306 0.001 0.003 0.859 0.001 0.003 0.683 0.001 0.003 0.824 0.001 0.003 0.722 
International Sales  0.038** 0.014 0.005 0.060*** 0.014 0.000 0.064*** 0.014 0.000 0.060*** 0.014 0.000 0.062*** 0.014 0.000 
Affiliated Firms  0.132*** 0.014 0.000 0.148*** 0.014 0.000 0.151 0.015 0.000 0.149*** 0.014 0.000 0.149*** 0.015 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.287* 0.129 0.026 0.339** 0.109 0.002 0.337** 0.110 0.002 0.337** 0.110 0.002 0.337** 0.109 0.002 
Protection 0.004* 0.001 0.007 0.005** 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.000 
Industry’s R&D  -0.204* 0.100 0.041 -0.572** 0.225 0.011 -0.630* 0.253 0.013 -0.570* 0.227 0.012 -0.582* 0.243 0.016 
Newly Created Firms  -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.304** 0.091 0.001 -0.303*** 0.092 0.001 -0.305*** 0.091 0.001 -0.304*** 0.091 0.001 
High Tech. Firms 0.062 0.123 0.612 0.408*** 0.034 0.000 0.263*** 0.030 0.000 0.404*** 0.034 0.000 0.355*** 0.043 0.000 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.614*** 0.168 0.000 -0.635*** 0.105 0.000 -0.436*** 0.104 0.000 -0.617*** 0.105 0.000 -0.329*** 0.105 0.002 
Wald chi2/F statistic (70-73) 12457 P> 0.000 649 P> 0.000 649 P> 0.000 658.000 P> 0.000 540 P> 0.000 
R squared 0.335   0.1851   0.191    0.1854   0.181   
Number of observations 32527      32527    32527   32527   
Number of firms 5567           5567     5567     5567     











DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Theoretical Contributions  
Prior studies have considered the advantages of exploration and exploitation and emphasized the 
importance of pursuing both activities (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005). Despite prior 
contributions, the literature has overlooked the role that external markets play in determining the 
returns to exploration and exploitation. As such, the question “which specialization strategy 
(exploratory or exploitative) and under what conditions is more advantageous to the firm?” has not 
been addressed sufficiently. Building on the premise that firms may use the market to balance the 
need to explore and exploit (Gupta et al., 2006), we contend that the returns to a specialization in 
exploitation or exploration strategy depend on a particular characteristic (the orientation) of the 
industry in which the firm operates. The empirical analysis of 32,537 observations supports our 
theoretical predictions and contributes to the exploration/exploitation literature in a number of ways.  
First, our analysis contributes to the literature on exploration and exploitation by specifying how the 
benefits of adopting exploratory and exploitative specialization strategies vary across industries with 
different orientation. As the effects of exploration and exploitation strategies on firm performance are 
not uniform, two firms might adopt a similar strategy but experience very different returns because 
of differences in the concentration of explorative- and exploitative-oriented firms in their industry. 
Our analysis further complements prior studies that focused on the firm’s own characteristics by 
showing that the firm’s choice to invest in exploration and/or exploitation is driven by industry 
orientation that in turn influences 1) the availability of collaborative and knowledge-sourcing 
opportunities that firms are exposed to, 2) the difficulty and transaction costs of accessing such 
opportunities and expertise from the industry and 3) the value of these opportunities. 
Second, work on organizational learning and innovation emphasizes the importance of ambidexterity, 
suggesting that firms should pursuit exploration and exploitation (Duncan 1976; Benner and 
Tushman, 2003; He and Wong, 2004; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 2006; Morgan and Berthon, 
2008). In developing a new typology that captures the orientation of firms in each industry, our study 
contributes to the ambidexterity-firm performance debate by showing that specialization, rather than 
ambidexterity, is particularly advantageous in certain industries. Exploratory-oriented, exploitative-
oriented and hybrid industries affect differently the opportunities that specialized firms have for 
complementing their operations and activities using the market. Our typology of industry orientation, 
therefore, helps us enhance understanding of how firms should distribute their efforts and investments 
across exploration and exploitation in order enhance their performance based on the orientation of 










Our approach differs from prior studies in exploration and exploitation (Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Gupta et al., 2006; Jansen et al., 2006) by considering the interrelatedness between the focal firm’s 
specialization strategy and the specialization strategies of firms in an industry. This explains why 
although some firms maintain a specialization strategy, industry dynamics make it possible to achieve 
ambidexterity at the industry level. Our approach therefore enables us to consider why certain 
industries may be more beneficial to specialized firms. It explains why some specialized firms 
perform poorly when they operate in industries with a similar orientation to that of the firm’s own 
specialization strategy, whereas others enhance their performance in industries where there are more 
opportunities to engage in collaborative and knowledge sourcing opportunities that are 
complementary to the firm’s own specialization.  
 
Managerial Implications  
Because our findings explain why specialized firms perform differently in industries with different 
orientation, they have practical implications for managerial decisions. First, as our study identifies 
the industry-specific mechanisms that make specialization more beneficial, it can help managers 
understand which specialization strategy their firms should pursue and how the industry in which 
they operate affects the returns and therefore the choice of this strategy. For instance, a specialization 
in exploitation strategy decreases performance when the firm operates in an exploitative-oriented 
industry that exhibits fewer opportunities for complementing its own activities. Conversely, the 
corresponding effect on performance can be positive when a firm that specializes in exploitation 
operates in a hybrid or exploratory-oriented industry. Although these findings do not contradict the 
premise that balance between exploration and exploitation is beneficial for enhancing firm 
performance, they suggest that a firm’s specialization strategies can enhance firm performance if their 
output complements industry’s needs. Second, our findings reinforce the view that firms may be in a 
more advantageous position if they invest in activities that are more likely to produce outputs that are 
less substitutable in the industry. Our typology of industry orientation can help firms decide whether 
a specialization strategy as well as which specialization strategy (exploration or exploitation) is more 
beneficial for a given concentration of firms that engage in similar activities or complementary 
activities. Managers thus can develop an optimal exploration/exploitation strategy that enhances 
performance by ensuring a better fit between their firm’s expertise and industry’s needs.  
 
Limitations and Future Research  
Our findings have some limitations, some of which may stimulate future research especially on the 










firm performance. First, for testing our hypotheses concerning the effects of specialization in 
exploratory- exploitative-oriented and hybrid industries, we use firms operating in a single country 
but operating in multiple-industry sectors (both firms operating in high and low-tech industries) to 
increase sample heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the generalizability of our results 
may be confined to those firms with similar characteristics to those of Spanish firms. For instance, 
one distinctive attribute of Spanish firms is that R&D expenditure in Spain is below average compared 
to that of other European countries (Eurostat statistics, 2016). Subsequently, other research may 
consider replicating and extending our results using a variety of counties of various degrees of 
institutional development (Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016; Chari and Banalieva, 2014; Chari and David, 
2012). We would expect the effects of specialization to be stronger and more positive in countries 
with strong institutional development since collaborative agreements between firms that explore, and 
exploitative industries can formally be shaped, and sanctions imposed, and contract enforcement is 
strong (Powel et al., 1996). For instance, licensing the proprietary rights of a technology is often 
encouraged in countries with strong institutional development. This in turn, can give specialized firms 
(in exploration) more opportunities to form collaborative agreements to get their ideas and 
technologies exploited by others and specialized firms (in exploitation) the chance to infuse their 
knowledge base with new ideas.  
Further, we empirically tested and confirmed the differential returns to a specialization strategy in 
exploratory exploitative and hybrid industries. Yet, we did not explore how the degree of institutional 
development in various countries could interfere and affect the returns to a specialization versus an 
ambidextrous strategy. For instance, based on studies (Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016) we would expect 
that countries that undergo major institutional transformations to affect differently the returns to a 
specialized versus and ambidextrous strategy. Specifically, our theoretical prediction is that 
specialized firms will benefit to a greater extent in countries that are not under transitional period and 
institutional reform because the transaction costs of using the industry market is low (Chari and 
Banalieva, 2014; Williamson, 2000; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016), encouraging thus specialized firms 
to engage easier in formal collaborative agreements and share the proprietary rights of their 
technologies with other firms of different specialization. Nevertheless, we would expect that 
institutional development will have less significant impact (negligible effect) on the returns to 
ambidextrous firms since those firms often explore and exploit themselves, relying less on using the 
industry to complement their activities.   
Third, we tested our theoretical predictions, arguing that specialized in exploration firms engage in 
formal and informal collaborations with other firms from the same industry in order to get their 










context of inter-industry collaboration because firms often have to cross their own technological 
boundaries and reach for knowledge that resides in other industries to produce better solutions 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Belderbos et al., 2010) and achieve complementarities in research 


















The literature on exploration and exploitation stresses the importance of pursuing both activities (i.e., 
achieve organizational ambidexterity) for enhancing organizational performance. However, firm 
performance depends not only on which activity is pursued, but also on the speed (i.e. how quickly) 
at which firms change their investments from one activity to the other. To enhance our understanding 
of this phenomenon, we examine how quickly firms change from one specialization strategy to 
another within a given timeframe, and how variations in the speed of such change affect firm 
performance. First, we show that changing between specialization strategies at high speed has a 
negative effect on the performance of the firm, mainly because the firm’s learning is compressed 
within a shorter timeframe. Second, the adverse effects of speed of change become more augmented 
as the size of the innovation department increases. However, these negative effects of speed may 
decrease (or even become positive) for firms that operate in R&D-intensive industries. These findings 
indicate that although high-speed changes affect negatively firm performance, in technologically 

























Prior research has long established the link between exploration/exploitation and firm performance 
(Venkatraman, et al., 2006; Auh and Menguc, 2005; Cao et al, 2009; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Junni et al., 2011; Koryak et al., 2018; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). It has stressed the benefits of 
investing in both exploration and exploitation (He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin, et al, 2006; Raisch et 
al., 2009) and suggested that firms may achieve this by engaging in a temporal shift (or cycling) from 
one activity to the other (Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006). However, firm performance depends 
not only on what activity firms are choosing to pursue, but also on the speed (i.e. how quickly) at 
which firms change their investments from one activity to the other. To enhance our understanding 
of this phenomenon, we examine how quickly firms change from one specialisation strategy to 
another within a given timeframe, and how variations in the speed of change affect firm performance. 
Firms may change between three specialization strategies (i.e., specialized in exploratory R&D, 
specialized in exploitative R&D and ambidextrous). Some firms change from a specialized in 
exploitative R&D strategy to either a specialized in exploratory R&D strategy or ambidextrous 
strategy, whereas others change from a specialized in exploratory R&D strategy to either a specialized 
in exploitative R&D strategy or ambidextrous strategy. There are also firms that change from an 
ambidextrous strategy to either a specialized in exploratory R&D or exploitative R&D strategy.  
we argue that changing specialization strategies may enhance learning and establish new capabilities 
(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Casillas et al., 2014; Hashai et al., 2015). However, changing 
quickly between specialization strategies can be disruptive and harmful for firm performance (Levitt 
and March, 1988; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Amburgey, 1990; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). The 
theoretical basis for this prediction is the organizational learning theory, and particularly the notion 
of time compression diseconomies. This notion suggests that when experiential learning is compacted 
over a short timeframe, it becomes less beneficial than learning that is spread over a longer period of 
time (Levinthal and March, 1993; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; García-García et al., 2017). Hence, since 
experience requires time to accumulate and organizational routines require repetitive execution to 
become efficient (March, 1991; Baum et al., 2000, Holmqvist, 2004), firms that quickly alternate 
between specialization strategies are less likely to apply their learning experience into establishing an 
efficient organizational routine (Schilling et al., 2003). Therefore, firms that change their 
specialization strategies quickly (e.g. every 1-2 years) may not benefit from their learning as those 
firms that change their strategy at a lower speed (e.g. every 4-5 years). Furthermore, we examine how 
certain contingencies associated with the size of the firm’s innovation department and the R&D 










This chapter extends prior research on the exploration and exploitation literature and firm 
performance in two ways. First, it extends such research by identifying how quickly firms should 
switch between specialization strategies. It also specifies how firms could minimize the disadvantages 
of disruption associated with either quick changes (of a shorter time-length) or extreme changes (i.e., 
from being specialized in exploration to being specialized in exploitation strategies and vice versa) 
that may inhibit their performance. Second, knowledge of how frequently firms need to shift between 
specialization strategies could help them to use time effectively to create a source of competitive 
advantage (Shi et al., 2012).  
The analysis shows that high-speed changes in specialization strategies are negatively associated with 
firm performance mainly because firms find it difficult to change and put in application the different 
elements of knowledge that specialized strategies require. This occurs because of time compression 
diseconomies and limitations in their absorptive capacity (Hashai et al., 2015; Garcia-Canal et., 
2002). Our analysis also indicates that that the negative effects of speed of change could be moderated 
when firms operate in R&D intensive industries because in R&D intensive industries firms are 
required to adapt to dynamic environmental changes to minimize both knowledge and skill 
obsolescence. Shifting therefore at high speed between specialization strategies may be less adverse 
if it is to keep up with industry changes (Uotila et al., 2009; Kessler and Chakrabarti,1996). Overall, 
the findings suggest that two firms may shift between specialization strategies but experience 
different performance outcomes because they have chosen to do it at different speeds and in 
technologically different industries.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Organizational Learning and Specialization Strategies  
Organizational learning comprises of exploitative activities and processes through which firms rely 
on experience and focused attention (Levinthal and March, 1993) to create refinements and increase 
production, as well as exploratory activities and processes through which firms rely on variability in 
experience and experimentation (Holmqvist, 2004). Drawing from organizational learning theory 
(Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988; Argyris, 2002; Wang and Ahmed, 2003; 
March, 1991) we subscribe to the view that knowledge exploitation and knowledge exploration are 
two antithetical activities, each of which requires different learning and knowledge base (Wilden et 
al., 2018). When firms specialize in either exploitation and ambidextrous strategies, they have to 
engage in repetitive activity to improve firm efficiency, whereas when firms specialize exploration 
activities they experiment with distant knowledge that often deviates from their existing knowledge 










firm’s existing know-how (March, 1991; Gupta et al., 2006), whereas specialization in exploratory 
R&D requires new knowledge, capabilities and skills (March and Simon, 1958; Weick, 1979). This 
important difference implies that each specialization strategy involves different types of knowledge, 
requires different structures and necessitates different activities that often force firms to work beyond 
their comfort zone and their established competencies.  
Regardless of the different knowledge and activity requirements, firms that choose to specialize are 
forced to acquire and use new knowledge, and different capabilities and skills to those that they 
already possess and build competence if it is to gain some expertise (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). However, the acquisition and application of those new skills, 
capabilities and knowledge that exploration and exploitation require are likely to be constrained when 
firms have to switch quickly between specialization strategies. This implies that a firm needs time 
and repetitive execution of the same task to establish routines and accumulate expertise in one activity 
in order to become more efficient. Time is therefore of essence because firm efficiencies are often 
achieved because of the repetition in execution, accumulated expertise and experiential knowledge 
gained by engaging in a specific task (Hanks and Chandler, 1994). Higher returns therefore often 
result from accumulated experiential learning gained by engaging with a specific specialization 
strategy, because experience can be translated faster into beneficial learning in areas of established 
expertise and tested competence (Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004; Kim and Miner, 2007).  
Organizational learning theory offers an important explanation which justifies the pursuit of stability 
in both organizational structures and activities (Haveman, 1993). As firms gain experience in 
engaging with specific activities and tasks, they build up their expertise in areas of chosen competence 
that makes them prone to repeat the same actions than shifting to a novel procedure or technology 
(Levitt and March, 1988; 1965; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, 1981). This implies that learning 
that accumulates with experience requires time. However, frequent alternations between 
specialization strategies decreases a firm’s ability to perform competently specific tasks compared to 
those firms that undertake the same task and activities for longer timeframes.  
 
 
Speed of Change and Firm Performance  
Drawing from organization learning theory and research on temporal effects (Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2002; Laamanen and Keil, 2008; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Levinthal and March 1993; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Hashai et al., 2015; Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014), we 
examine how the speed at which firms change from one of the three specialization strategies 










Although shifting from one specialization strategy to another has certain benefits because it enables 
firms to both exploit and explore and avoid competency traps, we contend that when these changes 
occur at higher speed, they negatively affect firm performance through the following mechanisms.  
First, when firms decide to shift from one specialization strategy to another, they will need to 
undertake substantial structural changes (Jansen et al., 2009). For instance, when a firm changes from 
a specialised in exploitative R&D strategy to an exploratory R&D strategy, it may need to change its 
existing configuration by either replacing their exploitative with exploratory units or by physically 
separating them (Christensen, 1998; Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014). The main justification 
is that specialized exploratory units need to be small and decentralized and with loose processes to 
pursue disruptive innovation and experimentation, whereas specialized exploitative units need to be 
large with well-defined processes to focus on repetitive execution and production (Benner and 
Tushman, 2003; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). These structural changes are necessary to facilitate 
temporal shifts between specialization strategies (Gupta et al., 2006). Yet, the establishment of a new 
business configuration, the engagement with new activities and knowledge processes and overall the 
founding of an effective organizational routine often requires time to reach refinement and 
sophistication (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
Because there are limits to adapting to new occurrences and structures (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), 
fast speed changes between specialization strategies are likely to leave the firm with unsuitable 
structures and often unprepared to deal with the different requirements of a new specialization 
strategy (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). Economies of learning are likely to be limited at initial 
stages of establishing a new business configuration. This affects not only the firm’s adaptation and 
efficiency, but also causes maladjustment and disruption to its existing business (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984).  
Let us consider, for instance, team composition. It has been suggested that team composition reflects 
the orientation (i.e., specialization) of the firm (Beckman, 2006). In our context, when firms decide 
to redistribute their investments from exploitative to exploratory ones, they will need to change the 
composition of their team to accommodate an exploratory mindset. The main justification is that 
founding teams whose members have a diverse working experience, prior working for the firm, are 
more likely to have unique ideas and contacts that encourage the engagement with exploratory 
activities, whereas those employees who have worked in the same firm for most of their lives have a 
common language and shared understanding that often encourages the engagement with exploitative 
activities (Beckman, 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Jansen et al., 2008). In the case of a significant 
change between specialization strategies, a reconfiguration of the existing business model that 











Similarly, a recent study reveals how teams could be composed a way to achieve balanced inventions 
(Wang et al., 2017). The findings indicate that moderate size teams and with moderate experience 
with inventions are more likely to develop balanced inventions of exploration and exploitation. Both 
studies indicate that when firms change specialization strategies, they often need to alter the 
composition of the team including team experience and size in order to cultivate a direction that 
supports the firm’s specialization strategy (Wang et al., 2017).  
Our discussion so far indicates that although change between specialisation strategies ultimately 
enable firms to become adaptive entities to market needs, it is only after enough time has passed for 
the firm to rectify problems associated with the disruption of its existing business (Amburgey, 1993).  
Since successful adaptation to new configurations requires time but also new skills and capabilities 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Child and Kieser, 1981; Klarner, and Raisch, 2013), fast changes 
between specialization strategies are likely to harm those firms whose skills and capabilities cannot 
be shifted quickly to new technologies and knowledge requirements (Dosi, 1982; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986), affecting its performance negatively. By contrast, firms that change at a lower speed 
and therefore less frequently are more persistent in their focus, engaging with the same activity for 
longer periods of time. The familiarity of a given set of routines enables those firms that change less 
often their specialization strategy to accumulate expertise and enhance the efficiency of a given 
specialization strategy with subsequent positive effects for firm performance (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001).  
Second, when firms change specialization strategies at high speed, they are constrained by time 
compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). The time compression diseconomies concept 
suggests that when learning is compacted over a short timeframe, it is less beneficial than learning 
that is spread over a longer period of time (Levinthal and March, 1981; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
The same mechanism of time compression diseconomies applies to our context. When a firm changes 
its specialization strategy quickly (e.g. every year), it may not accumulate the same stock of 
knowledge as those firms that change their strategy at a lower speed (say, every four years). As 
learning cannot be compressed in time, quick changes between specialization strategies will 
contribute less to the stock of the firm’s knowledge (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2002).  
As a result, those firms that quickly seek to reach a given level of knowledge stock when this stock 
could be reached proportionally over a longer timeframe are likely to face diminishing returns to 
certain activities (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Hashai et al., 2015) because a short time requires an 










timeframe. For instance, learning that comes too quickly gives rise to managerial overload 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and cost (Hashai et al., 2015). The associated managerial overload and 
cost may be related to managers additional need to use a stream of either exploratory units to pursue 
new ideas or exploitative units to exploit the potential of their exploratory ideas, as well as other 
supporting managerial resources, such as administrative staff, legal and financial consultants. The 
need to accommodate these additional requirements when switching to a new specialization strategy 
is likely to put a strain on existing resources affecting thus the business flow often reflected in a firm’s 
poor sales.   
Third, quick changes imply shorter time for firms to translate their collective experience into effective 
routines, beneficial learning and outcomes (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). Experience requires time to accumulate and organizational routines 
require repetitive execution to become efficient (March, 1981). Hence, firms that quickly alternate 
between specialization strategies are less likely to apply their learning and experience into 
establishing a proficient organizational routine that gives structure to their activities and increase their 
efficiency. This is consistent with organization theory which suggests that periods of adjustment 
which firms are subject to less frequent changes are important for organizational routines to emerge 
(Klarner and Raisch, 2013). This argument is reinforced by the fact that firms often transfer and apply 
experiential knowledge gained from a previous situation to a new one unsuccessfully (March and 
Levitt, 1988; Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Choi and McNamara, 2018) when they have little time 
to evaluate and decide which routines could be utilized successfully. In our context, firms that engage 
in high speed changes often transfer inappropriately context-specific knowledge that is gained 
through their experience with a specialization strategy into a new specialization strategy. Yet, those 
firms often fail to reconsider the effectiveness of their prior routines and retain those that increase 
their efficiency and production affecting therefore their performance negatively (Finkelstein and 
Haleblian, 2002; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Baum and Ingram, 1998). One possible explanation is that 
prior experiences are often hetereogeneous to translate and utilize them in another context (Choi and 
McNamara, 2018), preventing the firm from making inferences and transferring them to create 
efficient routines. From a learning point of view, we could identify three factors that often inhibit the 
ability of the firm to learn and utilize effectively the learning in creating efficient operational routines 
when the speed of change between specialization strategies is high. First, specialized firms require 
time and effort to realize the learning demands of a new specialization strategy. Second firms learning 
and absorptive capacity that is compacted in shorter timeframe restricts its ability to learn effectively 
from prior experiences. Third, heterogeneity in experiences prevent firms from effectively applying 










Finally, the negative effect of high-speed change on a firm’s performance can also be explained by 
the notion of absorptive capacity (Shift, 2016). Absorptive capacity predicts that the ability of a firm 
to acquire, integrate into its routines and exploit to commercial ends new knowledge elements 
depends largely on the overlap between prior and new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane 
et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the firm by investing in exploratory R&D does not necessarily benefit 
from new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990) because it needs to be able to identify 
commercially valuable knowledge. This implies that the low degree of knowledge overlap between 
specialization strategies limits the firm’s absorptive capacity. When firms change their specialization 
strategy quickly, they have to expand or alter their knowledge base to accommodate the knowledge 
requirements of the new specialization strategy. The low degree of relatedness in knowledge base 
between the existing and new specialization strategy is likely to prevent quick knowledge assimilation 
and successful application (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002; Volderba et al., 
2010). Because changing quickly from a new specialization strategy and adapting to its organizational 
routines, structures and processes require increased absorptive capacity, adaptation efforts and costs 
increase (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Zollo and Winter, 2002) with negative consequences for the 
efficiency of a given strategy and subsequently for the overall performance of the firm. Accordingly: 
H1: The higher the speed of change amongst a firm’s specialization strategies, the more negative its 
effect on firm performance. 
 
Extreme Changes in Specialization Strategies 
Change is broadly defined in the literature as alterations in the configuration or structure of 
organizations (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1996; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Such changes, which 
typically involve resource redeployment, can be either moderate (first-order) or extreme (second-
order), thus requiring adaptive or transformative alterations respectively (Bartunek and Moch, 1987). 
In our context, some firms may make moderate changes to their specialization strategy. For instance, 
they may change from an exploitative R&D (or exploratory R&D) specialization strategy to an 
ambidextrous strategy. Such changes involve smaller adjustments to existing operations and 
organizational routines (i.e., repetitive patterns of activity; Nelson and Winter, 1982). By contrast, 
other firms undertake extreme changes from one year to another and shift their exploratory 
specialization strategy to an exploitative one (or vice versa). Such changes involve substantial 
departures from existing organizational routines and activities (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; 
Pettigrew et al., 2001; Shift, 2016). For instance, changing from exploitative R&D to exploratory 
R&D is proved to be harmful for firm performance (Shift, 2016). It is possible that changes in 










changes but also behavioral changes as well as organizational reconfiguration (i.e., re-arrangement 
aiming at retention, deletion and addition of new elements; Karim and Mitchell, 2000). For instance, 
a recent study suggests that the exploratory or exploitative mind set of a team is also affected by 
emotions (Hakonson et al., 2016). Drawing from theories of emotion, the authors indicate that team 
decision-making to explore a new routine is affected by positive and optimistic emotions that broaden 
the novelty of individuals’ thoughts and actions, whereas negative and pessimistic emotions cultivate 
an exploitive mindset characterised with risk aversion tendency to exploit existing routines. This 
study exemplifies the fact that extreme changes in specialization strategies may also require changes 
at the behavioural level of the team in order to nurture successfully the new specialization strategy.  
We hypothesize that extreme changes in specialization strategy have a stronger negative effect on 
firm performance compared to moderate changes for the following reasons.   
First, the success of change depends on the redeployment of tangible and intangible assets, such as 
knowledge stock, organizational routines and experienced personnel, in the new specialization 
strategy and in the routines and configurations that this particular specialization strategy requires 
(Mitchell and Singh, 1993; Anand and Singh, 1997; Karim and Capron, 2016). Firms that pursue 
moderate changes in specialization that do not significantly depart from their prior activities and 
focus, they can partly redeploy their assets and build on existing expertise. Conversely, firms that 
pursue extreme changes in specialization that require entirely different processes, routines and 
expertise from their current focus and trajectory, are less likely to redeploy their assets (March, 1991). 
Since the knowledge stock that forms the basis of organizational routines decays with disuse or even 
with occasional use (Hannah and Freeman, 1984), those firms that change their specialization strategy 
significantly will need to reinvest in those skills that have learned in the past as well as invest in 
learning new skills to keep up with the demands of the new specialization strategy. From a learning 
point of view, firms that pursue moderate changes in their specialization strategy are likely to learn 
more effectively because they operate in areas in which their existing knowledge has greater utility 
and function (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Sears and Hoetker, 2014). In such 
cases, there is higher degree of knowledge and asset overlap between the two specialization strategies, 
assisting firms in improving their performance.  
Second, extreme changes affect negatively firm performance because they make firms liable to their 
newness (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997; Parastuty et al., 2015; Hannah and Freeman, 1984). Since 
major organizational reconfiguration sets the liability of newness clock back to zero (Amburgey, 
1993), those firms that undertake extreme changes are less experienced with the routines of a 
specialization strategy, affecting thus negatively their reliability and accountability. Firms often 










and reproducible, and that organizational performance is contingent upon its members possessing a 
range of organizational capabilities such as specialized knowledge of the chosen strategy and tacit 
understanding of its operation (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Amburgey, 1993). Consequently, firms 
that make extreme changes in their strategy are likely to be less reliable and accountable not only 
because the routines of an exploratory specialized strategy will be less reproducible in an exploitative 
specialization strategy, but because there is a temporal pattern of learning investments by a firm’s 
personnel from one specialization strategy to another (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Further, since the 
collective returns to learning investments will take time to be realized and materialized, the firm’s 
efficiency and thus revenue are likely to be affected negatively, at least at initial stages of transition 
to a new specialization strategy.  
Further, moderate changes in firms’ strategy and small shifts in their orientation allow firms to rectify 
their mistakes and oversights. Proponents of incrementalism have emphasized the advantages of 
making moderate, gradual changes in organizations (Cyert and March, 1963; Starbuck et al., 1978), 
suggesting that unnecessary risks can be lowered by nurturing small disruptions and small 
reorientations (Hedberg et al., 1976; Hedberg, 1981). Consequently, firms that make moderate 
changes in their strategic orientation and objectives are likely to outperform those firms that undergo 
extreme changes because they can rectify errors caused by small swifts between specialization 
strategies. 
Third, an extreme change in a firm’s specialization strategy does not favour the existing business 
because it requires a reconfiguration of the whole business model, which in turn can cause significant 
disruption to the firm’s existing business. This is consistent with the idea of adaptive strategy (Miles 
et al., 1978; Tyre and Von Hippel, 1997), concluding that when changes are not consistent with the 
current identity, focus and orientation of the firm will ultimately be rejected. Consider the extreme 
change in specialization strategy that the RCA (Radio Corporation of America Company) in the mid 
1950’s. The semiconductor firm was initially thriving on its specialized in exploitation strategy, 
investing heavenly on the development of the vacuum tubes (i.e., a device used to intensify electronic 
signals) invention (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). Following a period of relative certainty and 
efficiency, the firm decided to make an extreme change in its specialization shifting its focus from 
exploiting the vacuum tubes technology to exploring a new technology, i.e., the transistor). Such an 
extreme change in the firm’s focus and technological trajectory proved that it cannibalized the profits 
from the vacuum tube business, forcing the firm to fail in its new specialization strategy (Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1996). Concerns such as how to effectively organize the new specialization strategy, 
less experience with the new technology, restricted re-deploabilty of existing personnel, greater 










capacity made the firm less prepared to deal with the requirements of the new specialization strategy.  
Forth, moderate changes have not only economic benefits associated with risk reduction, but also 
cognitive advantages. For instance, small structural adjustments cause less opposition and conflict; 
they are more reversible and cheaper than extreme changes. Further, small structural changes put less 
strain on the cognitive capacities of the managers since they do not require extensive periods of 
analysis to figure out appropriate solutions (Miller and Friesen, 1982). Similarly, moderate changes 
may be less harmful for a firm’s revenue when employees feel that their interests are not threatened, 
and their current skills are not outdated in the new specialization strategy. Evidently, firms that 
undergo a phase of significant change, employees often experience stress because of the realization 
that their former skills are likely to become invalid and less valuable in the new setting (Schabracq 
and Cooper, 1998). This uncertainty is experienced to a lesser degree by employees undergoing 
moderate changes because they typically perceive sufficient continuity to anticipate and discern the 
direction of change (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995 Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Graetz, et al., 2006). 
Further, in case of extreme changes, employees may lose their commitment and loyalty to their firm, 
affecting thus the way they undertake and perform their work tasks (Becker, 1992, Becker et al., 1996; 
Burnes, 2004). Thus, although individuals learn and adapt to new roles and circumstances differently, 
extreme changes are likely to cognitively affect firms’ employees regardless of their expertise and 
learning capacity because different skills and behaviors are required when engaging in specialization 
strategies that require different learning capacities (i.e., new knowledge elements and generative 
learning versus existing/already tested knowledge and adaptive learning; Tyre and Von Hippel, 1997) 
and skills (i.e., refinement versus experimentation) to engage competently. Accordingly, we expect 
the following: 
H2: Extreme changes in firms’ specialization strategy will have a more negative effect on their 
performance compared to moderate changes.  
 
The Size of the Firm’s Innovation Department 
Although quick changes between specialization strategies affect negatively firm performance, we 
further hypothesize that this effect is more negative for firms that possess a larger innovation 
department than for firms with a smaller innovation department. We therefore expect the size of the 
firm’s innovation department to negatively moderate the relationship between speed and firm 
performance. We argue that inertial forces are stronger when the size of the innovation department is 
larger (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Amburgey et al., 1990) because size affects the organization of 
the innovation department. Although larger size is positively associated with resource munificence, 










to organizational instability (Baker and Cullen, 1993). For these reasons, larger innovation 
departments could be less effective in implementing changes than their smaller-size counterparts, 
which may increase the negative effects of speed on firm performance.   
First, larger size leads to inertia that is triggered by the gradual loss of a firm’s operational flexibility 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Kellyand Amburgey, 1991). The loss of operational flexibility arises 
because when firms change specialization strategies quickly, they need to spend considerable time on 
reorganizing core aspects of their structure. Hence, the existing structures and personnel of the 
exploitative innovation department must be replaced by exploratory-oriented structures and 
personnel. Larger firms may decentralize the decision-making process, but such decentralization 
requires standardization of procedures, formalization of operations and effective integration 
mechanisms to link organizational subunits (Child, 1972; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Haveman, 
1993). This increases bureaucracy and due to the higher demands in managing bureaucracy, we expect 
that the negative effect of speed on firm performance to be stronger when a firm’s innovation 
department is larger in size. 
Furthermore, a large-size innovation department is more complex than smaller-size counterparts 
because a large number of personnel need to change their scope of their operations when shifting 
from one specialization strategy to the other. During this transition, firms with large size innovation 
departments may have for some period a mix of older and newer structures as well as exploratory and 
exploitative aims. This may confuse organizational action, personnel roles and relationships among 
firm members and give rise to organizational conflicts (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The necessity 
of this structural transformation, i.e., disassembling one structure and building a new one increases 
organizational instability. As larger size innovation departments are more strongly affected by 
organizational instability, they are less adaptable to high speed changes, with negative consequences 
for firm performance.  
Second, firm size may impact the formal organization of a firm (Haveman, 1993; Baker and Cullen, 
1993) because larger size requires high levels of administrative reorganization (Blau, 1970; Baker 
and Cullen, 1993). The necessity of administrative reorganization in larger innovation departments 
adds complexity to a firm’s structure by inducing disputes, and communication and coordination 
problems (Blau, 1970). Larger firms exhibit greater formalization in communication, task 
differentiation, and decentralization of authority (Haveman, 1993). For instance, the ability of 
personnel to conduct direct interactions diminishes as personnel increases (Graicunas, 1933). 
Employees in larger groups have to use formal forms of communication and interaction, which is 
likely to lead to fragmentation and subsequent differentiation of authority (Haveman, 1993). As the 










place concurrently, and a greater level of control, coordination and attention is required (Haveman, 
1993).  
Third, as size is often associated with age (Baker and Cullen, 1993), larger firms are more likely to 
have habitually established rules and routines, and investments in fixed equipment that complicate 
decisions to change practices. Larger size makes adaptation difficult because institutionalized rules 
and formal structures are more developed and harder to change (Adizes, 1979). Interruption of 
organizational routines when shifting from one specialization strategy to another quickly is more 
pronounced in larger innovation departments because norms and rules are deeply embedded in 
established routines (Di Maggio and Powel, 1984; Amburgey, 1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Hence, shifting specialization strategies affects the performance of large innovation departments to a 
greater extent because knowledge about its operations and activities is habitually embedded in norms 
and in the behavior of a large number of employees. Based on the above discussion, we introduce the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: The effects of speed of change on firm performance will be more negative for firms with a larger 
innovation department than for firms with a smaller size innovation department. 
 
The role of R&D Intensive Industries 
In the previous section, we theorize that shifting at high speed between specialization strategies has 
a negative effect on the performance of the firm. However, we also argue that the effects of speed of 
change on firm performance could be moderated positively when firms operate in R&D intensive 
industries. Technologically dynamic environments are characterized by high volatility (i.e., high rate 
of change) and unpredictability (i.e., uncertainty) that necessitates that firms respond quickly (high 
speed) to keep up with frequent changes (Zahra, 1996; Schilkes, 2014). We therefore expect R&D 
intensive industries to positively moderate the effects of speed on firm performance because 
munificence in technological opportunities allows firms to benefit from quick changes (Uotila et al., 
2009, Audretsch and Feldmann, 1996; Ito and Pucik, 1993; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). A 
number of theoretical reasons supports this view.  
First, the unpredictability and high rate of change in R&D intensive industries make the effects from 
specializing in exploratory and exploitative R&D equally important for different reasons. Firms in 
technologically dynamic industries focus on knowledge generation to avoid obsolescence and 
maintain competitive advantage (Schumpeter, 1942; 1950; Zahra and Das, 1993). Firms’ rational 
response to maintain their competitive edge is not only to create new knowledge but also abort after 
utilizing very quickly their newly developed technologies and ideas and replace them with new ones 










achieve market differentiation. Hence, in technologically dynamic industries firms are encouraged to 
quickly swift from searching for distant and unfamiliar knowledge to achieve such differentiation 
(Zahra and Das, 1993; Schumpeter, 1950; Bierly and Daly, 2007; Uotila et al., 2009; Zahra, 1996), 
to maintaining their existing competence and expertise so that they will be able to exploit existing 
technologies and ideas.   
The demands of those environments force firms not only to learn faster and translate their collective 
experience into organizational routines but also develop new skills and utilize existing skills and 
capacity to enhance their performance. Adaptation of those firms into those environments means that 
those firms progressively adapt and learn how to swift easier between specialization strategies. Hence, 
R&D intensive environments not only necessitate but also enable firms to learn how to adapt 
smoother making oscillation at high speed between specializing in exploratory and exploitative R&D 
easier to employ, offsetting therefore the negative effects of speed of change on firm performance.  
Second, firms in R&D intensive industries are exposed to an environment with abundance of 
technological opportunities and high industry growth (Aldrich 1979; Zahra, 1993). The abundance of 
such technological opportunities may require firms to change strategies at faster speed in order to 
develop new skills and competences in emerging areas and therefore stay ahead of their competitors. 
A higher speed may also assist firms to avoid outdated practices, which is particularly important in 
R&D intensive industries in which current technologies, knowledge and skills become redundant 
quickly (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Failure to change strategies and develop new skills means that 
the firm may remain good at performing tasks and routines that are gradually less valued by the 
market. Therefore, shifting between specialisation strategies at a higher speed may have a less 
negative effect on firm performance in R&D intensive industries that require firms to adapt to 
frequent changes, minimise knowledge and skill obsolescence and keep up with demands for 
technological progress. Hence, the negative effects of speed of change could be moderated for firms 
operating in R&D intensive industries.  
Third, technologically dynamic industries are fast-changing and knowledge-abundant environments 
where new technologies introduced at higher rates than less dynamic industries (Uotila et al., 2009; 
Zahra, 1996). As a result, the high levels of exploratory and exploitative R&D activities enable firms 
to have more opportunities not only for knowledge creation and technology generation but also 
utilization of existing ones. Since firms act as input combiners (Conner, 1991), the higher availability 
of knowledge and opportunities in those industries will help them to find more ideas to exploit, 
increasing therefore the returns to exploitative R&D activities (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Jacobides et 
al., 2006).  










response in fast-changing environments is the utilization of existing technological opportunities. 
Hence, the level of technological dynamism in an industry enhances the effects of exploitation on 
firm performance because it accentuates the value and usefulness of exploiting the existing pool of 
knowledge. Further, such knowledge-triggering environments could offer firms more chances to 
engage successfully in exploratory R&D and increase the impact of exploratory R&D on firm 
performance. Therefore, firms in those dynamically-changing industries have not only better 
opportunities to both exploit the ideas and knowledge developed by other firms and explore new ones 
(Kafouros and Buckley, 2008), but quickly swift between specializing in exploratory and exploitative 
R&D activities alleviating therefore the negative effects of high-speed changes on firm performance.  
Forth, in R&D intensive industries, there is strong competition and frequent changes due to 
technological progress (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Zahra, 1996). Technological intensity creates 
opportunities for a firm within its industry and in markets outside its traditional scope, which may 
help the firm benefit from faster pace between specialisation strategies by exploiting opportunities in 
the chosen technological trajectory and exploring prospects in new markets (Zahra and Ellor, 1993). 
Subsequently, a higher speed of change may be less negative for firms in R&D intensive industries 
because firms in such environments must meet demands associated with high rates of technological 
progress, and because they must engage in business renewal more often (Uotila et al., 2009).  
Fifth, firms that operate in technologically dynamic industries have more chances to accelerate their 
generative and adaptive learning (Kogut and Zander, 1993). Our reasoning suggests that firms’ 
generative and adaptive learning accentuates in technologically dynamic industries because firms are 
not only exposed to new knowledge elements that expand their existing knowledge and horizons 
(Koza and Lewin, 1998), but also because they learn in order to create refinements on products and 
services created by others making therefore the swift at high speed between specialization strategies 
easier to employ in R&D intensive industries. Accordingly, we introduce the following hypothesis: 
H4: The effects of speed of change on firm performance will be less negative (or even positive) in 
R&D intensive industries than in less R&D intensive industries. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS  
As explained, the data and methods section are mainly a reproduction from other Chapters of this 
PhD thesis. However, for more details on the operationalization of these variables, please refer to the 
Method Section (Chapter 4) of the thesis.  
 










Following common practice and the literature on R&D (Kafouros et al., 2018; Adams and Jaffe, 1996; 
Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016b), we measure firm performance by 
estimating its productivity performance (TFP). As explained in detail in Chapter 4, the choice of TFP 
as our dependent variable was based on three reasons. First, TFP considers the firm’s outputs (i.e., 
sales both from products and services) but also inputs i.e., the firm’s investment in labour (reflected 
in number of employees) and tangible assets (or capital). Thus, TFP reflects the ability of the firm to 
make sales while controlling for the cost of inputs that a firm utilizes to achieve a certain level of 
output. By implication, TFP measures avoid biases that often derive from the fact that different 
outputs may exhibit different economies of scale (Kafouros and Aliyev, 2016a; Kafouros and Aliyev, 
2016b). Second, TFP reflects that R&D investments could lead to both product and process 
innovations. This implies that although the development of new products could affect a firm’s sales, 
process innovations may influence the firm’s cost or modify its labour capital and thus enhance its 
productivity by leading to efficiency gains due to better allocation of resources. Third, while other 
measures such as firm profitability are unstable and often take negative values, productivity measures 
remain stable regardless of fluctuations in the market, variations of exchange rate, and accounting 
standards (Buckley, 1996). 
In estimating TFP we estimate a ‘residual’. This residual (with nominator the firm’s output (firm 
sales) and denominator the firm’s inputs (labour and capital) reflects increases in firm output that 
cannot be explained by firm inputs (Kafouros et al., 2018). The estimation of TFP (is given in 
Equation 1 in Chapter 4) and as explained, it reflects the intermediate capacity of inputs into outputs 
which reflects the firm’ proficiency in generating value from specific input.  Since economic 
relationships are rarely linear and two ease the interpretation of our results, we followed standard 
methodology and transform the TFP measure in its logarithmic form (Van Beveren, 2012; Qingwang 




Firms’ Exploitative and Exploratory R&D  
Consistent with prior research (D’Este et al., 2017; March, 1991; Jansen et al., 2006; He and Wong, 
2004; Piao and Zajac, 2016) and the survey’s definitions (PITEC), exploration consists of the creative 
basic & applied research conducted by firms in order to develop new knowledge that aims at creating 
something new to business and market. By contrast, exploitation consists of the systematic 
technological development that relies upon the firm’s existing knowledge that has been accumulated 










products and processes. As explained in detail in Chapter 4, firms in the survey report the distribution 
of their current R&D expenditure by type of research. Accordingly, we measure exploration using 
the log of each firm’s annual investment in exploratory/experimental research activities (once again, 
we divide it by the number of employees to normalize for firm size). Similarly, we measure 
exploitation using the log of each firm’s annual investment in exploitative activities (normalized for 
firm size).  
 
Firms’ Specialization in Exploratory, Exploitative R&D and Ambidexterity  
Following previous studies (He and Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009) we use the absolute (percentage) 
difference between firms’ expenditure on exploratory and exploitative activities. Building on the 
definition that specialization is a strategy by which firms limit the scope of their activities, we classify 
a firm as specialized in one activity when it spends over 66.6% of its internal R&D budget on either 
exploration or exploitation. This means that a firm’s investment in one of the two activities is at least 
two times higher than its investment in the other activity. In operationalising the specialization in 
exploratory and exploitative R&D variables we used two different approaches. First, we use is a year-
specific measure of specialization that reflects what the firms does in a given year. This variable is 
time-variant because a firm could specialize in exploratory R&D in one year but not in the next year. 
Second, we estimate the average percentage of each firm’s budget spent on exploratory and 
exploitative R&D throughout the sampled years. This classification ensures that a firm remains 
specialized in one activity over a long period of time (rather than for just 2-3 years). We accordingly 
create two variables, one for specialization in exploration and one for specialization in exploitation, 
that take the value of 1 when a firm specializes in one of the two activities (and 0 otherwise). Further, 
when the percentage of the firm’s budget is thus between 33.3% and 66.6%, these firms were 
categorized as firms with ambidextrous investments (i.e., ambidextrous firms).  
 
Speed of Change 
We first classified each firm as either specialized in exploitation or specialized in exploration or 
operates in an ambidextrous mode. Change in each specialization strategy occurs when in a given 
year a firm switches its specialization strategy from one mode to another. For instance, a firm that 
specializes in exploitation may change its strategy and become specialized in exploration. Consistent 
with prior studies (Hashai et al. 2015; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002; Laamanen and Keil, 2008) we 
operationalize the speed of change between the different specialization strategies as the average 
number that a firm change within a given timeframe (in our case, the overall number of years that the 










within an 8-year period, its average speed of change will be 0.25 per year (i.e. a complete change will 
occur on average every four years). Similarly, when a firm changes its specialization strategy four 
times within an 8-year period, its average speed of change will be 0.50 per year (i.e. a complete 
change will occur on average every two years). In the former case, the speed of the change in the 
firm’s strategy will be lower compared to that of the latter case. Our operationalization of speed 
therefore considers the temporal distance or gap between changes (Homburg and Bucerius, 2005).  
 
Extreme Changes  
To capture those firms that decided to change completely their specialization strategy, we created a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for those firms that changed their specialization strategy 
from exploratory to exploitative R&D and vice versa, and 0 when firms change to an ambidextrous 
strategy to indicate moderate change in their strategy as opposed to extreme change.  
 
Size of R&D Department 
To operationalize the size of a firm’s R&D department, we consider the number of internal R&D 
staff. Our dataset provides us with a direct measure of this variable. We then transformed it into its 
log to reduce the skewness of the size distribution. 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
We further control for various firm- and industry-specific factors that may affect firm performance. 
First, we control for each firm’s tangible resources (Auh and Menguc, 2005; Jansen et al., 2006; 
Lubatkin et al., 2006), measured as the log of each firm’s gross investment in tangible resources in 
each year. This may account for the difficulties that resource-constrained firms encounter in different 
industrial environments (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tushman et al., 1985). Second, we control for 
newly created firms using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is newly created 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006). This variable may affect firm performance by influencing a firm’s ability 
to find collaborators, establish itself in an industry and accumulate different types of knowledge.  
Third, we control for each firm’s international sales (dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
firms that sell their products abroad) because a firm’s market expansion is associated with its growth 
(He and Wong, 2004), international competitiveness and access to new market knowledge (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006). Fourth, we control for affiliated firms using a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for firms that are affiliated to groups (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Blindenbach-Driessen 
and Ende, 2014) and may therefore enjoy certain advantages that enhance their performance. Fifth, 










2014), we control for the mechanism that each firm uses to protect its inventions (Vega-Jurado et al., 
2008). These mechanisms include the use of four protection mechanisms (patents, utility models, 
trademarks and copyrights. This variable therefore ranges from 0 to 4, depending on how many of 
these mechanisms each firm employs.   
However, firm performance can also be affected by industry-specific attributes. We control for 
industry’s intensity of competition operationalized using the number of 2-digit intra-industry 
competitors (Jansen et al., 2006) because in highly competitive industries firms are forced to improve 
operational efficiency (Matusik and Hill, 1998) and avoid risk-taking behavior (Miller and Friesen, 
1983; Auh and Menguc, 2005) or experiment with novelties to avoid obsolescence (Uotila et al., 
2009). Because this measure does not capture the market share of firms and whether few firms control 
most of the market, we also estimated Herfindahl Index (the results from the regressions of this 
chapter Herfindahl Index as a measure of competition). As explained in the general method section 
of this thesis, Herfindahl Index (HI) is an appropriate measure of industry concentration (Kafouros 
and Aliyev 2016; Wu et al. 2016). We estimated HI by summing of squared market shares of firms 
in the industry. It is thus calculated as "#$ = 1 − ∑ )*$+,*-. , where sij is the market share of firm i in 
industry j and therefore it takes values between 0 and 1. The higher the value of Herfindahl Index the 
lower the concentration level within an industry, reflective thus of low levels of competition. We 
therefore use the inverse value of the Herfindahl Index (i.e. 1- Herfindahl Index) so that a higher 
value indicates high levels of competition.  
We control for time effects by including in the model year dummies (that equals 1 that corresponds 
to specific year) to account for differences in economic trends over years (Belderbos et al., 2010). In 
models that are not nested in industries (i.e. when they are not multi-level), we also include industry 
dummies in our model to account for the different industry characteristics and variations in their 
nature, both technological and economic. Further, we include in the model a binary variable that 
represents those firms that operate in high-technological industries. As explained in the method 
section of this thesis, in constructing this variable we use the OECD classification (given in COTEC 
Report 1997 cited in Bayona Sáez and Arribas, 2002).  High-tech industries refer to sectors such as 
chemicals, pharmaceutical, computing, electronics, electrical, communication, and medical devices 
and optical instruments. By contrast, medium and low-tech industries include sectors such as textiles, 
furniture, leather, rubber and plastic (taking the value of 1 when firms operate in high tech industries 
and 0 otherwise). We also control for the industry’s R&D intensity using the industry’s total R&D 
expenditure divided by total industry sales (Uotila et al., 2009) because in environments with high 
levels of R&D spending, there are abundancy of technological opportunities than in environments 










(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). Finally, when using GLS as an alternative estimator, we included 
industry dummies in our model to control for technological and economic variations. 
 
ESTIMATION METHOD (Since the estimation method remains the same across the three 
empirical chapters of this thesis, we have reproduced below a cut-down version for the convenience 
of examiners. Please refer to the method section of Chapter 4 for greater details and reasoning on the 
choice of the estimation method) 
As explained in Chapter 4, given that our sampled firms are clustered within industries, a Multilevel 
Mixed Model approach was better suited for estimating TFP (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002; Preacher et 
al., 2006; Anderson, 2014; Pindado et al., 2012). As explained the choice of Multilevel Mixed 
estimator was driven by two factors: First, in contrast to traditional panel data estimators, multilevel 
analysis with mixed effects considers both FE and RE effects. Second, the model is specified at 
different levels, meaning that it produces coefficients that are nested in each industry and firm. Third, 
by nesting the effects within each firm the analysis has the additional benefit of producing an 
estimator that is very close to FE since it estimates the effects separately for each firm and industry 
separately (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell and Bond, 2000). Although as we explained, we 
experimented with other estimators such as FE and RE, the fact that we expected the effects of 
specialization strategies and exploration/exploitation investment to vary a lot depending on the 
industry made these estimators less appropriate to reveal variability at both industry and firm level. 
Thus, our chosen estimator allows us to explicitly specify the estimation with complicated clustering 
patterns near models while relies on the assumption of independence of error terms, which may be 
violated when firms are clustered in various industries (Hox et al., 2017; Anderson, 2014; Preacher 
et al., 2006). As a robustness check, we also used alternative estimators to establish consistency across 
our results, including the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator which is appropriate when using 
longitudinal data (Wooldridge, 2000; Blundell and Bond, 2000). 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, we followed established practice and specified our model (refer 
to equation 2) (Temouri et al., 2008). We also transform the variables in their logarithmic form to 
ease the interpretation of our findings (Qingwang and Junxue, 2005; Van Beveren, 2012). However, 
in equation 2 for testing the hypotheses of Chapter 7, we also added the variables of speed of change, 
extreme changes, size of innovation department, industry R&D intensity and their interactions with 














Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the key variables while Table 2 reports 
the regression results using the Multilevel Mixed Effect Model. We also examined the possibility of 
multicollinearity in our chosen variables. The maximum VIF value obtained in any of the models was 
significantly below the cut-off point of 2 (O’Brien, 2007; Lin et al., 2012). The highest VIF value we 
obtained from the analysis was 1.55 with average 1.19. Hence, the possibility of getting biased 
coefficients because of multicollinearity in the chosen variables is low.  
To estimate the results, we use Multilevel Mixed Effects Model and specify the model to produce 
results that are nested both in each industry and firm (Bliese et al., 2002). As explained, unlike 
traditional panel data our chosen estimator has the additional benefit of producing coefficients that 
are close to FE estimator and produces coefficients for each firm and industry separately (Pindado et 
al., 2012). Model 1 is a baseline model for firm performance (measured as TFP). Model 2 tests the 
direct effect of speed of change, whereas Model 3 presents the direct effect of extreme changes on 
firm performance. Model 4 includes simultaneously both these direct effects. Model 5 presents the 
results of the interaction between speed of change and size of the firm’s Innovation Department. 
Model 6 tests the interaction between speed of change and industry’s R&D intensity (technological 
dynamism). In model 7, we test both the direct and interaction effects of all the specified hypotheses 
on firm performance. 
Models 2 and 3 test the hypothesized effects of H1 and H2. They test and provide support of the idea 
that the speed of change between specialization strategies and the extreme changes from specializing 
in exploratory R&D strategy to a specialized in exploitative R&D strategy (and vice versa) affect 
negatively firm performance. The results are consistent when both direct effects are tested 
simultaneously (but the coefficient of extreme changes loses slightly its statistical significance from 
5% to 10% level). The results suggest that high speed and thus frequent changes between 
specialization strategies affect adversely a firm’s revenue. As explained in the theoretical background 
of Chapter 7, when firms cycle quickly between specialization strategies, their experience 
(experiential learning) is compressed in time and thus less likely to be translated into beneficial 
learning that will help them to establish effective organizational routines to enhance their performance 
(Hashai et al., 2015; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Dierickx and Cool, 1989)  
Model 5 tests the first interaction (Speed of Change X size of innovation Department) and the results 
confirm Hypothesis 3. They indicate that the negative effects of speed of change become augmented 
as the size of innovation department becomes larger. This result supports the view that inertial forces, 










(Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Baker and Cullen, 1993) that prevent them from switching between 
exploratory and exploitative R&D. Model 6 supports Hypothesis 4, suggesting that although (on 
average) high speed among specialization strategies harms a firm’s performance, its negative effects 
turn into positive in R&D intensive industries because technological opportunities are abundant in 
those environments and firms are likely to find it easier to switch amongst specialization strategies. 
Model 7 (which is the full models provides support for the above results.   
Overall, the results suggest that firms that change specialization strategies very quickly, they are 
negatively affected in terms of performance. The negative effects of speed of change are more 
pronounced when the innovation department increases in size. Interestingly, the effects of speed on 
firm performance are ameliorated by the R&D intensity of the industry, suggesting that although fast 
speed changes between specialization strategies affect negatively firm performance, those effects 










Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Total Factor 
Productivity 1 
           
 
 
Exploratory R&D  -0.074 1 




R&D  -0.065 0.2815 1 
         
 
 
Tangible Assets 0.2074 0.0849 0.0874 1 




Sales  0.2395 -0.023 -0.0301 0.0691 1 
       
 
 
Affiliated Firms 0.3276 -0.009 -0.0001 0.0909 0.11 1 




Competition 0.0552 -0.0209 -0.0592 0.0376 0.15 -0.02 1 
     
 
 
Protection 0.1307 0.0162 0.0034 0.0822 0.17 0.143 0.105 1 




intensity   -0.301 0.2823 0.2049 0.0283 -0.07 -0.1 0.04 0.0244 1 














Department 0.1077 0.2869 0.3401 0.0957 0.04 0.121 -0.06 0.0728 0.0776 -0.003 -0.0003 1 
 
 
Speed  -0.037 -0.028 -0.0368 -0.019 -0.05 -0.08 0.008 -0.081 -0.075 0.006 -0.0465 -0.0589 1 
 
Extreme Changes -0.006 -0.0093 -0.0164 -0.006 -0.01 -0.01 0.006 -0.024 -0.033 -0.01 0.0003 -0.0179 0.25 1 
Mean 0.059 4281 4790 8.160 0.755 0.449 0.924 -3.978 0.068 0.006 0.215 2147288 0.215 0.068 
Std. Dev. 0.937 19806 16427 1.734 0.430 0.497 0.089 3.520 0.192 0.074 0.411 13300000 0.198 0.252 
Min -11.016 0 0 -2.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.908 0.001 0.000 0.000 879 0.000 0.000 










Table 2 Regressions (Multilevel Mixed Model) 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
  Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1: Speed of change     -0.149*** 0.044 0.001    -0.143** 0.045 0.002 
H2: Extreme changes       -0.020* 0.010 0.039 -0.018† 0.010 0.062 
H3: Speed of change X Size of Innovation 
Department.               
H4: Speed of change X Industry R&D 
intensity            
Size of Innovation Department 0.021*** 0.005 0.000 0.021*** 0.005 0.000 0.022*** 0.005 0.000 0.022*** 0.005 0.000 
Exploratory R&D  0.003** 0.001 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Exploitative R&D  0.004* 0.002 0.018 0.004* 0.002 0.016 0.003* 0.002 0.026 0.004* 0.002 0.022 
Tangible Assets -0.005 0.004 0.245 -0.005 0.004 0.247 -0.005 0.004 0.247 -0.005 0.004 0.249 
International Sales  0.033* 0.015 0.030 0.032* 0.015 0.031 0.033* 0.015 0.029 0.033* 0.015 0.030 
Affiliated Firms  0.120*** 0.017 0.000 0.119*** 0.017 0.000 0.121*** 0.017 0.000 0.120*** 0.017 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.268† 0.147 0.068 0.268† 0.147 0.068 0.268† 0.147 0.068 0.268† 0.147 0.069 
Protection 0.003* 0.002 0.027 0.003* 0.002 0.031 0.003* 0.002 0.028 0.003* 0.002 0.031 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.219* 0.101 0.031 -0.218* 0.102 0.032 -0.217* 0.102 0.033 -0.216* 0.102 0.033 
Newly Created Firms  -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.051 0.114 0.658 0.045 0.114 0.690 0.051 0.114 0.656 0.046 0.114 0.687 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.495*** 0.133 0.000 -0.454*** 0.131 0.001 -0.497*** 0.133 0.000 -0.457*** 0.131 0.000 
Industry Variance 0.257 0.065  0.257 0.0646  0.2571 0.0650  0.2566 0.0646  
Firm Variance 0.4879 0.0437  0.4874 0.0437  0.4876 0.0437  0.4872 0.0437  
Residual Variance 0.1266 0.0149  0.1266 0.0149  0.1266 0.0149  0.1266 0.0149  
Wald chi2 (19-22) 234.23 P> 0.000  P> 0.000 231.68 P> 0.000 241.690 P> 0.000 
Number of observations  32527     32527     32527     32527     










Table 2 cont. Regressions (Multilevel 
Mixed Model)  
Model 5   Model 6   Model 7   
  Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1: Speed of change  -0.151*** 0.047 0.001 -0.018† 0.010 0.061 -0.146** 0.048 0.002 
H2: Extreme changes -0.018† 0.010 0.065 -0.137** 0.047 0.003 -0.018† 0.010 0.065 
H3: Speed of change X Size of Innovation 
Department.   
-0.025† 0.015 0.089    -0.029* 0.015 0.040 
H4: Speed of change X Industry R&D 
intensity    
0.479* 0.241 0.047 0.499* 0.242 0.040 
Size of Innovation Department 0.022*** 0.005 0.000 0.021*** 0.005 0.000 0.022*** 0.005 0.000 
Exploratory R&D  0.004** 0.001 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.002 
Exploitative R&D  0.004* 0.002 0.017 0.004* 0.002 0.020 0.004* 0.002 0.015 
Tangible Assets -0.005 0.004 0.251 -0.005 0.004 0.239 -0.005 0.004 0.240 
International Sales  0.033* 0.015 0.030 0.032* 0.015 0.032 0.032* 0.015 0.033 
Affiliated Firms  0.120*** 0.017 0.000 0.120*** 0.017 0.000 0.120*** 0.017 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.266† 0.147 0.069 0.285* 0.146 0.050 0.284* 0.145 0.050 
Protection 0.003* 0.002 0.031 0.003* 0.002 0.037 0.003* 0.002 0.037 
Industry’s R&D intensity   -0.209* 0.104 0.045 -0.376*** 0.108 0.000 -0.374*** 0.108 0.001 
Newly Created Firms  -0.308*** 0.080 0.000 -0.304*** 0.080 0.000 -0.303*** 0.080 0.000 
High Technological Firms 0.046 0.114 0.688 0.046 0.112 0.683 0.046 0.112 0.683 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc.  
Constant -0.462*** 0.131 0.000 -0.461*** 0.128 0.000 -0.466*** 0.128 0.000 
Industry Variance 0.2566 0.0643  0.2462 0.0618  0.2459 0.0613  
Firm Variance 0.4867 0.0437  0.4875 0.0437  0.4869 0.0437  
Residual Variance 0.1266 0.0149  0.1265 0.0149  0.1265 0.0149  
Wald chi2 (19-23) 239.3 P> 0.000 288.960 P> 0.000 287.73 P>  
Number of observations  32527     32527     32527     











ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS  
Results using Alternative Estimators 
As a robustness check, we used alternative estimators. We found that the generalized least squares 
(GLS) estimator was also appropriate when using longitudinal data (Hanse, 1982; 2010; 
Wooldridge, 2001). We considered empirical reasons in choosing Random Effects (RE) versus 
Fixed Effects (FE) estimators. Empirically, the fixed effect model was not appropriate for testing 
our hypotheses because important variables such as the speed of the change is a time-invariant 
variable (based on averages throughout the firm’s years of operation). Additionally, the Fixed 
Effects (FE) estimator was not appropriate for testing the effects of binary variables such as the 
extreme changes variable we used in our empirical model. Table 3 reports the regression results 
using the GLS estimator. Overall, the hypothesised effects are supported and in some cases the 
statistical significance of our results was improved. Specifically, when running the GLS 
regression Hypothesis 2, which states that extreme changes between specialization strategies 
affect negatively the performance of the firms improved its statistically significance from 10% to 
5%. However, Hypothesis 3, which tests the interaction between speed and the size of innovation 
department reduces its significance from 5% to 10% level.   
 
Treatment for Outliers 
We further explored whether the hypothesised effects are supported when removing from the 
dataset the outliers. As in prior empirical chapters of this PhD thesis, we used the standardised 
residuals variable and delete from the dataset those cases that were over 3 and less than -3 standard 
deviations. The final sample were reduced from n=32,527 to n=32,077. Overall, the hypothesised 
effects were consistent both when using the full sample and the sample with the outliers excluded 
which further supports the fact that the coefficients we obtained were not biased to sample 
specifications. 
 
Results for Manufacturing Industries  
We further investigated whether the hypothesised effects hold only for manufacturing firms 
including those firms that operate in service industries (i.e. industry codes 36; 37; 38; 43; 44; 49; 
50; 51; 52; 53; 54; 55). The final sample excluding those firms is estimated at n=25,434. Model 
2 tests Hypothesis 1 which examines the direct effects of speed of change on firm’s performance 
is fully confirmed for manufacturing firms. Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2 which indicates that 
extreme changes between specialization strategies affect negatively firm performance did not 
reach statistically significance for manufacturing firms. When testing both speed and extreme 










Hypothesis 3 which tests the interaction effect of speed and size of innovation department is also 
supported for manufacturing firms. Model 6 tests Hypothesis 4 which explores that the interaction 
effect of speed of change and industry R&D intensity is not supported. In the final model (model 
7) when adding all direct and interaction effects into the model the results were partly supported. 
Precisely, the hypothesised effects were confirmed for both hypotheses 1 and 3 of which the 
former improved its significance from 1% to 0.1%.  Hypotheses 1 and 4 were not supported, yet 












 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 Table 3 – Regression Results using the 
GLS Estimator 
Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E   
H1: Speed of change     -0.145** 0.047 0.002    -0.138** 0.047 0.003 
H2: Extreme changes       -0.021* 0.010 0.029 -0.019* 0.010 0.047 
H3: Speed of change X Size of Innovation 
Department.               
H4: Speed of change X Industry R&D 
intensity             
Size of Innovation Department 0.024*** 0.005 0.000 0.023*** 0.005 0.000 0.024*** 0.005 0.000 0.024*** 0.005 0.000 
Exploratory R&D  0.003* 0.002 0.019 0.003* 0.002 0.014 0.003* 0.002 0.025 0.003* 0.002 0.019 
Exploitative R&D  0.003* 0.002 0.024 0.003* 0.002 0.021 0.003* 0.002 0.035 0.003* 0.002 0.030 
Tangible Assets -0.004 0.003 0.109 -0.004 0.003 0.111 -0.004 0.003 0.110 -0.005 0.003 0.112 
International Sales  0.0363** 0.014 0.008 0.035** 0.014 0.009 0.036** 0.014 0.008 0.036** 0.014 0.009 
Affiliated Firms  0.127*** 0.014 0.000 0.126*** 0.014 0.000 0.128*** 0.014 0.000 0.127*** 0.014 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.286* 0.129 0.027 0.286* 0.129 0.026 0.286* 0.129 0.026 0.286* 0.129 0.026 
Protection 0.003* 0.001 0.019 0.003* 0.001 0.022 0.003* 0.001 0.019 0.003* 0.001 0.022 
Industry’s R&D  -0.211* 0.097 0.029 -0.211* 0.097 0.029 -0.209* 0.097 0.031 -0.209* 0.097 0.031 
Newly Created Firms  -0.309*** 0.092 0.001 -0.309*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 -0.310*** 0.092 0.001 
High Tech. Firms 0.062 0.122 0.611 0.058 0.122 0.634 0.062 0.122 0.611 0.058 0.122 0.633 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.850*** 0.169 0.000 -0.809*** 0.170 0.000 -0.852*** 0.169 0.000 -0.812*** 0.170 0.000 
Wald chi2/F statistic (73-74) 12792.3 P> 0.000 12849.8 P> 0.000 12816.89 P> 0.000 12870.2 P>  
R squared 0.3452   0.346     0.346    0.3462   
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   32527   
 
            











Table 3: cont. Regression Results using the GLS 
Estimator 
Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
  Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P Coef. S.E P 
H1: Speed of change  -0.147** 0.048 0.002 -0.133** 0.048 0.005 -0.142** 0.048 0.003 
H2: Extreme changes -0.019* 0.010 0.050 -0.019* 0.010 0.046 -0.019* 0.010 0.049 
H3: Speed of change X Size of Innovation Department.   -0.027 0.017 0.109    -0.031† 0.017 0.069 
H4: Speed of change X Industry R&D intensity    0.442* 0.194 0.022 0.464* 0.195 0.017 
Size of Innovation Department 0.024*** 0.005 0.000 0.023*** 0.005 0.000 0.024*** 0.005 0.000 
Exploratory R&D  0.003** 0.002 0.017 0.003* 0.002 0.020 0.003* 0.002 0.017 
Exploitative R&D  0.003* 0.002 0.025 0.003* 0.002 0.029 0.003* 0.002 0.023 
Tangible Assets -0.004 0.003 0.113 -0.004 0.003 0.106 -0.004 0.003 0.107 
International Sales  0.036** 0.014 0.009 0.035** 0.014 0.009 0.035** 0.014 0.010 
Affiliated Firms  0.126*** 0.014 0.000 0.127*** 0.014 0.000 0.127*** 0.014 0.000 
Industry Competition 0.284* 0.129 0.027 0.3020* 0.130 0.020 0.300* 0.129 0.020 
Protection 0.003* 0.001 0.022 0.003* 0.001 0.026 0.003* 0.001 0.026 
Industry’s R&D  -0.201* 0.099 0.041 -0.356*** 0.099 0.000 -0.353*** 0.099 0.000 
Newly Created Firms  -0.309*** 0.092 0.001 -0.306*** 0.092 0.001 -0.3056*** 0.092 0.001 
High Tech. Firms 0.057 0.122 0.641 0.060 0.122 0.621 0.059 0.122 0.630 
Time Effects  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Industry Dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Constant -0.815*** 0.170 0.000 -0.817*** 0.171 0.000 -0.819*** 0.171 0.000 
Wald chi2/F statistic (76-77) 12887 P> 0.000 12869.9 P> 0.000 12889.10 P> 0.000 
R squared 0.3467   0.346    0.347    
Number of observations 32527   32527   32527   
Number of firms 5567     5567     5567     
 
       










DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
The exploration and exploitation literature has considered the performance advantages of 
investing in exploration and exploitation (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Wilden et 
al., 2018; Koryak et al., 2018) but has not paid attention to how the speed of changing between 
specialization strategies might affect performance and how the firm’s context might affect the 
relationship between speed and performance. Therefore, the question “what is the performance 
effect of speed of change between specialization strategies, and under what conditions is more 
advantageous to the firm?” has not been addressed.  
This chapter contributes to research on exploration and exploitation (Markides, 2013; Martini et 
al., 2013; Tushman et al., 2010; O'Reilly and Tushman,  2013; Raisch et al., 2009; Chen and 
Katila, 2008) and ambidexterity literature (D’Este et al., 2017; Cassiman and Veugelers,  2006; 
Atuahene-Gima, and Murray, 2007; Levinthal and  March, 1993) by explaining how higher speed 
of changes in a firm’s specialization strategy has a negative effect on its performance. Drawing 
from organizational learning theory (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Cyert and March, 1963). Levinthal 
and March, 1993; Holmqvist, 2004; Tyre and Von Hippel, 1997; Schilling et al.,  2003; Kim and 
Miner, 2007) we contend that higher speed and therefore quick transitions between a firm’s 
exploratory/exploitative R&D compromises its learning and therefore it is less likely to help the 
firm establish efficient organizational routines to enhance its performance (Levitt and March, 
1988; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). The proposed justification relies on 
the fact that shorter experience with a specific strategy cannot easily be translated into beneficial 
learning, putting strain on the firm’s absorptive capacity (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002; Cohen 
and Leventhal, 1990; Hashai et al., 2015; Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014).  
Therefore, although it is often presumed that firms should change rapidly from one specialization 
strategy to the other to avoid knowledge obsolescence and capability rigidity (Teece, 2007; 
Atuahene-Gima, 2005), we found that fast alterations in strategies impact negatively firm 
performance (Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). This finding 
contributes to the exploration and exploitation literature by showing at which speed firms need to 
change their investment decisions in order to create a source of competitive advantage (Uotila et 
al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2006). In doing so, the chapter offers an explanation that accounts for 
variations in firm performance when firms decide to change their specialization strategies at 
different speeds and in different contexts. The findings suggest that firms experience different 
performance outcomes not only because they change between specializing in 
exploratory/exploitative R&D at different speeds but also because they have different 
characteristics (size of innovation department) and operate in different industries (high and low 










effects of speed at which firms change their specialization strategy on firm performance are 
contingent upon different industry environments.  
A key insight that the analysis is that although higher speed affects negatively a firm’s 
performance, these negative effects turn into positive effects when firms operate in R&D-
intensive industries. Because R&D intensive industries are characterized by the need for 
technological progress, faster changes between exploratory/exploitative strategies are more 
beneficial because they enable firms to invest in activities that are becoming more valuable in 
their industry (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Zahra, 1993). The findings contribute to understanding 
the relationship between technological dynamism and a specialization strategy (Uotila et al., 
2009; Gupta et al., 2006; Zahra, 1996). Ignoring that the effects of speed might vary in different 
contexts could be a major shortcoming in understanding that fast-pace changes between 
exploratory/exploitative R&D strategies could increase rather than compromise a firm’s 
performance in technologically dynamic industries that require firms to respond quickly to 
frequent technological changes (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Zahra, 1996).  
Furthermore, we show that the adverse effects of speed are even more negative as the size of the 
firm’s innovation department increases. In larger innovation departments, inertial forces are 
stronger (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997; Parastuty et al., 2015; 
Amburgey et al., 1990) and the levels of bureaucracy and administrative coordination further 
increase (Baker and Cullen, 1993). Consequently, larger innovation departments may find more 
difficult to change their exploratory and exploitative R&D strategies. They may also be less 
effective in implementing changes because they face higher organizational instability than their 
smaller-size counterparts (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Another insight from the empirical 
analysis indicates that extreme changes in the firm’s specialization strategy impact negatively its 
performance. From a learning point of view, although moderate changes in specialization allows 
firms to redeploy their assets and build on existing expertise, enhancing their learning (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1992), extreme changes require entirely different processes, 
routines and expertise from the current focus and trajectory (March, 1991; Wilden et al., 2018) 
and they are more likely to put overload and demands on the firm’s existing knowledge stock and 
basis. These findings contribute to organizational learning theory, emphasizing the importance of 
accumulated experience (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004) by 
explaining why some firms that change exploratory/exploitative R&D strategies faster alleviate 
the negative effects of experiential learning that is compressed in time.  
These results, together with the findings about the role of industry help us understand why two 
firms that change their specialization in exploratory/exploitative R&D at the same speed may 
exhibit different performance outcomes because they operate in different industries and because 
the size of their innovation department differs. The findings about R&D intensive industries also 










(Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002). It appears that in technologically dynamic environments, firms 
are exposed to an abundance of technological opportunities that may make it easier to switch at 
faster speed between exploratory and exploitative R&D (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and 
George, 2002). 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
The findings have a number of practical implications. First, managers should understand that due 
to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), firms that quickly shift from one 
specialization strategy to another compress learning over a shorter time frame which may in turn 
lead to diminishing returns (Hashai et al., 2015). Higher speed also requires an increase in 
managerial capabilities and it is likely to put a strain on a firm’s existing resources (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000; Hashai et al., 2015). Hence, managers should keep in mind that even in cases 
in which ambidexterity is beneficial, a high-speed cycling from one activity to the other might 
actually have adverse consequences for their performance. Managers should control how 
frequently they change their specialization strategies and seek to minimize managerial cost and 
avoid overload that may compromise rent generation. As the management of time is subject to 
managerial control (Ancona et al., 2001), our findings could help managers to use time effectively 
to create a source of competitive advantage (Shi et al., 2012). 
Second, managers should bear in mind that the way in which the speed of changing specialization 
strategies affects their performance depends on the technological dynamism of the industry in 
which their firm competes. R&D intensive industries enable firms that change their specialization 
strategies frequently to enhance their performance. It is therefore advisable for such firms to 
change specialization strategies at a faster pace. This may enable firms in such industries to keep 
up with the industry’s changes and exploit opportunities for technological progress. Conversely, 
for those firms operating in industries that exhibit lower levels of technological dynamism, it is 
advisable to change their specialization strategies less frequently.   
Third, managers should be aware that the negative effect of speed on a firm’s performance 
accentuates for those firms with larger innovation departments than for those with smaller 
innovation departments. The key managerial implication of this finding is that firms with larger 
innovation departments should limit their speed as it has a particularly negative effect on 
performance mainly because size could increase organizational instability and could affect 
organizational operations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Baker and Cullen, 1993).  
Managers need to be cautious that some loss of their firm’s operational flexibility will occur 
throughout the transition to a new specialization strategy because a large number of personnel 
need to change the scope of their operations when shifting from one specialization strategy to the 
other. Furthermore, as the size of the innovation department increases, greater managerial control, 










1993; Lubatkin et al., 2006). In such situations, managers will have to spend considerable time 
on reorganizing core aspects of their firm’s structure, coordinating their employees’ actions and 
maintaining control by formalizing their operations (Child, 1972), taking managers’ attention 
away from rent generation.  
Forth, managers should understand that firms that make extreme changes in their specialization 
strategies (i.e. shift their exploratory specialization strategy to an exploitative one or vice versa) 
may decrease their performance to a greater extent than those firms that make moderate changes 
(i.e., from being specialized in exploration/exploitation to being ambidextrous and vice versa). 
Managers should be aware that when they invest in activities that involve a substantial departure 
from their firm’s current activities and organizational routines, they need to direct more time, 
resources and skills towards a reconfiguration of the business and this may cause significant 
disruption (Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). For example, concerns may 
arise on how effectively to organize an efficient routine for the new specialization strategy which 
may be exacerbated by the fact that the firm is likely to have limited experience with it and the 
existed personnel restricted re-deployability in the new business. Thus, by identifying how 
quickly firms should switch between specialization strategies and understanding what type of 
changes (extreme vs moderate) they should pursue, managers can minimize disruption that could 
inhibit their ability to generate revenues. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
Our results are subject to a number of limitations, some of which may provide promising avenues 
for future research. First, although we used a large sample of firms that compete in different 
industry contexts, all those firms located in Spain. Therefore, our results are more applicable to 
Spanish firms and to firms that exhibit similar characteristics to Spanish firm. To examine 
whether our theoretical predictions and empirical findings hold for other countries, future studies 
should consider conducting a similar analysis for different countries or adopt a multi-country 
research design.  
Second, we tested our theoretical predictions, arguing that faster speed of change between 
specialization strategies affects negatively firm performance (as measured by a firm’s ability to 
generate sales). Future research can extend our theoretical predictions by considering how speed 
affects firms’ ability to innovate. As sales and innovation are determined by different factors, the 
results might be different. For instance, it might well be the case that although speed has a negative 
effect on firm sales, it may be beneficial for innovation because it enables firms to discover and 
absorb new technologies quickly. Such differences might be more profound in technologically 
dynamic industries in which the risk of knowledge obsolescence is higher (Sorensen and Stuart, 
2000; Uotila et al., 2009) and firms should innovate quickly to deal with short product life cycles.  










influence the effects of the speed of change on firm performance. For instance, we have shown 
that the effects of speed are more negative for those firms with larger innovation departments. 
Conversely, we found that the effects of speed are positively moderated by the level of 
technological dynamism in an industry. Although this examination has shown that the effects of 
speed may vary, a valuable avenue for future research would be to consider other factors and 
contingencies, either firm-specific or environment-specific, that might affect the role of speed. 
For instance, from the point of view of firm-specific characteristics, future studies may consider 
characteristics, such as the age of the firm, could interact with speed to affect firm performance. 
Fast pace changes can be disruptive to a firm’s established routines (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
1987). Hence, although older firms survive long enough and rebuild new routines (Amburgey, 
1993), speed might affect the performance of older organizations to a greater extent.  
Similarly, from the point of view of environmental contingencies, one of the characteristics of 
Spain is that its R&D intensity is below the average of other European countries (Eurostat 
statistics, 2016). This might affect how fast firms can change from one specialization strategy to 
the other. R&D intensity is a strong indicator of innovative output (Deeds, 2001). Hence, firms 
in countries with greater R&D intensity and shorter product life cycles may need to change faster 
between specialization strategies compared to countries with low R&D intensity and prolonged 
product life cycles. Future research may extend the current study by using countries with different 


























CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
This study sets out to explore the performance effects of knowledge exploitation (often equated 
with efficiency, implementation and refinement) and knowledge exploration (often equated with 
experimentation, new searches and discoveries; Duncan, 1976; March, 1991; Gupta et al., 2006; 
Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dover and Dierk, 2010) in the context of R&D (D’Este, et al., 
2017). Accordingly, the study draws from organizational learning theory (March, 1991; Cyert 
and March, 1963; Argyris and Schön, 1978; Levinthal and March, 1993; Yelle, 1979; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Argyris, 2002; Huber, 1991; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Ingram and Baum, 1997; 
Wang and Ahmed, 2003) and examines the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance and shows how these effects are contingent upon certain firm- and industry-specific 
factors (Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Uotila et al., 2009).  
Prior studies emphasise the importance for firms to be ambidextrous by balancing (i.e., making 
similar investments) both exploratory and exploitative R&D activities (He and Wong, 2004; Cao 
et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Venkatraman, et al., 2006; Auh and Menguc, 2005; Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004; Wilden et al., 2018; Koryak et al., 2018). We suggest that, from the point 
of view of performance, being ambidextrous might not be the most optimal choice in all contexts 
(Bierly and Daly, 2007; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005; 
Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004; Auh and Menguc, 2005; Cao et al, 2009). Accordingly, we 
advance the concept of specialization (Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Romer, 1987; Brusoni et al., 
2001; Calderini and Scelato, 2005) and explore how balance versus specialization in exploratory 
and exploitative R&D affects firm performance under certain contingencies.   
Although prior research has examined the relationship between ambidexterity (or balance) and 
firm performance, research on the relationship between specialization and firm performance is 
limited. For this reason, it remains unclear whether firms should be ambidextrous or specialize in 
either exploratory or exploitative R&D and how their decision might change in different industry 
environments and contexts. We therefore adopt a contingency approach and enhance 
understanding of this phenomenon by examining how firm- and industry-specific factors 
influence the effectiveness of exploratory R&D and exploitative R&D on firm performance. We 
argue that balance and specialization are two distinct strategies that are more beneficial for some 
firms and contexts and less valuable for other firms that operate in different contexts. This study 
thus identifies, tests empirically and theorises on the mechanisms that explain the usefulness of 










such firm- and industry-specific idiosyncrasies, this thesis explored three set of research questions 
that were organized in three separate empirical chapters:  
 
In the first empirical chapter of this PhD thesis we examined two important research questions:  
a) Is specialization in either exploratory or exploitative R&D more beneficial than an 
ambidextrous strategy? 
b) How the economic returns of exploratory and exploitative R&D differ for those firms 
that adopt a specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy?  
 
Whereas the first empirical chapter focused on whether firms should be ambidextrous or 
specialize (Wilden et al., 2018), the second empirical chapter examined which specialization 
strategy (exploratory or exploitative R&D; Dranove et al., 1998; Jacobides et al., 2006) and under 
what conditions is more valuable for enhancing firm performance. In the second empirical 
chapter of this PhD thesis we examined: 
a) How the orientation of the industry (i.e., exploratory-oriented, exploitative-oriented 
and hybrid) affect the impact of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm 
performance?  
 
Finally, in the third empirical chapter of this PhD thesis we examined: 
a) How the speed of change between specialization strategies influence the usefulness 
of balance and specialization, and in turn, the effects of exploratory and exploitative 
R&D on firm performance?” 
b) Are there any conditions under which the effects of speed (hypothesized negative) 
could change? 
 
Since the theories, hypotheses, methodology and empirical results have been discussed in detail 
throughout this PhD thesis, the next section briefly summarises the theories we draw upon and 
synthesises the empirical findings.  
 
THEORIES EMPLOYED & EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
For answering the first set of questions, we draw on organizational learning theory (March, 1991; 
Cyert and March, 1963; Argyris and Schön, 1978; Levinthal and March, 1993; Yelle, 1979; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Argyris, 2002; Huber, 1991) arguing in favour of the positive effects 
of a specialized strategy (over an ambidextrous) on firm performance. Our justification is based 
on two important considerations. First, since by definition specialization requires focused 
attention, specialized firms by limiting the scope of their R&D activities, they gradually 










proficiently on those R&D tasks that engage frequently (Romer, 1987; Hanks and Chandler, 1994; 
Brusoni et al., 2001; Holmqvist, 2004). Second, specialized firms build competence in areas of 
already established expertise (Baum et al., 2000). As a result, when specialized firms repeat those 
R&D activities that require similar knowledge base to their current knowledge trajectory and 
predisposition, they often eliminate errors in subsequent executions (Cohen, and Levinthal, 1990; 
Lane et al., 2006). We therefore argue that specialized firms build on what their existing 
knowledge base without the need to look for unfamiliar knowledge or cross organizational or 
technological boundaries (Romer, 1987; Hanks and Chandler, 1994; Brusoni et al., 2001). They 
can fully exploit their current expertise replicating prior successful ideas.  
By contrast, ambidextrous firms are running the risk of being mediocre at both exploratory and 
exploitative R&D given the differential knowledge base and structures they require (Lubatkin et 
al., 2006, March, 1991; Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014). The performance-enhancing 
effects of specialization (either in exploratory/exploitative R&D) derive from firms’ ability to 
learn to use and reuse their existing knowledge stock (exploratory or exploitative). This in turn, 
strengthens their capacity to perfect the execution of those R&D activities that repeat frequently, 
achieving thus greater efficiency, productivity and expertise (Baum et al., 2000; Ebben and 
Johnson, 2005).  
Building on this reasoning, in the first empirical chapter of the thesis, we examine a set of 
hypotheses about the relationship between specialization in exploratory/exploitative R&D and 
firm performance. The empirical analysis of 32,537 observations largely supports our theoretical 
predictions. Precisely the results show that exploratory R&D investments have a stronger positive 
effect on the performance of those firms that specialize in exploratory R&D, whereas exploitative 
R&D investments have a stronger positive effect on the performance of those firms that specialize 
in exploitative R&D. Conversely, the opposite pattern emerges with the corresponding effect of 
exploratory R&D on firm performance being weaker when a firm specializes in exploitative 
R&D.  
For answering the second set of questions nested in the orientation of industry typology, we rely 
on organizational learning theory that has been most widely used in the exploration and 
exploitation literature (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1991; Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 
1991; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Wang and Ahmed, 2003; Levinthal and March, 1993) but we also 
employ industrial organization economics (Bain, 1968; Mason, 1939; Schumpeter, 2017; Porter 
1979; 1990; 2000). We build on the notion that firms can adopt a specialization strategy, and yet 
achieve ambidexterity complementing their activities and accentuating the value of their expertise 
and knowledge using the industry (Gupta et al., 2006; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; Chesbrough, 
2006). Without contradicting the notion of ambidexterity, we extend it from the context of firm 










Specifically, we contend that the returns to specialization depend upon the orientation of the 
industry where firm competes. To this end, we develop a typology of industry orientation (Bain, 
1968; Porter, 2000; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Dranove et al., 1998; Jacobides et al., 2006) that 
captures regularities and variations in the concentration of exploratory/exploitative R&D 
activities.  
This typology clarifies which specialization strategy and how the returns to a specialization 
strategy differ for those firms that operate in exploratory-oriented, exploitative-oriented and 
hybrid industries. We argue that differently-oriented industries account for performance 
differentials across firms because they affect differently the opportunities that specialized firms 
have in complementing their activities using the industry. We suggest three mechanisms that 
could change the industry dynamics between specialized firms and industries and thus the returns 
to a specialization strategy a) the availability of collaborative and knowledge-sourcing 
opportunities that firms are exposed in differently oriented industries b) the transaction costs of 
accessing opportunities and expertise from the industry and c) the knowledge similarity between 
firm’s explorative/exploitative activities and that of the industry’s (Cassiman. and Veugelers, 
2006; Buckley, and Ghauri, 2015; Williamson, 1981; Geyskens et al., 2006; Sears and Hoetker, 
2014).  
The empirical analysis of 32,537 observations mainly supports our theoretical predictions. It 
shows that the effects of specializing in exploitative R&D are negative for firm performance when 
firms compete in an equally exploitative-oriented industry. Equally, the effects of specializing in 
exploitative R&D are positive for firm performance when firms compete in a hybrid or in an 
exploratory-orientated industry. Our findings suggest that the returns to a specialization strategy 
become stronger and positive when firms operate in industries that are differently-oriented to the 
firms’ current investment strategy and learning predisposition. The main justification is that a 
firm’s offerings and activities (exploratory or exploitative) are more valuable when they 
complement rather than substitute industry’s activities (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006; Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Vassolo et al., 2004; Buckley and Casson, 1976).   
For answering the third set of questions, we draw again on organizational learning theory and 
particularly the notion of time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and studies 
on temporal dimensions (Hashai et al., 2015; Klarner and Raisch,  2013; Casillas and Moreno-
Menéndez, 2014) to argue that firms that quickly alternate between specialization strategies are 
less likely to apply their learning experience into establishing efficient organizational routines 
because their experiential learning is compacted over a short timeframe (Levinthal and March, 
1993; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Therefore, firms that change their specialization strategies 











The analysis of 32,537 multi-industry Spanish firms shows that fast-speed changes in 
specialization strategies are negatively associated with firm performance. Our theoretical 
justification lies on the fact that firms find it difficult to change and put in application the different 
elements of knowledge that specialized strategies require due to time-compression diseconomies 
and limitations in their absorptive capacity (Hashai et al., 2015; Zahra and George, 2002; Chen 
and Katila, 2008; Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014; Casillas, and Moreno-Menéndez, 2014). 
Interestingly, the negative effects of speed of change could be ameliorated (moderated positively) 
when firms compete in R&D intensive industries. Our justification is based on the nature of 
dynamic industries. The abundance of knowledge in those environments make it easier for firms 
to generate not only new knowledge but also leverage existing knowledge allowing them to cycle 
and switch easier between specialization strategies (Zahra and Das, 1993; Schumpeter, 1950; 
Bierly and Daly, 2007; Uotila et al., 2009; Zahra, 1996).  
 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
The study makes a number of theoretical contributions. It contributes to organization learning 
theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991; 
Levinthal and March, 1993; Baum et al., 2000) and to the ambidexterity (exploration/exploitation) 
literature (Tushman et al., 2010; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013) by identifying how firm 
idiosyncrasies and industry dynamics affect the returns to exploratory and exploitative R&D. 
Specifically, it adds to the ambidexterity debate and its effect on firm performance (Birkinshaw 
and Gupta, 2013; Wang and Rafiq, 2014) by specifying the boundary conditions of ambidexterity, 
theorizing and empirically testing the idea that specialization (rather than ambidexterity) might 
be a more advantageous investment strategy for enhancing firm performance when certain 
conditions are met.  
Our analysis also adds to organizational learning theory by identifying that the effectiveness of a 
learning mechanism (exploratory and exploitative R&D) in enhancing firm performance 
accentuates when a firm chooses to invest in activities with similar knowledge to that of the firm’s 
specialization strategy. We advance scholarly knowledge on exploration and exploitation a) by 
explaining how and why the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance 
differ for firms that adopt a specialization versus an ambidextrous strategy and b) by specifying 
the mechanisms that explain why some firms (on average) may be better off to specialize in either 
exploratory or exploitative R&D rather than being ambidextrous, emphasising the importance of 
experiential learning and competence building when engaging with either exploratory or 
exploitative R&D activities (Baum et al., 2000; Holmqvist, 2004; Brusoni et al., 2001; Levitt and 
March, 1988; 1965; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Hedberg, 1981; Chiva, and Alegre, 2010). More 










ambidexterity literature in the following ways: 
First, although extant research on knowledge exploration and exploitation justifies the reasons for 
firms to be ambidextrous for enhancing their performance (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 
2005; Koryak et al., 2018; Lubatkin et al., 2006), it has overlooked the boundary conditions of 
ambidexterity and whether firm specialization (rather than ambidexterity) might be a better 
investment option for some firms and in specific contexts. To our knowledge, the 
exploration/exploitation literature has not explicitly made any direct comparison between 
ambidextrous and specialization strategies. For this reason, there is ambiguity about the effects 
of ambidexterity versus specialization strategies and the conditions under which their 
effectiveness on firm performance augments or weakens. The literature has also made the implicit 
assumption that the returns to exploratory and exploitative activities are similar for both 
ambidextrous and specialized firms (Markides, 2013). However, the returns to specialization 
strategies may depend upon the choice of firms to invest further in either exploratory or 
exploitative R&D.  
Second, we contribute to organisational learning theory (March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 
1993; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Morgan and Berthon, 2008; Argyris, 1976; Chiva et al., 2010) 
by clarifying the importance of different learning mechanisms (exploration or exploitation) and 
in what contexts they matter the most for enhancing firm performance. Specifically, 
organisational learning theory explains the importance of different types of learning mechanisms 
(i.e., single versus double-loop learning, adaptive versus generative learning), their objectives 
(efficiency versus discovery), their knowledge requirements (new versus existing knowledge 
stock), and their possible performance outcomes (short-term versus long-term gains). However, 
it does not explain the conditions under which the value of such learning mechanisms accentuates 
or diminishes. In the context of exploratory and exploitative R&D, our results show that that there 
is a performance-enhancing effect when there is knowledge similarity between existing R&D 
investments and a firm’s existing knowledge base, whereas there is a performance-weakening 
effect when there is knowledge dissimilarity between current R&D investments and a firm’s 
knowledge stock (Choi and McNamara, 2018).  
Third, our study contributes to the ambidexterity-firm performance debate (Duncan 1976; Benner 
and Tushman, 2003; He and Wong, 2004; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 2006; Morgan and 
Berthon, 2008) and extends the ambidexterity discussion by shedding light on moderators. With 
only few exceptions (Aug and Mengue, 2005; Jansen et al., 2006; Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Luger et al., 2018), prior research has overlooked the role that external industries play in affecting 
the returns to exploratory and exploitative activities. We address this gap in our knowledge by 
theorizing how the effects of specializing in exploratory/exploitative R&D are contingent upon 
the orientation of the industry in which the firm competes. We advance thinking on ambidexterity 










the returns to specialization strategies. Our theoretical reasoning suggests that certain dynamics 
in exploratory, exploitative and hybrid industries shape differently the availability of certain 
collaborations, determine the transaction costs of accessing those collaborative opportunities and 
the value of these opportunities that is mainly affected by knowledge similarity between the 
explorative or exploitative activities and those offered by other firms in those industries. 
Another important contribution of the study is the typology of industry orientation, which explains 
why two firms that adopt the same specialization strategy exhibit different performance outcomes. 
Studies on industrial organisation economics often presume (and thus operationalize) competition 
with the number of intra-industry firms (Porter, 2000; McGahan, 1999). Thus, the established 
assumption is that the higher the number of intra-industry firms, the greater the intensity of 
competition. Our typology challenges the way we think about and operationalize competition. 
The analysis shows that what matters in an industry is the nature of R&D activities the majority 
of firms engage rather than the number of firms operating in those industries. In doing so, this 
study explains why is it that some specialized firms perform poorly when they operate in 
industries with a similar orientation to that of the firm’s own specialization strategy, whereas 
others enhance their performance in industries that complement the firm’s own specialization 
strategy. The opportunities to engage in collaborative agreements, knowledge sourcing and 
accessing expertise differ across differently-oriented industries, affecting the returns to 
exploratory and exploitative R&D activities.  
We advance theoretical understanding of this issue by showing that depending on the orientation 
of an industry, some industries may present greater opportunities for complementing the activities 
of specialized firms. Our approach is distinct from prior studies (Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Gupta et al., 2006; Jansen et al., 2006) because it considers the interrelatedness between the focal 
firm’s specialization strategy and the specialization strategies that the majority of firms engage in 
an industry. This explains why although some firms maintain a specialization strategy, yet 
industry dynamics enable them to achieve ambidexterity at the industry level (Gupta et al., 2006).  
Although our positioning does not necessarily contradict the ambidexterity logic, it adds to this 
notion by linking together the context of a single firm to the context of the industry.  
The literature has also considered that ambidexterity could be achieved: a) either by 
simultaneously having firm subunits that explore and others that exploit (Benner and Tushman, 
2003; He and Wong, 2004; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996) b) or by temporarily shifting from one 
activity to the other (Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006). Yet, it paid no attention to how the 
speed of change between the two specialization strategies might influence firm performance and 
whether the firm’s industrial context might affect the relationship between speed and 
performance. Thus, the question “what the effect of speed of change between specialization 
strategies is (exploratory/exploitative and hybrid) and under what conditions is more 










comprehensive view of the factors that account for variations in firm performance when firms 
decide to change their specialization strategies at different speeds and in different contexts. 
Precisely, we explain why is it that two firms may shift between specialization strategies yet 
experience different performance outcomes because they have chosen to do it at different speeds 
and in different technologically dynamic industries.  
Our findings add to the ambidexterity literature by showing at which speed firms need to change 
their investment decisions in order to create a source of competitive advantage (Uotila et al., 2009; 
Gupta et al., 2006). Our findings could help firms to minimize the cost of disruption associated 
with either quick changes (of a shorter time-length) or extreme changes (i.e., from being 
specialized in exploratory R&D to being specialized in exploitative R&D and vice versa) that 
may inhibit their ability to generate revenue.  
Finally, our findings show that quick changes in specialization strategy enhances performance 
when the industry where the firm operates is technologically dynamic (R&D intense). The 
findings contribute to understanding the interaction between industry technological dynamism 
and a specialization strategy (Uotila et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2006). Ignoring that the effects of 
speed might vary in different contexts could be a major shortcoming in understanding that fast-
pace changes between exploration/exploitation strategies could increase rather than compromise 
a firm’s performance in technologically dynamic industries. For this reason, firms in such 
industries may have to alternate quickly between specialization strategies in order to adapt to 
frequent technological changes (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Zahra, 1996). 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Since our study explores the effects of exploratory and exploitative R&D on firm performance, 
the findings have practical implications for managers. From a performance point of view, it seems 
that specializing in either exploratory or exploitative R&D may be a better investment option than 
being ambidextrous under certain industry-specific attributes such as the orientation of the 
industry and the R&D intensity of the industry where firms compete, and firm-specific 
characteristics such as the speed at which firms choose to change between specialization strategies 
(Hashai et al., 2015; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Kelly and Amburgey, 
1991).  
This is important because not all firms can be ambidextrous (especially resource-constrained and 
small-size firms (Cao et al., 2009; Ebben and Johnson, 2005)), and because ambidexterity is not 
beneficial in all contexts (Auh and Menguc, 2005). Our findings therefore suggest that firms do 
not necessarily need to balance their exploratory and exploitative R&D as this may result in being 
mediocre at both (Lubatkin et al., 2006, March, 1991; Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014). It 










exploitative) that exhibit knowledge similarity to the firm’s current focus and trajectory, utilising 
thus and build upon their current knowledge pool (Sears and Hoetker, 2014). Firm managers 
should realise that by engaging repetitively in the same R&D (exploratory or exploitative) firms 
are likely to strengthen their capabilities and skills involved with the specific R&D and thus add 
further to their expertise mainly because they will be able to replicate prior successful behaviour, 
decreasing the possibility of doing errors in subsequent tasks. Managers can exploit their existing 
knowledge pool, use already tested and successful ideas and replicate past activities offering the 
industry what they are endowed to do well and getting from the industry what they are less 
competent to do by themselves to enhance their firm performance (Buckley, and Ghauri, 2015; 
Buckley, 2016; Schmiedeberg, 2008). 
Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the equal distribution between exploratory and 
exploitative R&D is not always the most optimal strategy for improving firm performance (Auh 
and Menguc, 2005; Ebben and Johnson, 2005; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman, 2004). They could 
assist managers in reconsidering whether an equal distribution of their R&D activities could fulfil 
their firm objectives. Not only because an equal distribution requires different physical structures, 
but also because they require managerial capacity and knowledge of both exploratory and 
exploitative R&D to manage them successfully (Blindenbach-Driessen and Ende, 2014).   
Our findings also show to managers that the orientation of the industry affects the returns to a 
specialized activity. The results can help managers decide how to distribute their R&D budget to 
enhance the performance of their firm. Importantly, the results could help managers appreciate 
why reducing the scope of their activities and tasks is likely to improve firm performance (Romer, 
1987; Hanks, and Chandler, 1994; Brusoni et al., 2001; Holmqvist, 2004). Since the findings 
indicate that differently-oriented industries affect differently the returns to a specializing activity, 
they could potentially assist managers in distributing their R&D budget towards either 
exploratory or exploitative activities. In doing so, managers have to consider that they are better 
off when they offer their firm’s expertise in industries with orientation different to their own 
specialization because in such industries it is more likely that their activities will complement 
industries’ needs and therefore the marginal value of their offerings will not be easily redundant 
by competitors’ offerings (Rothaermel,  2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Chesbrough, 2006; 
Vassolo et al., 2004; Schmiedeberg, 2008).  
Specifically, managers will be able to understand which investment decision they should pursuit 
depending on the offerings, availability of knowledge, the transaction cost (i.e., internalize some 
activities versus buy them from the market) of the industry where their firm competes (Jacobides 
and Billinger, 2006; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011). Therefore, they will be able to make informed 
decisions that will help firm performance. For instance, our analysis indicates that a specialization 










oriented industry where the majority of firms undertake similar activities to those of the focal 
firm, limiting therefore opportunities for complementing its own activities (Rothaermel, 2001). 
By contrast, when a firm specializes in exploitation and operates in a hybrid or exploratory-
oriented industry, it is likely that there will be more chances for the firm to either collaborate or 
source knowledge to complement its activities.  
Although these findings do not contradict the premise that balance between exploration and 
exploitation is beneficial for enhancing firm performance (He and Wong, 2004; Lubatkin et al., 
2006; Koryak et al. 2018), they suggest that a firm’s specialization strategy can enhance firm 
performance if it complements industry’s needs. Our findings reinforce the idea that firms benefit 
when they invest in activities that are more likely to produce products and services that are 
different to industry’ s offerings mainly because their value is less likely to be redundant (Vassolo 
et al., 2004; Karim and Capron, 2016). Our typology of industry orientation can help firms decide 
whether a specialization strategy as well as which specialization strategy (exploration or 
exploitation) is more advantageous for a given concentration of firms that engage in either similar 
or complementary activities. This can help managers develop an optimal exploration/exploitation 
strategy that enhances performance by ensuring a better fit between the firm and its industry’s 
offerings.  
Further, our analysis indicates that shifting quickly between specialization strategies affects firm 
performance negatively (Hashai et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2012) and such negative effects exacerbate 
a) when the firm decides to make an extreme change shifting for instance from exploration to 
exploitation investments and vice versa. Yet, high-speed changes between specialization 
strategies are beneficial for firms operating in R&D intensive environments. These findings have 
a number of managerial implications.  
Our findings also suggest that managers should avoid shifting very quickly (within one or two 
years) their investment decisions because this way the learning of their firm will be compressed 
within a short time-frame, which in turn, may lead to decreasing returns. As exploration and 
exploitation require different knowledge, operational structures and processes to be successful, 
managers should be cautious that the choice to alternate between investment decisions is likely 
not only to put a strain on a firm’s existing resources, but also on managerial capabilities. As the 
management of time is subject to managerial control (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and 
Tushman, 2001), our findings could help managers to use time effectively to create a source of 
competitive advantage (Shi et al., 2012).  Consequently, managers should control how frequently 
they change their specialization strategies in order to minimize disruption to established 
operational routines, managerial and resource cost in order to avoid overload that is likely to limit 
rent generation especially at initial stages until a task becomes efficient through its repetitive 










Furthermore, the findings show that the negative effects of speed on firm performance turn into 
positive when firms compete in industries with intense R&D expenditure. The results from prior 
research indicate that in technologically dynamic environments, exploration is more beneficial 
for performance since firms are required to constantly generate new knowledge to avoid outdated 
practises and knowledge obsolescence and at the same time exploit knowledge that has 
accumulated in such knowledge abundant environments (Uotila et al., 2009; Banerjee and Siebert, 
2017). Our results implicitly provide support for this contention suggesting that firms in such 
industries have to keep up with its frequent changes and exploit opportunities for technological 
progress at frequent intervals. Hence, findings could assist managers when their firms operate in 
industries with low levels of technological dynamism to change their specialization strategies less 
frequently while those managers with firms operating in industries with high levels of 
technological dynamism to cycle between the two specialization strategies more often.  
Managers should be aware that the size of their R&D department has an effect on the performance 
of their firm when they decide for instance to change quickly their exploration investments to 
exploitation investments and vice versa. Our results suggest that the negative effect of speed on 
a firm’s performance exacerbates for those firms that own larger innovation departments than for 
those with smaller innovation departments. Consistent with prior research which shows that size 
increases organizational instability and changes to large size firms affect its operations (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984; Baker and Cullen, 1993), we suggest that the bigger the size of the innovation 
department the greater the disruption to already established operational routines. Thus, we would 
advise managers with large innovation departments to avoid making fast-paced changes to their 
specialization strategies it is expected that some loss of their firm’s operational flexibility will 
occur throughout the transition to a new specialization strategy because a large number of 
personnel need to change the scope of their operations when shifting from one specialization 
strategy to the other. Furthermore, as the size of the innovation department increases, it requires 
greater managerial control and coordination skills. For instance, managers will have to spend 
considerable time on reorganizing core aspects of their firm’s structure, coordinating their 
employees’ actions and maintaining control by formalizing their operations (Child, 1972). All 
these logistics and practicalities are likely to take managers’ attention from their firm’s rent 
generation.  
Managers should acknowledge that shifting their exploratory specialization strategy to an 
exploitative strategy or vice versa, i.e., make an extreme shift to their investments they may put 
at risk their firm performance to a greater extent compared to making a moderate shift (i.e., from 
being specialized in exploration/exploitation to being ambidextrous and vice versa). Exploration 
and exploitation activities require not only different knowledge base, but also resources, time to 
materialize, and changes in operational structures in order to succeed. Consequently, the workload 










organizational routines deviate from existing practices. If this is the case, then managers may need 
to direct their time and monetary resources. They should also develop their skills to reconfigure 
a business model that is likely to disrupt the firm’s established routines until managers have 
accumulated experiential knowledge on how to run it smoothly (Karim and Mitchell, 2000; Van 
de Ven and Poole, 1995). For instance, limited experience with a specific investment strategy and 
restricted redeployability of the existed personnel in the new business may cause less smoothly 
operational system (Karim et al., 2016). Overall, our findings could help managers not only to 
identify how quickly firms should switch between specialization strategies but also understand 
that extreme changes in their investment may cause disruption that could prevent the firm to 
generate its revenue. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
Our findings exhibit a number of limitations that could potentially trigger some future research. 
First, although we used a multi-industry context to test our hypotheses, the generalizability of our 
results is limited to those firms with similar attributes to that of Spanish firms and context. For 
instance, the R&D expenditure in Spain is below average compared to that of the other European 
countries (Eurostat statistics, 2016). Subsequently, future studies could test our theoretical 
predictions in contexts of different development and innovation infrastructure. For instance, 
future studies could examine whether and how the effects of specialization versus ambidextrous 
strategies affect firm performance in emerging and well-developed countries where institutional 
norms play a crucial role in legitimizing the firm’s activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1984). 
Second, we argue that firms that specialize in exploratory R&D have more opportunities to 
engage in collaborations (formal and informal) with other firms from the same industry in order 
to either exploit their own technologies or utilize the ideas of other firms. As firms often reach 
for knowledge that is beyond their own technological and firm boundaries to produce better 
solutions (Belderbos et al., 2010; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) and achieve complementarities 
in research capabilities (Mindruta, 2013; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), future research can 
explore our predictions in the context of inter-industry collaborations.  
Third, although we examined how the returns from a firm’s specialization strategy are influenced 
by industry orientation, we did not consider how other contextual factors such as the institutional 
development of a country or other industry dynamics, such as the intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection of the industry, could interact with specialization strategies to affect firm performance. 
As the legal framework is less important when firms use complex designs, secrecy, 
complementary assets and tacit knowledge to protect their inventions (Thomä and Bizer, 2013), 
we expect that IPR protection will have a strong effect on the performance of firms that specialize 
in exploitation, rather than exploration. In addition, although strong appropriability regimes 










positive externalities and knowledge leakage (Kafouros and Forsans, 2012). Consequently, we 
would expect that in industries with weak protection, firms that specialize in exploitative R&D 
will have more opportunities to exploit the ideas and technologies developed by their rivals. 
Forth, we found that quick changes between specialization strategies affect negatively firm 
economic performance. Future research could test and develop a conceptual framework that 
considers how speed of change affects firms’ ability to innovate. Since sales and innovation are 
both reflective of a firms’ performance, yet they are affected by different factors, it might be 
possible that the results may vary. Therefore, although high speed might impact firm sales 
negatively mainly because it is disruptive to a firm’s established routines, its effect might be 
positive for innovation. As quick changes allow for expansion in knowledge capacity and prevent 
capability rigidity (Teece, 2007 Atuahene-Gima, 2005), we would expect the effect of speed of 
change on innovation (or innovative thinking and creativity) to be positive. Such differences 
might be more pronounced in technologically dynamic industries which are threatened from 
technology obsolescence (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000; Uotila et al., 2009) and firms are forced to 
constantly innovate to keep up with frequent changes and short product life cycle.  
Fifth, our analysis considered certain firm- and environment-specific contingencies that could 
affect the relationship between specialization strategies and firm performance. Future studies 
could consider other contingencies that might affect this relationship. For instance, from the point 
of view of firm-specific contingencies, future studies may explore how the age of the firm could 
interact with the speed of change between specialization strategies to affect firm performance. 
We would expect that older organizations might be affected the most because their routines are 
highly institutionalised and thus the speed of change will cause major disruptions to their 
operations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Nevertheless, some studies suggest that older firms 
survive long enough to rebuild new routines and discard those that make them less efficient with 
their operations (Amburgey, 1993; 1987). Therefore, the speed of change between specialization 
strategies is likely to be less distractive to their daily operations. 
Finally, from the point of view of environment, future research may extend the current study by 
examining how different industry dynamics might affect the relationship between specialization 
strategies and firm performance. For instance, firms in highly competitive environments are often 
forced to produce new technologies and generate a constant stream of new ideas (Schumpeter, 
1942; 1950; Zahra and Das, 1993). This suggests that the effect of specialization in exploitative 
R&D on firm performance will be negative. Yet, a counter argument suggests that because in 
highly competitive environments, firms often abandon quickly technologies and replace them 
with new ones (creative destruction), the effects of specializing in exploitative R&D on firm 
performance are stronger and more positive than the effects of specializing in exploratory R&D 












Table 1: Operationalization of variables used in this study 
Variables Definitions 
Total factor productivity (TFP) Log (firm sales/Labour+Capital) 
Exploratory R&D Log (internal R&D expenditure to Basic & Applied research/number of 
employees) 
Exploitative R&D Log (internal R&D expenditure to Technological Development/ number of 
employees) 
Industry Competition inverse value of the Herfindahl Index 
Tangible Assets Log (gross investment in tangible resources in the last two years 
Newly Created Firms 
Binary variable that takes 1 if a firm is created in the last 4 years 
International Sales a binary that takes the value of 1 for firms sell their products at international 
markets 
Affiliated Firms Binary that takes the value of 1 for firms that belong to a group (affiliated 
business) 
Protection Log (sum of 4 types of legal mechanisms for protection, i.e., patents, utility 
models, trademarks and copyrights) 
Year Dummies (2003-2012) Each dummy equals 1 if associated with the corresponding year. 
Industry Dummies Dummy that equals 1 for each corresponding industry. 
Firms’ specialization in 
exploratory/exploitative R&D 
Time-variant binary that takes the value of 1 when a firm spends over 66.6% of 
its budget on either exploratory or exploitative R&D). 
Ambidextrous Firms 
Time-variant binary that takes the value of 1 when a firm spends between 
33.33% and 66.66% of its budget on both exploratory and exploitative R&D). 
Exploratory/Exploitative-Oriented 
Industries The median value of 20 is used to split the industries into their orientation. 
Hybrid industries Binary variable that takes the value of 1 for industries that did not fall into an 
oriented category 
Speed of change 
Years of a firm's life in the dataset/number of changes in investment decisions 
Extreme Changes Binary that takes the value of 1 for firms that swift from exploratory R&D to 
exploitative R&D and vice versa 
Size of innovation Department Log (the number of internal R&D staff of the firm) 
Industry R&D Intensity Industry’s total R&D expenditure / total industry sales 
Constant Specialization in Exploratory 
R&D Invest in Exploratory R&D for all the observable years in the dataset 
Constant Specialization in Exploitative 
R&D Invest in Exploitative R&D for all the observable years in the dataset 
Constant Specialization in Ambidexterity Make similar investments on both Exploitative and Exploratory R&D for all 













Table 2: OECD classification contained in the COTEC Report 1997 (source: Bayona Sáez and Arribas (2002).   
  
 
          
 
       
High technological intensity 
      
Chemicals and pharmaceutical products Office machinery and computer equipment Electrical machinery and material 
 
Electronic components 
      
Radio and TV apparatus and communications Medical, precision and optical instruments  
   
        
Medium technological intensity 
      
Rubber and plastic materials Mechanical machinery and equipment Motor vehicles  
   
        
Marine construction 
      
Aeronautics and space construction Other transport material  
    
        
Low technological intensity 
      
Extraction, cooking plants and petrol refining 
     
Food, drinks and tobacco 
      
Textiles, clothing and footwear 
      
Timber and cork (excluding furniture) 
     
Furniture 
       
Other manufacturing activities 
      
Recycling 
       
Paper, publishing, graphic arts and reproduction Non-metallic mineral products 
   
Ferrous and non-ferrous metal products 
     




















APPENDIX 2  
Descriptive statistics regarding exploratory, exploitative and hybrid industries  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for different industries. As this table shows, not all 
industries are similar in the extent and in the way they choose to invest in exploratory and 
exploitative R&D. Some industries are characterized by a large number of firms that specialize 
in exploitative R&D (i.e., exploitative-oriented industries), whereas others exhibit a preference 
in exploratory R&D (i.e., exploratory-oriented industries). In addition, there are some industries 
namely hybrid industries that are more balanced in this distribution i.e., make similar investments 













Table 1: Additional Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Exploratory-oriented Industries Hybrid Industries Exploitative-oriented Industries 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Exploration / Internal R&D expenditure 7482 63% 29% 13474 49% 31% 16989 35% 28% 
Exploitation / Internal R&D expenditure 7482 37% 29% 13474 51% 31% 16989 65% 28% 
Investment in Exploration  7482      1,333,949.00 €    4,631,013.00 €  13474          290,328.20 €       1,131,020.00 €  16989         416,606.40 €     4,283,753.00 €  
Investment in Exploitation  7482        773,922.30 €    4,240,810.00 €  13474          299,173.70 €       1,013,528.00 €  16989      1,057,136.00 €     8,048,603.00 €  
Number of Inter-industry competitors 7482 285 148 13474 172 128 16989 268 171 
Tangible Resources  7482 2,952,391 € 20,900,000 € 13474 10,100,000 € 93,000,000 € 16989 7,383,461.00 € 84,800,000.00 € 
Purchase knowledge from Companies (% 
of total innovation expenditure) 
7482 26% 40% 13474 24% 40% 16989 26% 42% 
Purchase knowledge from 
Universities/Research Institutes (% of 
total innovation expenditure) 
7482 23% 39% 13474 19% 37% 16989 16% 35% 
Remuneration of R&D staff  7482 30,567.70 € 19,263.15 € 13474 26,316.37 € 59,814.14 € 16989 30,776.08 € 39,645.56 € 
Number of legal mechanisms to protect 
inventions (patents, utility models, 
trademarks and copyrights)  
7482 1 1 13474 1 1 16989 1 1 
Firm Sales per Employee (euro) 7482 230,706 € 309,809 € 13474 293,044 € 617,907 € 16989 200,129.30 € 532,837.20 € 
Sales from innovative products per 
Employee (euro) 
7482 113,589 € 253,724 € 13474 153,885 € 391,663 € 16989 103,266.20 € 345,465.70 € 
Number of registered patents 6711 2 11 12129 1 3 15211 1 11 
Firm R&D Intensity (Firms total 
innovation expenditure/ firm sales)  










Industry R&D Intensity    Industry total 
innovation expenditure/ industry sales)  
7482 22% 38% 13474 2% 8% 16989 4% 4% 
Total Industry Innovation Expenditure  7482 521,000,000.00 € 428,000,000.00 € 13474 120,000,000 € 96,600,000 € 16989       333,000,000  €      290,000,000  €  
Firm Innovation Expenditure  7482 2,953,375.00 € 10,400,000.00 € 13474 959,357 € 2,865,030 € 16989 2,734,435 € 18,400,000 € 
Market share 7482 1% 4% 13474 2% 10% 16989 14% 212% 
International Sales 7482 11,900,000,000 € 8,140,000,000 € 13474    11,700,000,000 €    10,900,000,000 €  16989 12,000,000,000 € 14,400,000,000 € 
Year of Establishment 7013 1981 20 12059 1979 21 15517 1983 20 
Internal R&D    7482 2,107,145 € 7,297,451 € 13474 589,264 € 1,721,307 € 16989 1,473,184 € 10,300,000 € 
External R&D  7482 579,254 € 3,852,254 € 13474 133,351 € 784,000 € 16989 474,161 € 5,844,528 € 
% of firms in High Technology 
Industries  
7482 60% 49% 13474 1% 8% 16989 21% 41% 
% of firms that Operate Internationally 7482 75% 43% 13474 76% 43% 16989 75% 43% 
% of firms that are Affiliated to business 
group 
7482 46% 50% 13474 46% 50% 16989 44% 50% 
Number of Firm Employees 7482 226 1046 13474 340 1241 16989 356 1720 
% of firms that Specialize in Exploration 
firm (over 66.6% time- variant special) 
7482 47% 50% 13474 35% 48% 16989 21% 41% 
% of firms that Specialize in Exploitation 
Firms (over 66.6%)  
7482 21% 41% 13474 37% 48% 16989 51% 50% 
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